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Abstract
2
This thesis criticises the current project of European Monetary Union, based on the 
Maastricht convergence criteria. It attempts to reinterpret the issue of economic convergence by 
looking into structural aspects from a political economic point of view. Taking a structural 
approach, I examine the socio-political sustainability of EMU.
The thesis applies the theoretical framework set forth by the French regulation school. 
Drawing on the regulationists’ notion of ‘regime’, the concept of structural / regime 
compatibility among member states is introduced. The need to study non-monetary regimes in 
assessing the viability of monetary union is stressed by drawing on the historical experiences of 
monetary unions in the 19th century - the Latin Monetary Union, the Scandinavian Monetary 
Union and the American Monetary Union.
Among the non-monetary structural regimes, the examination of national labour market 
regimes is crucial. After the loss of exchange rates as a means of adjustment, labour market 
adjustment becomes the key in coping with asymmetric economic shocks. Labour market 
flexibility is considered to be the main weapon of adjustment in post-EMU Europe. The 
comparison of three main labour market regimes in Europe - France, Germany and Britain - 
shows that they diverge substantially in their adjustment mechanisms and in the nature of their 
flexibility. Following Robert Boyer, I argue that there is fundamental incompatibility in national 
ideologies, concepts and practices of labour market policies in Europe. Without a common 
labour market regime, such differences could lead to major tensions between the Anglo-Saxon 
model of ‘external flexibility’ and the continental European model of ‘internal flexibility’. The 
thesis aims to show where the difficulties lie for the management of the future ‘Euroland’, 
including Britain, in order to indicate the tremendous task facing European policy makers.
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Introduction
The project of European Monetary Union (EMU) set forth by the Delors report (1989) 
was formalised by the Treaty on European Union in Maastricht, 1992. (thereafter, Maastricht 
Treaty). It set out to create economic and monetary union in Europe in January 1999. This 
thesis criticises the Maastricht approach to EMU as flawed by not taking account structural 
factors which affect the sustainability of monetary union.
Article 109(j) of the Treaty, and the protocol on the convergence criteria in particular, 
define specific quantitative targets which member states should meet, in order to qualify for 
EMU. The convergence criteria set quantitative limits for member states' inflation rates, 
budgetary positions, and long-term interest rates. In addition, in order to qualify, a member state 
should not have devalued within the two years prior to the decision to enter EMU. The four 
basic criteria are as follows: first, a rate of inflation close to that of the three best performing 
member states (within 1.5%); second, budget deficits less than 3% of GDP, and national debts 
of less than 60% of GDP;1 third, the observance of normal ERM fluctuation margins for at least 
two years without any devaluation; forth, convergence in long-term interest rate levels to the 
three best performing member states (within 2%). The relevance of these particular indicators 
is heavily contested. Some works representing the argument will be reviewed in Chapter 1. 
Although these studies often propose alternatives to the current convergence criteria, very few 
have put forward a fundamental critique concerning structural aspects.2 I argue that the
^These quantitative criteria along with others which are not mentioned 
in Article 109 (j) are written into separate protocols on the excessive
deficit procedure, and on the convergence criteria. However, these 
quantitative criteria can be altered in accordance with article 104c(6) in 
case of excessive deficits. The rest of the quantitative criteria can be 
replaced by unanimous council decision.
2The most widely known critique of the convergence criteria, in favour 
of focusing on structural features distinguishing national economies, is a
convergence criteria are insufficient for the following two reasons: first and foremost, the criteria 
attempt to assess the plausibility of monetary union only through a small number of superficial 
demand-side macroeconomic variables. Second, except for the devaluation criterion, they only 
focus on static convergence: that is to say, the EU countries' qualification for becoming members 
of monetary union will be assessed by their economic performance at a particular point in time, 
i.e., the economic conditions in 1997. Thus, in an extreme sense, if a country put all its effort 
into getting the figures right, even if it were only for 1997, it would qualify for EMU. Indeed, 
there were some attempts at creative accounting to cope with the budget deficit criteria. France 
and Italy took one-off special measures to boost their fiscal revenues, which were heavily 
criticised by the British: Italy introduced the Euro-tax, and France used the pension fund of 
French Telecom to boost their budgets. Even Germany unsuccessfully planned to use foreign 
exchange profits of the Bundesbank, and successfully used the reclassification of hospital debt 
to cosmetically reduce the budget deficit. Since the decision was made on the basis of reports 
provided by the European Monetary Institute and the European Commission, conventional 
wisdom argued that the extreme scenario described above was highly unlikely. However, the 
convergence criteria did not require a dynamic interpretation in measuring economic 
performance. This is a paramount flaw, as such criteria ought to assess the medium to long-run 
sustainability of future monetary union. In its report of 25 March 1998, the Commission 
assessed the economic performance of member states against the convergence criteria and 
recommended 11 out of 15 member states to adopt the Euro on the 1st of January 19993.
proposal to include unemployment criteria, suggested by Eddie George, the 
governor of the Bank of England.
3In this report, the Commission assessed member states' performances, 
by examining the convergence of inflation rates, budget deficits, public debt, 
long term interest rates, and exchange rate stability. As for the inflation 
rates, all 14 countries except for Greece cleared the criteria, and so they 
did for long term interest rates. A political decision had to be made for the 
other two criteria. For the exchange rate criterion, Italy and Finland posed
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Accordingly, eleven countries converted to the Euro.
The convergence criteria only focus on main demand side measures and deliberately 
avoid proposals for an assessment of supply side conditions in the economy. However, if 
countries are serious about deeper integration of Europe, there has to be at least a broad 
agreement on the kind of European supply side model they want. It is a well-known fact that 
macroeconomic performance depends on an effective supply side4. Jacques Delors, the architect 
of EMU deliberately left the question unanswered in the ill-defined ‘subsidiarity principle’. 
Thus, there is an on-going debate between federalists and anti-federalists regarding the correct 
dimension o f‘European’ influence. Those sympathetic to the Federalist European model would 
push for further harmonization of taxes, labour standards and social policy. The social charter 
may not be sufficient to fill this gap. They argue that what is needed is a European-wide 
coordination of supply side policies, which promotes, is consistent with, and complementary to 
the demand side. Those who subscribe to the ‘Europe of the nation-states’ model argue that 
supply side policy should be controlled by the member states, and for the need to allow divergent 
responses and outcomes to keep monetary union afloat. Indeed, there seems to be an 
unreconcilable difference between these two camps, without any political or ideological
a problem, as they had less than 2 years of continuous ERM membership. The 
Irish punt was revalued by 3% against the other ERM currencies in March 1998. 
Nevertheless, under the political interpretation, all 12 currencies were 
considered not to have experienced severe exchange rate tensions in the two 
years under review. The Greek drachma, the Swedish krona and the British 
sterling did not qualify as these countries did not participate in the ERM 
during the review period. As for budget deficits, 14 member states managed 
to get their figures either below or equal to the 3% of GDP reference value 
in 1997. A political interpretation was also necessary in case of the public 
debt criterion, where most countries had government debt/GDP ratios of 60-80% 
in 1997, and some, notably Belgium, Greece, and Italy had more than 100%. For 
these three countries, however, given the level of surplus on the primary 
balance they had achieved, it was interpreted that they were on the path of 
a continuing and steady reduction of their debt ratios. For more detail, see 
the European Commission (1998).
4 c.f. Begg, Fischer and Dornbusch (1987).
consensus on what kind of Europe the member states want. Such a political rift not only makes 
crucial decision making difficult, but sometimes impossible. The absence of member states' 
ideological harmony, and enthusiasm, as well as a willingness to work together to create a 
common destiny has resulted in numerous incidents of long and fruitless discussions. This has 
promoted the image to the public of European institutions as being inefficient and ineffective. 
The most basic but foremost precondition for creating such a historical proj ect as monetary union 
must be political: there has to be convergence in policy stance among the participating states. 
In a situation where power in a monetary union would be distributed in a highly asymmetrical 
fashion, it would be conceivable that such convergence could be established through the 
hegemonic power of a dominant state. In the European case, where monetary union is 
characterised by a relatively symmetrical distribution of power among the big member states, 
coherence of economic policies requires a high degree of cooperation. It would be easier for 
countries to agree on a common economic policy framework if their social and economic 
structures were similar.
In this thesis, I shall review the current Maastricht road to monetary union by evaluating 
the precondition behind establishing monetary union, and propose an alternative perspective 
focussing on structural factors. I shall argue that successful monetary union without political 
union requires a high level of economic, social and political congruence among member states. 
The Maastricht criteria only set out partial economic guidelines for national economies to 
become sound. Maastricht criteria set out narrow economic benchmarks for national economies 
to converge to, reflecting the prevailing macroeconomic orthodoxy of monetary and fiscal 
soundness. The standardised numerical convergence criteria do not capture qualitative 
differences between economic infrastructures. A much broader concept of convergence has to 
be examined, as monetary union involves a regime shift.
This thesis applies a two staged analysis in its empirical part. Chapters 1 to 3 deal with 
methodological and theoretical questions. The first two empirical chapters, Chapters 4 and 5, 
examine historical experiences of monetary union to see whether domestic structural differences 
matter for the success or failure of monetary union. Three 19th century monetary union projects 
have been chosen as case studies. Except for EMU, the 20th century does not offer an equivalent 
case of large-scale monetary union. Having established that structures mattered for the 
sustainability of the three historical monetary union cases, I move to the second set of my 
empirical chapters, Chapters 6 to 8, for a study of the current EMU case.
Chapters 1 and 2 provide review of literature. By reviewing the literature, Chapter 1 
introduces the central focus of the thesis: it establishes the need for an investigation of structural 
factors, especially labour market structures, to assess the issue of sustainability EMU. By 
reviewing the debate about the pros and cons of the Maastricht convergence criteria, I shall take 
a critical stance towards the criteria and propose an alternative perspective by extending the 
‘economist approach’. Then, the EMS experience as a precursor to EMU is examined to see 
whether monetary cooperation has empowered policy makers to push through domestic structural 
reforms. In my view, the EMS, together with the prospect of EMU, did successfully empower 
policy makers in the ERM member states to adjust some key domestic structures and 
mechanisms of national monetary policy-making. However, in terms of labour markets, there 
are mixed outcomes: as the French and Italian cases show, the efforts of policy makers regarding 
labour market reforms were only partially successful and sometimes resulted in unintended 
outcomes. This indicates that labour market structures, being a unique segment of market 
relations with a strong social dimension, work as serious constraints upon policy makers’ 
intentions and their policy commitments. Hence, it makes sense to study the nature of these 
constraints in determining the task ahead for policy makers to turn EMU into a successful and
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sustainable project in the long run.
Chapter 2 reviews different approaches to the analysis of monetary union by political 
scientists, economic historians and economists, and assesses their advantages and limitations. 
Some mainstream approaches by different disciplines point to the importance of structure, but 
are insufficient for exploring my research question: how different are national labour market 
structures, and how do these differences affect the prospects for sustainability of monetary union. 
For that, a more comprehensive structural analytical framework is necessary. In Chapter 3 ,1 
introduce the French regulation school approach which meets these analytical demands. Unlike 
neo-classical economists, and like Keynesian economists, this school takes the view that money 
is not neutral. The success of monetary union cannot rely on the monetary sphere alone: it 
depends on non-monetary regimes as well. Among them, the labour market regime is crucial, 
as it will have to predominantly bear the adjustment costs. Labour market structures are 
important for the following three reasons: first, the loss of the exchange rate instrument as a 
means of adjustment, second, interest rates are no longer available as a tool of adjustment for 
individual member states due to the ‘one size fits all* monetary policy of the European Central 
Bank, and third, national fiscal policy is constrained by the Growth and Stability Pact. Therefore, 
it is crucial to examine how labour markets adjust among EMU member states for the 
sustainability of EMU. If these states subscribe to totally different modes of labour market 
adjustment, and/or if their labour markets do not adjust fast enough, persistent conflicts over the 
issue of economic management among EMU states will be difficult to avoid. If member states 
cannot agree on a dominant mode of adjustment, close coordination of economic policies, which 
is necessary once EMU takes place, would be difficult. This is hardly a scenario to achieve 
successful and sustainable monetary union.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine historical monetary unions in Europe and America in order to
extract relevant lessons for the current EMU project. Though these monetary unions took place 
within a different international context, the issues confronting them in regard to managing 
monetary union were remarkably similar to the challenges faced by EMU. Indeed, cohesion 
among the member nations was one of the decisive factors for success or failure. Following the 
methodological argument in Chapter 3, Chapters 6 to 8 examine the labour market regimes of 
France, Germany and Britain as potential participants of EMU. This choice of countries may well 
be contested, as Britain, in particular, did not become an initial member of EMU. The three 
countries are chosen for comparison in the empirical study as they represent the ‘top league’ of 
the EU. Together with Italy they are G-7 members, and are more similar to each other in the 
combination of GDP, per capita income, population, and size than to the other EU member states. 
Italy, although in terms of its economic indicators in the same league as Germany, France and 
Britain, was deliberately left out from the empirical study. This is because Italy is not a key 
player in the regime competition about the future shape of Europe’s social and economic make­
up. Italy’s political and social structure has been persistently in flux and unstable, with a 
particularly weak record in its fiscal and labour market regimes. Although Britain is not in EMU 
yet, it is worth considering it in the empirical study because of the following three reasons: first, 
the current administration is committed to the project of EMU and likely to join in 2002. Second, 
having a competitive economy, it is a player in regime competition, and third, it is willing to 
influence the economic management of the Euro-zone even from the outside as a leading player 
in the EU. Thus, the three most active and influential players in the Euro zone have been chosen 
for comparison.
Those who question the participation of Britain in EMU normally do so because of 
diverging business cycles between Britain and the continent. Obviously, such cyclical differences 
are an obstacle to interest rates management by the European Central Bank. When Britain
experiences boom, the continent may be in recession. The interest rate that the European Central 
Bank sets would be a compromise, thus, sub-optimal for both regions. Or, it may be set in favour 
of the core countries, ignoring the needs of the periphery. In such a case, the periphery countries 
may have to pay the cost by uncontrollable boom or bust.5 Rather than pursuing this line of 
argument, my contribution lies in the introduction of structural elements: behind the problems 
of and potential conflicts over satisfactory interest rate management by the European Central 
Bank lie structural and policy differences particularly in labour markets, as the three major 
countries in Europe have distinctly different labour market regimes. Unless policy makers give 
greater consideration to the problem of differences in labour market regimes, these regime 
differences may well become the cause of severe difficulties in managing the Euro.
5For a detailed argument, see De Grauwe (1998).
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Chapter 1
The Maastricht Approach to EMU
This chapter reviews the Maastricht process of EMU by examining the convergence 
criteria in particular. The objective is to clarify the context which leads me to explore my central 
thesis - that domestic structures, in particular, labour market structures, matter for the 
sustainability of EMU, once established. I suggest that the neglect of labour market structures 
in the Maastricht process poses severe risks for the future of the whole EMU project. Structural 
differences can be overcome if there is enough political will and commitment in member states 
to do so. However, the examination of structural differences gives us an indication of the scope 
of possible causes for policy conflict and the parameters within which difficulties in the 
economic management of the EMU zone can be expected to arise.
This chapter first aims to clarify the Maastricht framework of monetary union by 
criticising the convergence criteria. It sets out with a conceptual debate over convergence 
regarding the establishment of monetary union, then argues for the extension of the ‘economist 
framework’ by bringing in the structuralproblematique. Accordingly, the convergence criteria 
are critically assessed by reviewing the literature. Additional factors worth considering, 
including political integration, are also discussed. Second, it examines whether the European 
Monetary System (EMS) as a precedent for EMU prepared the ground for EMU by affecting 
member states’ economies. The external constraint imposed by membership of the EMS 
empowered policy makers to push through domestic structural reforms. Using empirical 
evidence, I study how and to what degree EMS membership contributed to the creation of 
structures needed for a viable EMU. Furthermore, I examine how domestic structures, in 
particular, domestic labour market structures, constrained policy makers’ willingness and ability
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to undertake structural reform. By doing so, I establish the rationale to study structural 
differences in labour markets as a pivotal intervening factor to be considered for the long term 
sustainability of EMU.
1.1. Pros and cons of convergence: the economist vs. the monetarist arguments
In a monetary union, inflationary behaviour among the member states should be similar 
as the common central bank can set only one interest rate, thereby imposing a ‘one size fits all* 
monetary policy. Hence, the nominal convergence of price performance becomes a prerequisite 
for the creation of monetary union. However, the convergence of price performance can only be 
maintained in the presence of underlying economic factors which do not put pressure on prices 
to diverge. Therefore, a certain degree of real convergence, convergence of working conditions, 
living standards, economic institutions and structures, matters for the long-term process of 
deeper European integration and in particular for the viability of EMU. (Anderton et al. 1992,
p.2)
As no single member state participating in EMU in history and at present has been and 
is the clear and undisputed hegemon to dictate terms, economic convergence has become the 
paramount issue for discussion in deciding the entry criterion for monetary integration. 
Economic convergence refers to a dynamic movement towards a common level or goal. 
According to Kaufmann (1987), there are two dimensions to the concept of economic 
convergence: first, a narrowing of international differences in present and expected future policy 
objectives and second, a confluence of economic developments, (p.239)
There are two schools of thought which debate the convergence of economic variables
as a prerequisite of monetary union. These two stances have been named the monetarist1 and the 
economist stance. Originally, this debate was instigated by the first publicly debated EMU 
proposal, the Werner Report (1970)2. The countries with balance of payment deficits and higher 
inflation, France, Belgium and Luxembourg, were ‘the monetarists’. They took the stance that 
monetary union would drive economic developments towards conditions that would be suitable 
for EMU. For them, economic convergence would inevitably and eventually result from 
increased Community measures in the monetary field, and particularly from the irrevocable and 
immediate fixing of exchange rate parities. In addition, they took monetary integration as a 
driving force to economic integration. On the other side, surplus and lower inflation countries, 
Germany and the Netherlands, took the position of ‘the economists’. Taking a cautious stance, 
the economists argued for the necessity of a long period of converging economic performance 
before the creation of monetary union. In particular, they put emphasis on convergence of 
inflation rates, budget deficits, government debt and interest rates, as in the current case of EMU, 
as well as the establishment of a single European market and an EEC fiscal agency to promote 
further fiscal policy coordination.
With the re-emergence of the EMU proposal in the Delors Plan, the debate between the 
monetarists and the economists resumed. The arguments are essentially the same as those a 
decade ago. The monetarist stance, taken by France and other Latin countries, believes that 
monetary union is important for the success of economic integration. These countries believe
xThe term "monetarist" here does not have any relation to the 
monetarist school represented by Friedman in conventional economic theory.
2There were other monetary union proposals in post-war Europe. The 
first EMU concept was developed along with the creation of the European 
Payment Union of 194 9 by the US Agency administering the Marshall Plan. The 
first major in-house EEC proposal for monetary union was advocated by Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe during 1959 and 1961, which was 
later followed up by Action Programme of the Community for the Second Stage 
in 1962. For details, see Dyson (1994).
that economic convergence would come along once monetary union was implemented. The 
monetarists argue that the external constraints brought about by monetary union would force 
member states to harmonize their policies, which would eventually lead to the convergence of 
economic performance. Believing in spill-over effects, the monetarists share the same views as 
neo-functionalists. For example, Marquand (1982) says that "once the toboggan had been given 
an initial push, the governments, parliaments and peoples perched on it would be carried along 
with willy-nilly, by the momentum of the integration process itself." (p. 235) This expectation, 
however, could be too simplistic. If they integrated prematurely without sufficient economic 
foundation or political willingness, those integrated might really ‘toboggan’ all the way down 
to a major economic breakdown.
The economist stance, represented by Germany, argues that a monetary union should 
come only after the completion of the single market and economic integration. The economists 
presuppose that monetary union requires a certain correspondence of domestic economic and 
political conditions. They would have to provide "a conducive background". (Kaufmann, 1985, 
p.56) The prior convergence of policy goals and economic performance is a prerequisite for 
monetary union. The latter position has prevailed in the Maastricht Treaty with the stipulation 
of convergence criteria and central bank independence, but not to the extent that the Bundesbank 
would have wanted.
The economist stance shares my concern about studying economic structures. The 
economist approach asks for an agreement over economic policy goals and their ranking, in 
addition to the agreement that no trade-off exists between inflation and unemployment. It also 
presupposes a similar understanding of how economic policies are transmitted to the various 
domestic sectors and the international economy. Economic policies, however, do not have to be 
the same in response to disturbances. Policies have to match the seriousness and characteristics
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of the internal and external disequilibria and the internal structural differences among countries. 
(Kaufmann 1985, p.60) A comparison of domestic socio-economic structures with respect to 
their institutions helps in understanding the structural differences in different countries, which 
could become an obstacle to managing a successful monetary union.
If there is a strong political necessity and will, however, convergence is not a prerequisite 
as the example of German reunification demonstrated.3 Y et, the German case has been sustained 
with the semi-permanent fiscal transfer from West to East Germany. In Europe where there is 
no incontestable political need nor overwhelming economic logic for a common currency and 
without an effective redistribution mechanism present, some degree of economic as well as 
socio-political convergence may be necessary to keep monetary union viable in the long run. In 
this thesis, I shall extend what the economists call "conducive background" by using the concept 
of regime. I will argue that the establishment of a coherent European-level regime through 
some degree of compatibility of domestic regimes is desirable for a successful European 
Monetary Union.
1.2. "Regime" as an overarching structural framework
As the economist stance requires deeper structural integration of economies as a 
prerequisite for monetary union, using the concept "regime" seems to me appropriate here. 
Regime is a word often used by social scientists, but without firm agreement on its definition. 
Economists use it at its face value in a positivist framework: one may characterise their definition 
of regime as a regular pattern of occurrence, action, or behaviour.
3It should be noted that it was possible because West Germany had a 
considerable current account surplus to finance unification. However, even 
in the German case, the effects and costs of reunification have turned out 
to be far bigger than anticipated.
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Other social scientists look for more normative elements in the definition of regime. A
school of political science defined it as:
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. 
Norms are standards of behaviour defined in terms of rights and obligations. 
Rules are specific prescriptions for actions. Decision-making procedures are 
prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice. (Krasner,
p.2)
Using this conceptual framework, regime theory became fashionable in the early 1980s, and was 
widely applied to analyse issues in political economy. It is a simple static theory which explains 
the continuity of the international system after the decline of the hegemon, by interpreting a 
hegemonic system as a regime.4 Although it was also applied to other areas than issues related 
to American dominance, the theory has been most useful in analysing specific and confined 
economic areas of activity.
Indeed, regime theorists present almost any international issue as a regime. According 
to them, there are a vast number of international regimes such as international regimes of 
"whaling, the conservation of polar bears, the use of electromagnetic spectrum and human 
activities in Antarctica." (Young 1989, p. 13) Whereas regime theorists permit regimes often to 
involve only a narrow constituency, I shall, instead, interpret regimes as overarching structural 
factors which influence the society in a broader sense. I perceive economic regimes as a wide 
social networking of economic arrangements or organisations which influence all members of 
society directly or indirectly. For example, issue areas such as international trade, money, 
production, or environment are regimes. However, those mentioned above by Young are not
4It is presented as an alternative to hegemonic stability theory, in 
order to explain the continuity of stability in the international economic 
system even after its loss of absolute hegemony. For a detailed criticism 
of regime theory, see Strange (1982).
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considered to be regimes in my definition. Regimes do not necessarily need to be international. 
Any domestic structural arrangement, such as how domestic economies are organised and how 
labour and capital interact, can be considered as domestic regimes. In order to study domestic 
labour market structures, one needs a deeper interpretation of the concept of regime. For my 
purpose, therefore, the notion of regime needs more sophistication and a deeper conceptual 
framework.
Here, scholars of the French regulation school can offer a more refined interpretation of 
regime. Since their theoretical framework will be explained in detail in Chapter 3, it will suffice 
to be brief here. As a critical theory, the regulation school is rich in interpreting structural 
interaction among social actors.5 The French concept of regime takes a holistic approach, 
combining the notion of system, regime, and regulation. Most of the works of the regulationists 
are geared towards the analysis of the domestic economic structure - what they call the 'domestic 
regime of accumulation1. The regulationists study almost every topic within the realm of 
political economy—inflation, growth and economic crisis, the role of the state, wage formation, 
and industrial relations, monetary relations and the international division of labour from the angle 
of regulation6 (Noel, p.304) in order to explain stability and cohesion in advanced economies. 
They argue that it is the correspondence of the economic organization with social norms and 
institutional structure which accounts for the legitimacy of specific regimes over a certain time. 
They emphasize the importance of relations between social structure and political economy and 
their complex interplay. This integration of social, political and economic dimensions seems to
5Depending on which branch of social science they belong to, 
regulationists have slightly different versions of defining "regime of 
accumulation and regulation". For details, see Appendix 1 of Boyer (1990).
6The word 'regulation' has wider connotations in the French language 
than in English. It includes the scientific meaning of "study of the role 
of a set of negative and positive feed-back loops in relation to the 
stability of a complex network of interactions." (Boyer 1988a, p.126)
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be a very important way of analysing the dynamics of the world economy today. The regulation 
school framework will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3.
In plain language, my definition of regime is the mode of economic management and 
interaction of organisations in the domestic as well as in the international economy. In a 
democratic society, in order for a regime to be successful and sustainable, it has to be 
accompanied by legitimacy as well. One can perhaps also call it ‘socio-economic order’.7 Such 
regimes are social institutions, but do not necessarily directly 'govern' states or markets. Instead, 
they constrain them by explicitly or implicitly setting the dominant rules of the game.
1.3. The debate over the convergence criteria
The convergence criteria set forth four elements to be fulfilled by member states to 
qualify for monetary union. There has been much debate about the need for these criteria, in 
particular regarding the fiscal criteria.
As argued in section 1.1., the economist stance supported by Germany and the 
Netherlands is predominantly reflected by the convergence criteria in the Maastricht Treaty. A 
further rationale of convergence in the context of EMU comes from the particular nature of 
European integration. Monetary integration will not be sustainable unless all member states have 
enough incentive to do so. The benefits have to outweigh the costs. As De Grauwe (1994) 
suggested, the convergence criteria cater for German interests. Once EMU materialises, 
Germany - the strongest economy in the EU - may have to bail out countries or regions in
7Young (1989) presented two subsets of international institutions: 
international orders and international regimes. The former is a "broad 
framework, arrangement governing the activities of all the members of 
international society over a wide range of specific issues." and it 
"subsumes a collection of more specific arrangements." (p.13) My definition 
of international regime is closer to what he conceived as international 
orders than what he sees as international regimes.
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distress by increased payments of fiscal transfers. Leading economists argue that theoretically 
it is perfectly feasible to assume that fiscal crisis or default in one country participating in 
monetary union would not bring about any external effects. As Buiter et al (1993) argue, "the 
cost of these market imperfection are borne only by defaulters and their creditors" (p.79). Bean 
(1992) also questions the need for fiscal transfer given the Maastricht treaty includes both ‘no 
monetization’ and ‘no bail-out’ clauses, (p.28) It is true that the current scheme of the Structural 
Funds financed by the European Union budget works to some degree as a partial insurance in the 
case of asymmetric economic disturbances. But the size of the current Structural Funds is far 
from enough to make any significant impact.
McKinnon (1996), on the other hand, argues that monetary union would give leverage 
to a country facing fiscal breakdown, as it is likely that some union-wide action would be taken 
to prevent union-wide bank failures and financial instability. It might take the form of the 
European Central Bank buying the troubled government's bonds, or direct govemment-to- 
govemment lending. As he put it, "knowing this ex ante, politicians in the errant countries might 
become less willing to take resolute fiscal action", (p.73) Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995) argue 
that the credibility of the European Central Bank would be undermined as the union becomes 
larger. This is because "in a larger union, each individual fiscal authority faces less of an 
incentive to contribute to this public good (of credibility) by building up less debt, because the 
(perceived) beneficial effects of less debt (and thus lower second-period taxes) in terms of lower 
inflation are smaller." (p.i) In the presence of such monetary and fiscal distortions, EMU might 
create fertile ground for excessive debt.
The reluctance of Germany and other ‘economist’ countries to admit highly-indebted 
countries to EMU is better understood from a political psychology point of view. West Germans
are still suffering from the considerable tax increases arising from German reunification in 1990.8 
In Germany the experience has led to concern about the future of EMU. It has been argued that 
a monetary union including not only weak countries like Italy or Belgium, but even a 
comparatively strong country like France, could face problems similar to those experienced by 
the German Economic and Monetary Union. The community budget is not big enough to cover 
major economic disasters. The total EU budget is only a fraction of national budgets. Indeed, 
the budgetary expenditure of the European Commission is a mere 1% of total EU GDP. This is 
in stark contrast to the expenditure of national governments, which is around 50% of their 
GDPs.9 The possibility cannot be ruled out that such inadequate fiscal resources could have 
seriously detrimental systemic effects - such as a financial or liquidity crisis - on the overall 
financial system linking the countries which introduce the single currency.10 If a local economic 
and/or financial crisis develops into a system-wide crisis, massive fiscal transfers may be 
required to stabilise the market. This is one of the important reasons why less developed 
European member states were more enthusiastic proponents of monetary union than their 
developed counterparts. This possible systemic need for bail-outs is another reason for the 
reluctance of the Germans to go for monetary union, apart from their well-established argument 
against it: i.e., the loss of monetary stability provided by the Deutsche Mark and Bundesbank. 
Indeed, on German insistence the Maastricht Treaty includes a 'no bail-out principle' in article 
104b (Buiter et al. 1993). Germany wants to have symmetric monetary integration which 
benefits it as well.
8A11 West Germans are required to pay 7% of their income as a 
solidarity surcharge. In addition, other taxes have increased since 
unification in order to finance the reconstruction of East Germany.
9For detailed statistics, see the statistical annex of European 
Economy. (1997) Tables 5, 63A, p. 118.
10As introduced later, Begg et al. (1991) take the same view.
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Obviously, Germany cannot expect all member states to become as prosperous as itself. 
Then, what extent of convergence is necessary? Are the criteria suggested in the Maastricht 
treaty of the right kind? Does it cover enough preconditions to create a viable monetary union?
1.3.1. Criticism of the convergence criteria
The Maastricht criteria have been widely questioned and criticized by many economists.
Most agree on the need for some convergence criteria, but none seems to endorse the criteria
fully. De Grauwe (1994) dismissed both nominal and fiscal convergence criteria as "obstacles"
(p. 159) to monetary union. He argues that monetary union would bring about nominal
convergence anyway, thus, there is no need for prior convergence. He states:
to meet the nominal convergence criteria a regime shift (the monetary union) 
must occur. After the regime shift, nominal convergence is easy. The Maastricht 
treaty has it back to front. It wants nominal convergence before the regime shift. 
This makes it unlikely that the regime shift will occur, thereby also preventing 
nominal convergence, (p. 159)
Whereas his argument holds very well from the point of view of economics, it does not 
do so as far as practical politics is concerned. It can be interpreted as a monetarist stance. Those 
who subscribe to the economist stance would disagree with his argument. Buiter (1995) argues 
along the same line as De Grauwe, but put it more realistically. He also takes the view that the 
interest rate criterion is meaningless, as complete interest rate equalisation immediately follows 
monetary union. This criterion, however, makes sense as "yet another stratagem for keeping out 
of the monetary union governments whose debt is subject to a significant default risk premium." 
(p.30) As for the exchange rates criterion, it is useful since it avoids "the risk of 'endgame' 
devaluations aimed at achieving a transitional competitive advantage or at reducing the real value 
of (public) debt denominated in domestic currency." (p.31) Concerning the inflation criterion,
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as De Grauwe (1994) put it, the logical order would be to have monetary union first which, then, 
brings about inflation convergence. Buiter (1995), however, points out the possibility of 
"inheritability of inflation inertia" (p.31). If such an inheritability exists, it is important to have 
inflation rate convergence prior to monetary union. The concept of inflation inertia denotes the 
situation of a sluggish response of an inflation rate to changes in the current economic 
conditions. If inflation inertia is inheritable, its presence or the different speed of inertia would 
cause relative price differentials between the countries sharing the single currency: this means 
that the value of the Euro circulating in France could be different from that in Germany. The 
concept of inflation inertia is interesting because it has structural implications. However, it is 
very difficult to rigorously conceptualize and estimate.
Although some dismiss its relevance, nominal convergence is not a very contentious 
issue. It is probably because all EMU core countries have no particular problem meeting the 
Maastricht targets in practice. What is debated is whether, and to what extent, the fiscal criterion 
and real convergence are relevant. Most academics argue that fiscal policy has to be flexible as 
a primary adjustment mechanism. With the exchange rate being lost as a means of adjustment, 
other policy instruments, such as fiscal policy have to bear more of the burden of adjustment in 
the case of external shocks. Consequently, they argue against fiscal federalism - the 
establishment of an European-level central fiscal mechanism.11 Some practitioners, however, 
tend to disagree with the academic argument, and support harmonization. The Delors Report 
(1989) argues for fiscal policy coordination and binding limits on national budget deficits. As 
an extension of this line of argument, sometimes even support for fiscal federalism is voiced. 
This argument, however, is logically flawed since "the monetary union really requires either
lxAs reiterated in Chapter 2, Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Feldstein
(1992), Krugman (1993) and Goodhart (1995) are among the few economists who 
have argued for the need for fiscal federalism for the efficient operation 
of monetary union.
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fiscal harmonization or common knowledge that monetary policy cannot later be used to correct 
a member’s fiscal policy errors." (Graboyes 1990a, p. 16) The Maastricht Treaty has already 
ensured the latter option through no monetization and no bail out clauses in Article 104b.
For this reason, Bean (1992) does not see the point of introducing fiscal rules on top of 
Article 104b. He argues strongly against the Maastricht fiscal criteria. The Maastricht treaty 
assumes fiscal restraints in order to ensure price stability. The fiscal criteria excessively boost 
its deflation bias and "could greatly handicap the Community in the long run" (p.29). He even 
repudiates the case for monetary union if the enforcement of "inappropriate fiscal policies" (p.36) 
stays as its prerequisite.12
De Grauwe (1994) also argues against the fiscal criterion on the ground that the 
particular ceilings set are arbitrary, and fiscal norms are unrelated to the working of monetary 
union. Given no monetization of budget deficits has been agreed, and the global finance 
penalising fiscally adventurous countries, he does not see the need for a fiscal criterion as a 
precondition for monetary union. In a nutshell, he dismisses the Maastricht criteria as having 
no economic rationale. Instead, he subscribes the theory of optimum currency areas as a sound 
economic basis for monetary union, which sets out criteria such as labour market flexibility 
(wage and/or price flexibility), labour mobility, a degree of symmetry among different economies 
sharing a single currency, and the presence of automatic fiscal redistribution.
Buiter, Corsetti and Roubini (1993), in their article, thoroughly evaluate the Maastricht 
fiscal criteria. Like Bean (1992), they argue that convergence criteria on fiscal policy can be 
harmful by promoting an over-disinflationary and recession biassed stance. Assessing the case 
for fiscal rules, they examine the logic behind the criteria, and conclude that the rationale behind
12Kenen (1992) puts forward a similar train of thought, but takes a 
much more moderate stance on the Maastricht fiscal rules. He implicitly 
encourages the changing of numerical ceilings through Council voting, as 
explicitly stated in the Protocol on the Excessive Deficit Procedure.
the Maastricht fiscal criteria is not economic but rather, a political concern. They question the 
attempt to set universal numerical targets for heterogeneous economies. In other words, "debt 
and deficit ceilings impair that flexibility and with it each Member State's ability to respond to 
nationally differentiated shocks." (p.90) They suggest that the Maastricht negotiators may have 
had German as well as EC average (in the year 1990) public investment behaviour in mind when 
selecting particular quantitative targets of 3% and 60%. Eichengreen (1994) argues that fiscal 
criteria should not have been applied in stage two of EMU, which started in January 1994. In 
his opinion, the theoretical ground only holds at stage three when monetary union is in place. 
As he argues, whether the fiscal deficits of EU countries are somewhat below or above a certain 
GDP fraction should not be the prime factor for being selected for monetary union. Rather, 
whether a country possesses credible "fiscal discipline" (p. 174) is the issue to be looked at. 
Given European countries have such different levels of fiscal deficits (not to mention the 
Belgium and Italian cases with a debt/GDP ratio of over 100%), it does not seem sensible to ask 
all countries to take the same fractions of GDP as a target.
Begg et al. (1991) also reject the binding rules on budget deficits, for the same economic 
reasons. In addition, they question the de facto effectiveness of the 'no-bail out clause': they 
point out that it "does not guarantee, however, that they (the indebted governments) actually 
travel alone, without infecting others with their crisis" (p.38). Thus, they propose to add a 
regulative framework on sovereign borrowing in order to protect banks and financial institutions 
from being exposed to systemic risk. Such proposals include setting an upper limit for lending 
by banks and other financial institutions to any single government, as a certain proportion of their 
assets, and strengthening their capital base.
Indeed, there is more or less consensus among leading economists that the Maastricht
fiscal rules are irrelevant or detrimental for the well-being of European economies.13 Hutchison 
and Kletzer (1995), and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1995) are almost the only proponents of 
quantitative limits of budget deficits. The former argue that there is a rationale for fiscal 
federalism, as it improves allocative efficiency after the establishment of EMU. The expectation 
of eventual fiscal federalism may give European governments an incentive to accumulate 
excessive debts, as their debt burden may be taken over by the federal fiscal authority in future. 
For this reason, they argue that the fiscal criteria make sense. As already mentioned in the earlier 
section, the latter argue that monetary union brings about excessive debt in the presence of both 
monetary and fiscal distortions. Monetary distortions stem from the inability of central banks 
to make a credible commitment to price stability and fiscal distortions are generated from myopic 
governments’ fiscal conduct. With the presence of both distortions, "the second best can be 
achieved by supplementing a conservative, independent central bank by debt ceiling. In this 
way, institutional arrangements are targeted directly at the origins of the monetary and fiscal 
distortions". (Beetsma and Bovenberg p. 13) Therefore, they believe that the quantitative debt 
ceilings set by the Maastricht Treaty is useful to prevent governments from misbehaving.
Yet, leading economists raise doubts about the assumption of governments’ tendency to 
overborrow. They assert that financial markets penalize such behaviour, and governments’ 
tendency to overborrow is a matter of the past and not the present. In addition, Bean (1992) 
proposes administrative measures to cope with this problem by making "payments into the 
Central Community budget dependent on debt and deficit levels in a way that lead national 
governments to correctly evaluate the costs of their tax and spending decisions." (p.28) Hence, 
there has been exhaustive debate over the fiscal criterion, but discussion over the other criteria
13In addition to the authors discussed in this chapter, similar 
arguments are made by Kenen (1992), Boverg, Kremers, and Masson (1991), van 
der Ploeg (1991) and Wyplosz (1991).
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as well as what the treaty left out has been very limited.
The logic of the Maastricht Treaty stems from the separation of monetary and economic 
policy under the concept of subsidiarity. Article 3b of the Treaty states that the Community only 
takes action in case the objectives cannot sufficiently be achieved by member states. As 
Caravelis (1994) points out, this logic is in line with traditional monetary theory, where 
"monetary policy can be divorced from economic policy." (p. 17) The Maastricht Treaty, on the 
one hand, promotes " . . .  a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level 
of employment and social protection, the raising of standard and of quality of living, cohesion 
and solidarity among Member States." (Article 2), but on the other hand, allows for maximum 
freedom for member states to decide economic policies. Does this combination necessarily 
constitute a reasonable and efficient way to create EMU? The following sections introduce 
proposals to improve the path to monetary union.
1.3.2. The need for additional criteria?
The Maastricht criteria left out several important aspects which relate to the performance 
of the real economy, except for the fiscal position. Eddie George, the Governor of Bank of 
England, proposed to add the unemployment rate to the convergence criteria. There are other 
economic variables which can be potential candidates. What Collignon (1993) calls the "hidden 
agenda", i.e., the convergence of the balance of payments, the rate of economic growth, and of 
unemployment, is worth noting, because these variables are "either related to underlying real 
factors which have some impact on nominal parameters, or they are related to the long-term 
sustainability of EMU." (p.56)
In addition, structural variables, such as productivity increase relative to wage increase,
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can be used as a more integral benchmark to assess sustainability. This particular variable is 
worth paying attention to for the following two reasons: first, it has been already applied in 
French macroeconomic strategy; and second, it has been introduced as a principal guideline in 
the strategy for managing wage settlements under EMU by the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 
(DGB), the German trade union confederation. In France, the concept of wage increases in line 
with productivity rises is one of the factors behind the success of the ‘Franc Fort’ policy as a 
sensible macroeconomic strategy, as will be elaborated in section 1.7.2.1. Credibility is a very 
important factor for the Franc-Fort policy to succeed. This is because "credibility would have 
the effect of accelerating the adjustments needed to bring about a return to full (or rather higher) 
employment". (Fitoussi et al. p.4) This strategy is beneficial for the economy as a whole, 
because nominal depreciation is prone to induce undesirable inflationary pressure. However, 
scholars have so far concluded that the strategy has been successful in bringing down inflation, 
but not in lowering unemployment rates by boosting the economy.14
In Germany, the DGB believes that the concept - wage increase in line with the labour 
productivity growth - will become the key for European wage adjustment under a single 
currency.15 What is important under EMU is the uniform wage formation process because of the 
following rationale:
If in one country wages react systematically differently to economic changes 
compared to others, there will be a systematic divergence of competitiveness. In 
an economic and monetary union changes in competitiveness can no longer be 
compensated for by realignments of exchange rates or movements within the 
ERM bands. If the economies of the Community countries are similar in all other 
respects, it could be argued that only policy reactions or the convergence of the 
wage bargaining process could prevent systematic divergencies (sic) of 
competitiveness. (Horn and Zwiener, p. 83)
14For details, see Blanchard and Muet (1993) and Fitoussi et al.
(1993) .
15Their position is based on G. Horn, R. Zwiener and H. Goepel (1996), 
the study commissioned by the DGB and its think tank.
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By making wage increases conditional on productivity growth, with a given level of technology, 
unit labour costs stay roughly constant. With the introduction of the Euro, countries will lose 
exchange rates as an adjustment mechanism. Thus, unit labour costs as indicators for external 
competitiveness must not be distorted by excessive rises in wage levels.
One should be very careful to distinguish wage levels from wage formation processes. 
The DGB argues that the single currency should not bring about the harmonization of wage 
levels. Rather, wage differentiation is crucial for the efficient allocation of capital and labour in 
order to prevent unnecessary unemployment in less competitive areas.
Connolly and Kroger (1992) put emphasis on the convergence of supply conditions for 
the efficient and proper working of the single market and successful monetary union. They focus 
on wage flexibility, lower taxes, better economic infrastructure, and structural policies to 
improve supply side performance as the key determinants for the positive expectations of higher 
rates of return. They believe that supply side flexibility and, in particular, labour market 
flexibility would be crucial for positive private sector expectations, which will induce 
investment, economic and employment growth. They focus on the concept of the domestic rate 
of return. A region or country where the expected marginal real rate of return is lower than that 
of other regions or countries would suffer: for investment and job creation would take place 
elsewhere. As labour mobility remains limited, that would result in regional unemployment, 
(p.l 1) In this context, they urge a regime change in wage formation processes towards greater 
flexibility, where wage levels develop consistent with an appropriate level of the rate of return. 
Just like the DGB, they are concerned about the possibility that greater labour mobility and the 
single currency will make the maintenance of wage differentials difficult. Unless wages rise in 
proportion to productivity growth, the experience of the former East Germany, a region which 
stays semi-permanently depressed, with wages being too high in relation to productivity and
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which survives only by absorbing huge fiscal transfers, would be repeated on a European scale.
Both the DGB and Connolly and Kroger are aware that wage and labour market 
behaviour have crucial implications for monetary union. Besides, unless European employment 
conditions improve through economic growth, people will start to perceive EMU as a cause of 
economic hardship.16 In this respect, it is important to examine more structural demand and 
supply conditions, in particular labour markets, to measure the sustainability and the success of 
EMU.
In spite of the importance of labour markets, they were not covered by the Maastricht 
criteria. The next section explores the reasons.
1.4. Why labour markets did not become an issue?
The convergence criteria are highly technocratic in nature and concentrate exclusively 
on monetary variables (Tsoukalis 1997, p. 169). The exclusion of other aspects, particularly 
referring to social policy and labour markets have frequently been criticised, (e.g. Gros and 
Thygesen 1992, p.467) Neo-classical economists are aware that the achievement of the European 
Central Bank’s aim of price stability depends crucially on the wage price mechanism.(Dombusch 
et al. 1998, p. 51-52) Why have labour markets not been considered in the Maastricht 
convergence criteria? This may be partly explained by the neo-liberal consensus behind 
monetary union which hopes that the single currency, once established, would necessitate greater 
labour market flexibility.17 As Tsoukalis (1997) put it, “EMU would put a premium on the
16Goodhart also made this point at a conference held at the London 
School of Economics on 10 March 1997.
17Reports by the European Central Bank persistently propagates this
idea.
flexibility of labour markets.” (p. 136) Dyson (1994) focuses more on the role of the dominant 
economic theory - monetarism - influencing policy makers’ decisions. He argues that the idea 
of sound money became predominant in partisan economic policy analysis in the 1980s, from 
which the key policy positions for EMU were derived. The predominance of this branch of 
economic thinking in turn may have constrained policy makers’ decisions. Indeed, there is no 
doubt that “the structural power of economic policy ideas” (p. 253) affected the particular policy 
choices underlying the Maastricht Treaty. In addition, this ideological and practical preeminence 
empowered the Bundesbank as an institutional model of Europe. Hence, the ECB was modelled 
after the Bundesbank, and the convergence criteria strongly reflect German perceptions and 
interests. In addition, the independence of member states’ central banks became a condition for 
the entry to EMU in the Maastricht framework. This means that the negotiators of the treaty were 
indeed aware of the domestic monetary structure, in contrast to other economic structures. Sound 
money theories believe in the neutrality of money, i.e., that money does not affect the functioning 
of the real economy in the long run. They believe that monetary policy can function 
independently from other economic policies, and consequently do not see the need to examine 
labour markets in establishing the conditions for creating monetary union.
In addition, of great importance is the politically charged nature of issues related to social 
policies and labour markets in the European integration process. The EU has until now avoided 
moving labour market institutions and regulations to the centre of attention. They lie at the heart 
of the identity of national regimes and are highly contested between the political left and right.18 
However, EMU has always been as much about politics as about economics. Against this 
background, the EU Commission made a strategic choice to leave labour market issues to be
18 A  good overview of the politicised nature of social issues is given 
by Tsoukalis (1997 Chapter 6).
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addressed under the subsidiarity principle.19 In effect, it placed much faith in the ability of 
member states to deliver in reality what was implicit in the Treaty itself.
1.5. Fundamental critique of the convergence criteria - Is there a need for a different kind of 
criteria?
The real problematique of the convergence criteria is that they merely cover the surface 
of economic performance of member states. In other words, they do not capture the structural 
dynamics of economies or economic fundamentals which make it possible for a country to 
become or stay competitive with economic growth. The right economic policies should be 
implemented by taking account of the different socio-economic structures of the economy. There 
are some who proposed a totally different approach for establishing monetary union.
Panic (1992) sensibly suggests that the creation of a currency union should be conditional 
on two other criteria. First, member countries' efficiency and income levels have to be alike, and 
second, their socio-economic preferences must also be alike. He adds that close historical links 
and long experience of pursuing similar economic objectives and policies would make the union 
both advantageous and feasible. Countries would then easily agree on stabilisation or adjustment 
policies, because of a tacit agreement on policies, derived from the internal cohesion of the 
union. In other words, what Panic is arguing is that domestic economic regimes have to be 
similar. The ‘domestic regime’ incorporates the political, social and economic organization, 
state-market relations and similar historical experience. In Chapters 4 and 5, I shall study 
historical monetary unions, and then, in Chapters 6 to 8 ,1 shall examine the current domestic 
regimes of Germany, France and Britain. In doing so, I focus on their labour market structures
19Confidential interview with the EU official.
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and institutions.
De Grauwe (1993) takes a political economic perspective and argues that the difficulty 
of the EMU process has derived from a conflict of interests among the member states. There are 
huge gaps between Southern and Northern Europe on what they expect to achieve through EMU. 
Roughly speaking, the former aims at strengthening its credibility through EMU. The latter, 
notably France, supports EMU to weaken the asymmetric structure of the EMS, i.e., the 
dominance of Bundesbank. The dismissal of the convergence criteria by De Grauwe as ‘mere 
non-sense’ is extreme. Nevertheless, he is right to point out that it is more important to focus on 
where economic divergences come from, rather than setting an arbitrary number of convergence 
criteria, as in the treaty. Economic divergence brings about asymmetric shocks across countries 
and they are more important to focus on than mere numerical targets. Asymmetric shocks 
happen because of the difference in economic and industrial structures. They cannot be easily 
eliminated by the convergence of economic policies. Therefore, a much broader strategy to deal 
with the structural differences (such as labour market flexibility) should have more importance 
than reaching convergence itself. His thesis lays the ground to argue for the need for some 
degree of structural convergence.
1.5.1. Monetary union and political union
Some dismiss the possibility of EMU before the creation of political union.20 Goodhart
(1995) questions the rationale of the Maastricht project with monetary union so far ahead of 
fiscal and political union, (p.498) Generally speaking, a political union will be automatically 
accompanied by a monetary union, as historical examples show. The most recent example has
20This position is particularly favoured by Bundesbank officials. See 
Tietmeyer (1994), Jochimsen (1993, 1994).
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been German reunification. One can also point to the case of the German monetary union of the 
last century. Historically, stable and successful monetary unions either accompanied political 
union or had a clear political hierarchy, as in the case of the CFA franc zone in Africa whose 
currencies are pegged to the French franc. An historical example of rather symmetrical monetary 
integration can be found in the Latin Monetary Union established in 1865, which proved to be 
a failure by the beginning of the 20th century. A similar fate befell the Scandinavian Monetary 
Union formed in 1873 and abandoned in 1931. A political union leads to the introduction of a 
monetary union, but it does not necessarily guarantee the success of the monetary union, as the 
American example shows. The historical monetary unions will be elaborated in Chapters 4 and 
5.
Can EMU work without political union21? There is widespread consensus in the 
literature that the project of EMU as it stands now needs further development to become 
sustainable. EMU so far will either become an engine for further political and economic 
integration, or risks failure. It has therefore been described as gamble for policy makers in the 
future. (Tsoukalis 1997, Jacquet 1998) The huge political and economic task which lies ahead 
comprises a deepening and reform of European Union institutions and further restructuring of 
domestic economies, to bring them in line with the requirements of a single monetary policy 
(Jacquet 1998). The harmonisation of national economic and fiscal policy making and national 
economic structures to underpin the operation of the ECB may in future create new momentum 
for political integration. Political union could well become an ultimate result of the process to 
create sustainable conditions for monetary union. The question is, given these political
21There is already a certain level of political integration in Europe, 
as represented e.g. by the presence of the European parliament. For this 
reason, Europe could be considered to have imperfect political union. 
However, the degree of political integration at the European level is far 
underdeveloped relative to that observed in nation states.
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challenges ahead, whether they can be tackled without achieving political union in the first place. 
It could be argued that political union should have preceded monetary union in order to facilitate 
policy steps necessary for its sustainability.
The validity of this argument can be questioned by placing it against the background of 
the creation of EMU. EMU was established by independent nation states under the strong 
leadership of national politicians. If national politics and policy makers succeeded in launching 
an ambitious project like EMU for eleven member states, why should it not be equally possible 
to proceed with the process of creating sustainable conditions under the current political 
conditions? The problem here is that the priorities behind the creation of EMU differ from the 
priorities associated with its sustainability. The creation of the single currency has been a project 
driven by the primacy of high politics. Although there was a strong economic rationale in favour 
of monetary union associated with the completion of the single market and the problem of the 
inconsistent quartet, it was national high political concerns that played a key role in motivating 
national leaders to choose monetary union22. According to Sandholtz (1993) and Milner (1997), 
monetary union became essentially possible because the French and other non-German political 
elites took it as an opportunity to correct the asymmetry that was Germany’s favour, inherent in 
the EMS. By moving towards EMU, the system becomes more symmetrical, and they can exert 
greater influence over EU monetary policy. German political leaders, on the other hand, 
perceived the “need to reaffirm the country’s commitment to European integration in the wake 
of German reunification”. (Tsoukalis 1997, p. 170) Helmut Kohl spoke in this context of 
economic and monetary integration as a matter of “of war and peace in the 21st century.”23
22Tsoukalis (1997), p. 164. The single market logic behind EMU was 
used by policy makers on the EU level, particularly by ex-Commission 
president Jacques Delors, as an argument to push forward the project.
23Quoted in Tsoukalis (1997, p. 170) Garrett (1994) also emphasizes the 
importance of German political interests in maintaining the pace of European
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With EMU in operation since January 1999, the central issue is whether high politics and 
national political leadership will continue to be sufficient to facilitate further integration. Given 
that the task lying ahead includes sensitive low politics areas such as domestic structural reform 
and closer coordination of the whole set of macro and microeconomic policy making, the 
political leadership faces a big challenge. Whether this challenge can be mounted is dependent 
on the degree to which national economic ideas, institutions and interests diverge at the outset, 
and whether these differences can be overcome by a united political leadership24. I will concern 
myself in this thesis with the current structural differences which have to be addressed in 
domestic structures, in particular labour markets, to cope with the pressures of the single 
currency.
1.5.2. Summary
In sum, the convergence criteria do not take account of economic structure. Despite the 
fact that the insistence on prior convergence reflects the German ‘economist’ position, as 
mentioned in section 1.3, the criteria do not go far enough to take into account structural 
convergence. Here, the monetarist stance prevailed insofar as it has been implicitly assumed that 
EMU, once established, would bring about the necessary structural convergence and the creation 
of institutions where needed. The question is whether membership in the single currency can 
indeed facilitate the reform of domestic structures, especially labour market structures, to bring 
about the eventual structural compatibility / convergence among EMU member states. To
integration.
24Dyson (1994) for example voices serious doubts as to the consistency 
of the policy processes behind the EMU project, since the project has until 
now lacked a single political actor at its center. He speaks of the 'hollow 
core' of EMU (Chapter 9).
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investigate this question, a brief review of the European Monetary System (EMS) / Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM) is useful in examining whether monetary cooperation / integration 
facilitates structural reforms. Let us therefore examine the EMS experience in the next section 
and see to what degree it affected member states structurally.
1.6. The European Monetary System (EMS)
The EMS, as the precursor to EMU, represents an altogether rather successful episode 
of close monetary cooperation by individual states, most of them now forming the Euro-zone, 
starting out with distinct national structures, particularly labour markets. The question to be 
investigated is whether the ERM facilitated structural convergence or structural reform towards 
compatibility of labour market structures among member states. Related to this question is the 
role of policy makers, as a possible agent pushing through structural changes.
In the 1970s, with the collapse of Bretton Woods system and the oil shocks, the world 
economy suffered from stagflation and a weak dollar. The EMS was created in 1979 by the 
strong political initiative of Helmut Schmidt, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Valery Giscard D’Estaing, the President of France, with the intention to create a zone of 
monetary stability in Europe. The EMS was a fixed but adjustable exchange rate regime25.
The performance of the ERM was, until the crisis in 1992-1993, generally regarded as 
successful (T soukalis 1997), despite several realignments. Whether the adjustment of the system 
through realignments and the final widening of the fluctuation bands indicate persistent structural 
differences, or can be explained solely by speculative pressure, has been debated in the 
literature. Gros and Thygesen (1992) evaluate the EMS under the following criteria: inflation
25For details of the functioning of the EMS and the ERM, see Gros and 
Thygesen (1992).
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performance, methods used to defend exchange rates, attitudes to reforms in the EMS, and the 
EMS as part of the ambitions of European integration, (p. 97). The EMS had a turbulent start in 
the beginning until March 1983. There were seven realignments in this period due to a difficult 
international environment and member states’ limited convergence in inflation rates and budget 
deficits. Divergence in national economic policy preferences became obvious with the election 
of President Mitterrand in France in May 1981, followed by his introduction of expansionary 
policies and the nationalisation of industries. There was policy divergence between Germany 
on the one hand and France, Belgium and Denmark on the other hand. The expansionary policies 
in the latter countries were corrected between 1982-83.
The period between March 1983 and January 1987 is characterised as a calmer phase for 
the EMS. Realignments were reduced to four, with a gradual convergence of national inflation 
rates. Capital liberalisation started and was confirmed as an objective of the Single European 
Act in 1986. The Single European Act also stipulated improvements in the decision making 
mechanism for a single market in good and services, including financial services, to be 
implemented by the end of 1992. It reaffirmed a number of long- run objectives including the 
enhancement of the EC’s monetary capacity with the view of achieving EMU. Capital 
liberalisation fostered speculation against ERM currencies in the winters of 1986 and 1987, 
which brought about ERM realignments, and finally the speculative attacks during the ERM 
crisis of 1992-93. As a consequence, Gros and Thygesen (1998) suggest that these realignments 
are less related to divergent economic structures than to speculative capital movements.
There has been considerable inflation convergence at the lower level among the EMS 
member states. The Basel-Nyborg agreement of 1987 further improved the functioning of the 
EMS. The agreement helped to boost the credibility of the EMS by visibly increasing resources 
for intervention and enhancing closer coordination among central banks. The measures taken
48
as a result of the agreement addressed the asymmetric nature of burden sharing in the EMS 
(Tsoukalis 1997). They helped to maintain the stability of the EMS until the onset of the ERM 
crisis of 1992-93. Does the ERM crisis, which has been interpreted as a de facto collapse of the 
ERM (Eichengreen 1996a), indicate that national economic structures in the ERM had not 
converged enough so that finally the system itself was not regarded as credible by the financial 
markets?
1.6.1. The ERM crisis
The Danish referendum in June 1992 served as a catalyst for a wave of speculative attacks 
against a number of ERM currencies between September 1992 and August 1993. Almost all the 
ERM currencies, except for the Dutch Guilder came under speculative attack. The crisis, which 
particularly hit the Italian Lira, Pound Sterling, Spanish Peseta, Portugese Escudo, Irish Punt and 
French Franc resulted in the exit of Sterling and the Lira from the ERM in September 1992 and 
a widening of the bandwidth in the ERM to ±15% in August 1993. The causes of the crisis have 
been widely debated in the literature26. Broadly speaking, three main explanations are given for 
the crisis: first, diverging economic fundamentals between member states, second, the removal 
of capital controls and third, the economic shock caused by German reunification.27 Of these 
three reasons, the last two are of systemic nature, whereas the problems with economic 
fundamentals point to domestic structural differences among member states. As Tsoukalis 
(1997) points out, the true causes of the ERM crisis probably lie in a combination of the three
26For a good review of this debate, see Cobham (1996).
27Tsoukalis (1997). An additional factor was the stiffening of the EMS 
for political reasons in response to the Maastricht negotiation process. 
(Busch 1994 and Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993a)
factors. I will focus here on the problem of national economic fundamentals since it is related 
to domestic structures. When financial markets perceive weaknesses in fundamentals, they see 
the possibility of member states not being able to adhere to their policy commitment to the EMS. 
Busch (1994) describes the period between 1987 and 1992 as a time in which the EMS countries 
behaved “as if monetary union were already in place”, (p.86) This made realignment in response 
to economic divergence virtually impossible. However, because macro-economic convergence 
was far from complete except for the inflation rate, pressure for realignment was building up. 
Hence, an economically-necessary realignment was not possible due to political reasons. The 
financial markets started to cast serious doubts on the realisation of the EMU project after the 
initial rejection of the Maastricht Treaty by the Danish referendum in June 1992. Furthermore, 
the criteria of monetary union agreed in the Maastricht Treaty (in particular, the fiscal criteria) 
were interpreted by the market to be too tough for some countries to achieve relative to their 
economic fundamentals. These factors fuelled speculative attacks by the financial markets.
There is widespread consensus that fundamental problems were the main cause for the 
crisis faced by Italy, Spain and Portugal in 1992. (Pons 1993) The high inflation rates of these 
countries compared with the rest of the ERM countries led to competitiveness problems which 
put the sustainability of their existing ERM parities in question. Little has been said in the 
literature about the possible structural causes of the comparatively bad inflationary performance 
of these countries. In the case of Italy, the desolate state of public finances has been pointed out. 
(Vaciago 1993) On a more general level, the importance of different labour market behaviour, 
related to different national wage bargaining arrangements has been emphasised by Flassbeck 
(1994), and Artis and Ormerod (1994). The latter, in a comparative analysis, assert that not 
simply inflation differentials as such, but divergent trends in wage levels matter for the 
sustainability of a peg. Whereas the past record of national wage developments demonstrated
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to markets that countries like the Netherlands and Belgium implemented labour market reforms 
which underpinned sustainability of the peg to the DM, Italy’s inflationary wage behaviour 
constituted a chronic problem.28
The realignments and the crisis of the ERM in 1992/93 demonstrate that the convergence 
between diverse national economies was not sufficient to achieve permanent exchange rate 
stability. Nevertheless, the considerable stability achieved after 1987 suggests that some 
convergence among the economies of the ERM member states has taken place.
1.7. Has the EMS/ERM facilitated domestic structural reform?
The membership of the EMS can be interpreted as a means to fight inflation for non- 
German member states by ‘tying one’s hand’ through exchange rate constraint. It meant 
adoption of German style monetary policy priorities by member states to control inflation. 
Germany, on the other hand, saw the EMS as an instrument against excessive revaluation of the 
DM. Furthermore, at a time of a lack of US leadership in international monetary affairs as a 
result of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and of the oil shocks and stagflation, the 
EMS was established to serve as a forum of economic cooperation aiming to create a zone of 
monetary stability.
This section examines whether the EMS has promoted structural changes in member 
states’ economies by imposing anti-inflationary discipline. The question how an international 
monetary system affects domestic structures has theoretically been addressed by two 
perspectives: structuralist international political economy (IPE) analysis argues from a systemic
28For further details about the Netherlands and Belgium, see in't Veld 
(1992) . This analysis is confirmed with regard to Italy by Micossi and 
Padoan (1994).
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point of view, and looks into the systemic constraints imposed by capital mobility under a fixed 
exchange rate system29. Domestic structure approaches in IPE have investigated the strategic 
behaviour of policy makers who are involved in a situation characterised by a tension between 
their international commitments and the demands of their domestic constituency30.
Arguing from a systemic structural approach, Andrews (1994) provides an analytical 
framework to interpret the ERM as an agent for structural change as follows. He starts from the 
capital mobility hypothesis based on the Mundell-Flemming approach, asserting that free 
mobility of private capital, monetary policy autonomy and fixed exchange rates cannot be 
achieved simultaneously.31 Thus, states have to make strategic choices about their exchange rate 
regimes - floating or fixed. In the case of the EMS, countries opted for the latter. As a 
consequence, they are constrained by capital mobility more than those which choose a floating 
regime. In a fixed exchange rate regime states are required to adjust to achieve inflation level 
similar to the anchor currency through monetary, fiscal policies and structural reforms. 
Structural reforms are necessary to eradicate structural pressure for inflation. Extending this line 
of argument, a combination of capital mobility and the membership of the ERM forces non- 
German member states to adjust so that their inflation performance becomes similar to that of 
Germany. The effect of the EMS on inflationary expectations, based solely on the strong 
reputation of the monetary authorities, must in the long run be supplemented by more 
comprehensive credibility, relying on the long-term sustainability of the exchange rate. 
(Williamson 1991) To achieve sustainability, inflationary countries have to adjust structurally
29For a good review on the debate about the systemic constraints on 
national monetary autonomy coming with capital mobility, see Pauly (1995) .
30A good example here is Milner (1997).
31Cohen (1993a) put it as the 'unholy trinity'. Padoa-Schioppa (1985, 
1987), including free trade, called it the 'inconsistent quartet'.
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to eradicate the structural causes of inflation, namely from labour markets and fiscal policies. 
For EMU, the latter were taken care of by the Maastricht criteria, but the former, the labour 
markets, were not even mentioned.
The fact that policy makers face, in a fixed exchange rate system, constraints by capital 
mobility does not mean that they have no option but to implement structural reforms. In the 
ERM, policy makers still had the option to choose among different policy strategies. They could 
either implement necessary structural reforms to make the exchange rate peg sustainable, or 
adjust the peg in response to the economic strains coming from structural divergence. 
Furthermore, they could attempt to postpone structural reforms and defend fundamentally 
misaligned exchange rates through monetary policy tightening. Ultimately, policy makers 
always had the option of abandoning the ERM altogether and floating.
As domestic policy approaches have been pointing out, structural reforms are not an easy 
option for policy makers, since they involve the adjustment of politically-sensitive domestic 
institutions32. Whether policy makers choose structural reform over other policy options depends 
on the advantages they see in defending their commitment to the ERM, the domestic political 
costs of structural adjustments and the capacity of the political system to implement structural 
reforms. Domestic policy approaches speak here of ‘two-level-games’33. Two level-games, as 
Milner (1997) has emphasised, contain a structural dimension. In the case of the ERM, 
membership may have empowered and legitimised policy makers to push through unpopular
32The good systematic description of the interaction between domestic 
and international pressures on policy makers in the case of exchange rate 
policy can be found in Milner (1997) and Simmons (1994).
33For a definition of 'two-level-games', see Putnam (1988, p.434). How 
different domestic situations affected the policy choices of policy makers 
in the ERM crisis has been described by Sandholtz (1996). The interaction 
between the commitment of international cooperation and domestic structural 
pressures influencing policy choices in the case of the negotiation of the 
EMU has been investigated by Sandholtz (1993) and Milner (1997), chapter 8.
structural reforms. On the other hand, the past forms of domestic structures themselves impose 
constraints on policy makers. As Dyson (1994, p. 177) notes, policy makers are embedded in 
institutional settings which incorporate and represent the past, and thus provide continuity 
between past, present and future. The following review of the ERM investigates whether the 
constraints imposed by the ERM indeed made policy makers choose structural reforms to make 
national labour markets more compatible with the requirements of fixed exchange rates. First, 
I review the economic evidence for the implications of the ERM for labour markets. Second, I 
look at the cases of France and Italy to see whether in these countries’ ERM membership 
facilitated labour market reform. I choose these countries because they combine long-term ERM 
membership with a strong commitment to European monetary integration. The cases of Britain 
and Germany, the two countries which I will later investigate together with France in my case 
study on EMU, have been excluded since Britain only participated in the ERM for a brief two 
year period, and Germany faced few constraints from ERM membership due to the asymmetric 
nature of the system. Let us review the empirical studies to see if one can observe a structural 
impact of ERM membership on labour markets.
1.7.1. Empirical evidence
There are a number of studies which empirically estimate the structural effect of the 
EMS/ERM on members’ economies. Yet there is no consensus among economists regarding: 
i) whether there were structural effects of ERM membership on the wage behaviour of member 
states, ii) even if there were some evidence, it is difficult to distinguish the effects resulting from 
ERM membership or from other factors, such as globalisation and other changes of labour 
market practices. In addition, it should be noted that most works reviewed here, except for
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Bayoumi (1992), examine the changing behaviour in wage equations. Hence, the ‘structural’ 
impact on labour markets that these works are concerned with does not go much beyond the 
change in inflationary expectations of the wage-setters.
Bayoumi (1992) examined the macroeconomic impact of the ERM on member states. 
He found that ERM members had relatively symmetric supply shocks. The ERM appears to 
have removed the flexibility of floating exchange rates and have lowered the speed of 
adjustment. At the same time, however, it has facilitated a more coordinated response among 
member states. He concluded that “the core ERM members have at least some of the 
characteristics desirable for a common currency area”, regarding their responses to shocks. 
(p.354)
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), Barrell (1990), Anderton and Barrell (1995), Morgan
(1996) and Artis and Ormerod (1994,1996) examined the implications of the ERM for European 
labour markets. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), Barrell (1990) and Artis and Ormerod (1994) 
found evidence for behavioural changes in wages in France and Italy in the 1980s. They found 
that the average rate of wage increases was far lower in the post-ERM period than in the period 
before entry, and a higher correlation of both price and wage inflation rates among ERM 
members. Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) found that the EMS became a catalyst for producing 
a shift in expectations. They observed a shift in inflation expectations of wage- and price-setters 
in the first quarter of 1985 in Italy, March 1983 in France, and in autumn 1982 in Ireland.34 
Barrell (1990) also found that, amongst the ERM members, wage-setters’ behaviour changed 
most in Italy. The credibility of the government’s commitment to anti-inflation through ERM 
membership and the gradual elimination of the scala mobile in the 1980s helped to change wage 
behaviour. A downward adjustment in European wage inflation processes can be observed in
34For more detail about the French and Irish cases, see Sachs and 
Wyplosz (1986) and Dornbusch (1989).
the 1980s, which was, at least partly, caused by the discipline imposed by ERM membership. 
In the later study by Anderton and Barrell (1995), however, little evidence for statistically 
significant structural change among the members was found, except for Italy. Affirming the 
result by Bayoumi (1992), they noted that “the ERM may have provided some pressure towards 
more symmetric response to shocks, but the changes have not been great.” (p. 60) They found 
that Britain and Italy, which suspended ERM membership in 1992, displayed sluggish responses 
in inflation and real wage adjustment. This suggests that ERM membership certainly produced 
lower wage rises by influencing wage-setters’ inflation expectations. However, the pressures 
of membership may not have gone deep enough to change the dynamism of the adjustment 
mechanism in labour markets. Whereas some wage effects of the ERM have been observed for 
member states, Morgan (1996) found that the effect of unemployment on wages and of real 
wages on employment differed considerably between Italy, Spain and Germany. He states, 
“these structural differences in labour markets suggest that these countries may respond very 
differently to economic shocks. For this reason, they should be an important consideration in 
Spain’s and Italy’s decision to join any future monetary union with Germany.” (p.86) Thus, 
ERM membership has helped to facilitate changes in wage behaviour by affecting the 
inflationary expectation of of wage-setters, but it may not have brought about enough structural 
change to underpin successful monetary union. All studies found that changes in wage 
behaviour were achieved at the cost of rising unemployment, the key problem that needs to be 
corrected in future. In other words, the EMS/ERM was purely a monetary agent which acted as 
a catalyst for some change regarding wage behaviour but only with the side effect of high and 
persistent unemployment.
These results were contested by Egebo and Englander (1993), who found little evidence 
of regime shift among the ERM participants, including Italy: the wage equation estimated
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between the period over 1972-1986 fits reasonably well for post-1986 data. Their evidence 
implies that the credibility effects stemming from ERM membership were small. Rather than 
credibility effects, they point to the adherence to tight macroeconomic policies as the key for the 
changing behaviour in some countries. This point is partly confirmed by the discussion in 
section 1.7.2, comparing the cases of Italy and France.
In addition, as Artis and Ormerod (1996) put it, it is problematic to explain anti- 
inflationary pressure in the EU solely because of the ERM. During most of the ERM period 
overall disinflation could be observed in the whole of the OECD, including non-ERM countries. 
In addition, they point out that, in trying to detect an EMS effect, it is impossible to distinguish 
between behavioural change in labour market that happened due to the ERM or other institutional 
changes in labour markets, including regulatory changes, or changes in working conditions. 
Hence, it is necessary to examine labour market structures closely, which will be done in 
Chapters 6 to 8.
1.7.2. The cases of France and Italy
This section analyses more closely the examples of France and Italy regarding the 
structural impact of the ERM on domestic labour markets. With ERM membership in the 
beginning in 1979, both countries attempted to adhere to the same external policy constraints. 
This turned out to be much more difficult for Italy than for France, as demonstrated by Italy’s 
need to operate in the wider fluctuation band until January 1990, and its inability to withstand 
speculative pressure in 1992. Domestic structures crucially account for this different 
performance. The question is how these different structures influenced the strategy of policy 
adjustment chosen by these two countries in response to ERM membership.
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1.7.2.1. France
The major policy adjustment in France under the EMS started not with its original 
membership in 1979, but with the U-turn in its expansionary macroeconomic policy in 1983. 
The original French EMS strategy to combine external stability with traditional redistributive 
Keynesianism, which produced consistently higher inflation than in Germany, failed in 1982 due 
to the pressures of globalisation and capital mobility. Faced with the strategic choice between 
floating the French franc and implementing a tough strategy of macroeconomic adjustment to 
stay within the EMS, the Mitterrand administration chose to opt for the Franc Fort strategy. 
(Walsh 1994, p. 251) It can be interpreted as a specific way chosen by France to respond to the 
pressures of globalisation: the adherence to German demands for macroeconomic stability by 
emulating German macroeconomic policy. (McCarthy 1993, pp.82-84) As a consequence, from 
1983 onwards, France displayed a remarkable convergence of monetary and fiscal policy and 
underlying macroeconomic philosophy to the German model of competitive disinflation35. This 
strategy seeks external competitiveness through lower inflation than in competing countries. It 
attempts to achieve external competitiveness through disinflation rather than devaluation. Real 
wages have to increase less than productivity in order to maintain external competitiveness. The 
fall in the rate of increases in wage costs brings about lower inflation rates and/or higher 
profitability of firms. This promotes export-led growth and investment by firms, thereby 
eventually creating more employment opportunities.
France’s impressive macroeconomic record, based on the coherent combination of tough 
anti-inflationary monetary policy and fiscal consolidation towards German levels, has been
35Leading scholars argue that the Franc Fort policy reached maturity 
by 1987, after the last realignment inside the EMS. See Fitoussi et
al. (1993) .
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explained by the unwavering commitment of French policy makers to undertake the adjustments 
necessary under the EMS, despite their short-term domestic costs. (Sandholtz 1993, pp.29-30) 
The ‘strong state’ capacity of France is explained by pointing to the specific French political 
structures, which give the executive a substantial degree of autonomy (Walsh 1994, pp. 246-48). 
In addition, the fact that major firms were owned or controlled by the state made it possible for 
government officials and businessmen to be aware of French competitiveness in the international 
economy. Consequently, the French elites strongly committed themselves to raise French 
competitiveness through the enforcement of the Franc Fort strategy (Goodman and Pauly 1993, 
p.74). Thus, the Franc Fort strategy should be interpreted as a pro-active macroeconomic 
strategy, rather than as a re-active attempt to defend the exchange rate parity within the ERM. 
It was an ambitious macroeconomic strategy to restore French competitiveness and its global 
influence by emulating the German economy.
Wage behaviour under the Franc Fort strategy changed substantially, as can be observed 
in the relationship between real wages and labour productivity. In France until 1982, wages were 
rising faster than labour productivity, whereas in Germany real wage increases were in line with 
and lower than rises in productivity. After 1983, the French managed to change wage behaviour 
and exhibit lower wage increases in line with productivity increases.36
Does this successful adjustment in wage behaviour, as a result of the Franc Fort strategy, 
indicate that France implemented structural changes in industrial relations under the constraints 
imposed by the ERM? The French system of labour market management went through 
considerable structural and institutional changes in the 1980s. The French government adopted 
successive measures to make labour markets more flexible, including wage de-indexation since
36For a graphical presentation, see Figures A2 and A3 in Blanchard and 
Muet (1993, p.49).
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198337, a slowing down of the minimum wage increases, a setting of strict wage guidelines for 
the public sector and nationalised firms to initiate wage moderation, a relaxation of job security 
legislation, and a reduction in welfare and unemployment benefits. In addition, wage bargaining 
has been decentralised. Since the mid-1980s, many firms applied performance related pay 
systems to enhance relative wage flexibility. (Boyer 1994, p. 59) As a result, the wage / price 
spiral in France was stabilised, a major factor contributing to the convergence of French-German 
inflation rates. (Onofri and Tomasini 1992) The key development here is the gradual wage de­
indexation of the 1980s. At the beginning of the 1980s, the impact of wage indexation on 
domestic inflation was almost instantaneous, but changed throughout the 1980s to become partial 
and lagged. (Artus and Salomon 1996, p.40)
Although these changes in structure and performance strengthened the sustainability of 
the French economy within the constraints of the ERM, there is little econometric evidence that 
they happened in response to ERM membership. As Artus and Salomon (1996) put it: “[i]t is 
commonly held that the EMS has had an influence on the French labour market, modifying the 
wage formation schema. We don’t find... evidence of such change.” (p.54) With regard to the 
changes in wage indexation, they specify that it was not systemic factors, but domestic 
considerations which account for the change: “[djomestic policy developments... seem to have 
proved more important in changing the mechanism of wage formation in France than the 
evolution of the functioning of the EMS.” (p. 40) Even if there is no econometric evidence to link 
French wage performance and the EMS, the question remains whether domestic policy 
developments stem from strategic political choices influenced by the commitment of policy 
makers to the ERM. What were these domestic policy developments, how did they affect labour
37Though explicit wage indexation was forbidden by law, the majority 
of wages agreed through collective bargaining were de facto indexed to past 
inflation.
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market structures, and how did they relate to the Franc Fort strategy?
The capacity of French policy makers to push through convergence towards the German 
system looks less impressive, if one considers wider structural reforms in labour markets beyond 
changes in wage behaviour. Whereas there is evidence of considerable structural reforms in the 
industrial and financial sector, evidence of structural changes in the labour markets in response 
to EMS pressure to converge towards Germany is weak.38 This does not mean that the 
government did not initiate labour market reforms. On the contrary, the government attempted 
to change labour market structure in line with the German practice. However, the structural 
difference in French labour markets brought about a different outcome than expected.
The major structural changes in French labour markets which underpinned their more 
disinflationary and more flexible performance have been an unintended consequence of the Loi 
Auroux passed between 1982-86 at the initiative of the socialists. The Loi Auroux was intended 
to improve the bargaining position of employees and trade unions at the workplace level, in the 
face of a fragmented and weak trade union structure at the sectoral and national levels in France. 
The legislation stipulated the following structural changes: first, management was obliged to 
negotiate with trade unions at the firm level about wages and working conditions on an annual 
basis. Second, under narrowly specified conditions, these firm level bargains were allowed to 
undercut wage settlements agreed at a higher-level. Third, co-determination of the employees 
at the workplace was legally established, and fourth, the power of trade union representatives at 
the firm level was enhanced. (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1993, p. 161)
The interesting point about the Loi Auroux is that it was inspired by the German example 
of industrial democracy, and designed to overcome traditional French authoritarian labour market
380n structural changes in industry see Boltho (1996, p.99) and Walsh 
(1994). On the reforms undertaken to create a more competitive financial 
sector based on the German credit-based system, and in response to growing 
international constraints, see Loriaux (1992).
structures associated with the power of patronat by increasing trade union representation and 
power at the firm level. This law can be interpreted as evidence of the influence of the EMS on 
political initiatives for labour market restructuring, and the French attempt to achieve structural 
convergence with the German economy. As Boltho (1996) put it, the switch to practices of 
German social dialogue was questionable since competitive disinflation requires an acquiescent 
labour force and weak unions. Emulating German structures for this purpose made little sense 
as German co-determination would not produce the expected result in the absence of the many 
other conditions which had shaped Germany’s industrial relations, (p. 100)
Paradoxically, what allowed the Franc Fort policy to succeed was the failure to emulate 
German labour market structure, in the face of the resilience of traditional labour market 
structures. What had not been foreseen by policy makers was the effect of the weak and 
fragmented nature of French trade unions. On the one hand, the laws eroded the influence of 
sectoral level wage bargaining, but on the other hand, they failed to strengthen trade union power 
at the firm level. As a consequence, as Howell (1992a) points out, the law produced greater 
labour flexibility at the firm level in the interest of employers. Given the more unified position 
of management against fragmented employee representation, the law resulted in a rapid increase 
in firm agreements to improve efficiency and undercut sectoral level wage bargaining. In other 
words, the consequences of the laws were opposite to their intentions. As Altvater and 
Mahnkopf (1993, p. 160) put it, ultimately, the Loi Auroux restored the power ofpatronat under 
conditions of greater flexibility. In other words, the French government embarked on the Loi 
Auroux with the intention of improving French labour market performance by establishing 
industrial democracy. The former objective was met but at the expense of the latter. France was 
unsuccessful in emulating German labour market structure and thus was not able to achieve 
structural convergence with the German labour market regime, which is able to both keep its
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competitiveness and embrace industrial democracy.
Overall, except for wage behaviour, the success of structural reforms in the labour 
markets motivated by the EMS constraints was very limited. Traditional French labour market 
structures asserted themselves against policy makers’ determination for change. Strong political 
leadership which had been able to facilitate adjustment at the macroeconomic policy level was 
not enough to push through convergence of labour market structures. (Boltho 1996, p. 100) 
Domestic structure intervened between policy choices and policy outcomes. The French 
experience thus suggests that the choices of policy makers to implement adjustments in 
compliance with international monetary commitments face growing domestic constraints, the 
more domestic social institutions are affected. The importance of traditional social preferences 
is particularly strong in the highly sensitive and politically-charged area of labour markets.
1.7.2.2. Italy
Italy, even more than France, represents a case of political elites choosing to take 
advantage of the external constraints imposed by EMS membership (vincolo esterno) to push 
through domestic structural adjustment. (Dyson and Featherstone 1996) Yet, unlike France, Italy 
did not have a comprehensive macroeconomic strategy to undertake economic reforms pro­
actively as it lacked consistent and strong state leadership and ability. The technocratic elites’ 
aspiration for domestic structural reform was confronted by continuous inflationary deficit 
spending rooted in the nature of Italy as a ‘weak state’ (partitocrazia), and the resilience of 
Italy’s traditional inflationary wage bargaining system. (Walsh 1994) Hence, relative to the 
French case, Italy’s policy actions remain re-active, aiming to defend the exchange rate pegs 
within the ERM. The expulsion of Italy from the ERM under speculative pressure in 1992
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demonstrated that the use of vincolo estemo did not bring about a comprehensive enough 
adjustment in the Italian economic structure to underpin a sustainable position for the Italian Lira 
in the ERM.
Like France, Italy was a founding member of the EMS, but given the fundamental 
weaknesses of its economy, it joined the ERM within the broad band of ±6%. The structural 
weaknesses of the Italian economy which led to persistently higher inflation rates than in 
Germany, forced Italy to devalue the Lira six times between 1979 and 1990. Nevertheless, in 
January 1990 the Italian government decided to increase vincolo estemo by moving to the narrow 
±2.25% fluctuation band, although Italy’s inflation rate for 1990 was still 3.4% above the 
German rate39. In September 1992, Italy’s membership of the EMS had to be suspended under 
the pressure of speculative attacks, but the continued commitment of political elites to the ERM 
and to the project of the EMU allowed Italy to rejoin the ERM with effect from November 1996. 
Consequently, Italy was able to qualify for original membership of the single currency, 
demonstrating sufficient inflationary and budgetary convergence in 1997. Overall, Italy only 
managed in the immediate period before its entry to EMU to bring its fundamentals in line with 
the requirements of the single currency. The speculative attacks of 1992 bear evidence to the fact 
that at least until the beginning of the 1990s, vincolo esterno had not achieved sufficient 
convergence of Italian fundamentals to the levels of France and Germany. Attacks have 
consequently been interpreted in the case of Italy as being caused mainly by competitiveness 
problems40.
It has to be noted that the Italian political commitment to the EMS and EMU never
39Table 25 of Statistical Annex of European Economy. European Economy 
June 1997. For details on the realignment of the Lira within the EMS, see 
Tsoukalis (1997), table 7.2., p. 147.
40E.g. Fratianni and Artis (1996).
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weakened, despite the setbacks of 1992. The political strategy underpinning this commitment
was the decision by the Italian technocratic elites to use vincolo esterno to impose discipline on
the state’s economic and monetary policies, in the face of partitocrazia.
The ‘ vincolo estemo’ involved a particular version of a two-level game: here the 
domestic ‘reverberation effects’ were of prime importance. EC-level 
developments and commitments were used by Italian elites to restructure the 
domestic policy process, thereby revising the balance of power between key 
actors and opening up new opportunities for policy reform at home. (Dyson and 
Featherstone 1996, p. 291)
On the agenda of domestic reform brought about by vincolo estemo, two structural and 
institutional changes feature prominently: i.e., the ‘divorce’ of the Bank of Italy from the 
Treasury between 1991 and 1994 and the gradual erosion and final abolition of the scala mobile, 
the Italian system of wage indexation, by 199341.
In respect to the question of how domestic structure intervened with the strategy of Italian 
elites taking advantage of external pressure to push through domestic reforms, the long process 
of removing the scala mobile is particularly illustrative. The scala mobile was the main labour 
market related cause for persistently high inflation in Italy throughout the 1980s and into the 
1990s42. Though wage indexation was dismantled completely in Italy only in 1993, the 
government tried to reduce its influence earlier. A peculiarity of the three-yearly rounds of wage 
bargaining in Italy emphasised absolute rather than proportional increases in wages, which 
defended the purchasing power of workers over the duration of the contract by comprehensive 
wage indexation. The scala mobile was widely believed to be a prime cause of inflation inertia 
in Italy. The Bank of Italy estimated the proportion of wage changes caused by the scala mobile, 
which was 60% in 1975 and 80% in 1978. (Barrell 1990, p. 68) Not only did backward-looking
41See Walsh (1994), p. 254-56, and Dyson and Featherstone (1996),
p.292.
42The other main cause being the inability of the Italian state to 
bring excessive public deficits under control.
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wage indexation increase the inertia of wage inflation, it also led to real wage inflexibility, 
thereby making it difficult for the economy to adjust to real shocks. In other words, the scala 
mobile raised the cost of disinflation, and made it difficult to absorb these shocks by distorting 
the efficient allocation of resources.43
With the joining of EMS, the Bank of Italy slowly managed to gain credibility, which 
made it possible for the government to address the problem of scala mobile. Yet, it was a 
painstakingly slow process. In 1983, it was modified to reduce the degree of indexation from 
1 to 0.85. The government set, by decree, a ceiling to limit wage indexation to one year in 1984. 
This was a minor change and the measure by itself should not have become significant. Yet, the 
opposition and militant unions called for a national referendum and were defeated. This defeat, 
in combination with the display of firmness of the government’s policy commitment, began to 
affect expectations far more than the measure itself. Given the fact that it took six years after the 
start of the EMS to be able to observe significant changes in labour market behaviour, EMS 
membership alone was not enough to change the expectations of the price-setters 
instantaneously. Rather, as Giavazzi and Spaventa (1989) put it, successive Italian governments 
had to prove the firmness of their policy commitment by being prepared to bear the cost of the 
unpopularity of a disinflationary strategy. Only then price-setters perceived the new monetary 
targets as credible and lasting, thereby changing expectations and behaviour in the labour 
markets. In 1985, the frequency of the adjustment was reduced from quarterly to bi-annually. 
In addition, the indexation rules were modified so that only those with low wages were 
compensated fully. The wages above that level were either partially indexed or not indexed at 
all. In 1986, a new indexation clause, a mild degree of indexation exhibiting wage elasticity of
0.5 lasting until 1991, was agreed. The government tried to abolish the scala mobile in summer
43For more detail, see OECD (1986a)
66
1990, but failed due to trade union pressure.
The scala mobile was finally abolished in 1992-1993. After long negotiations in July 
1992, the government, trade unions and the employers associations reached an agreement, the 
“Income Policy Agreement”. This agreement established the definitive abolition of the 
indexation mechanism. The agreement also set guidelines for a comprehensive reshaping of 
wage bargaining processes to improve the coordination of bargaining at different levels. This 
was a complementary but important measure because, in the past, the lack of coordination 
exacerbated the inflation inertia caused, predominantly, by the wage indexation mechanism. 
Furthermore, it represented the beginning of a structural shift in wage bargaining relations, with 
the six most important employers organisations and the three large trade union confederations 
agreeing to complement central wage bargaining with regional and sectoral wage bargaining 
contracts over longer periods, modelled on the example of Germany. (Altvater and Mahnkopf 
1993)
The drawn-out processes of adjustment in the labour market regime under the pressure 
of vincolo estemo contrast with the relatively fast and successful divorce of the Bank of Italy 
from the Treasury. This divorce starting in 1981 increased the autonomy of the bank to 
determine the money supply independently of the inflationary policies of the Treasury44. As 
Walsh (1994) emphasises, although this divorce allowed the Italian central bank to give priority 
to the defence of the exchange rate commitment under the EMS, the strategy was undermined 
throughout the 1980s by the government’s inability to control inflation and fiscal deficits, (p.254)
What explains the varying degrees of success of the Italian technocratic elites to push 
through the strategy of domestic reforms in the financial and labour markets by making use of 
the ERM constraints? It is here that attention has to be paid to the different fashion in which the
44Goodman (1992) p. 181. For a detailed description of the steps taken 
to divorce the Bank of Italy from the Treasury, see Walsh (1994), p.255-56.
respective domestic structures intervened: financial and labour market structures imposed 
different degrees of constraint on the capacity of policy makers to push for change. In the case 
of the divorce of the Bank of Italy, relatively quick and comprehensive adjustment was possible 
because the area of central banking was atypical for Italian policy making mechanisms insofar 
as it was controlled by a small group of senior civil servants in a core executive strongly 
committed to the ERM. (Dyson and Featherstone 1996). Furthermore, as Helleiner (1995) 
explained, the technocratic nature of financial reform has low domestic political visibility and 
thus faces comparatively little domestic resistance (pp.203-05). Vincolo esterno was sufficient 
to push through the divorce. There was consensus among technocratic elites to make the Bank 
of Italy an efficient political agent for economic soundness in the Italian political system that was 
inefficient overall. In contrast, the reform of the scala mobile touched upon deeply-ingrained 
institutional patterns of labour market behaviour embedded in civic society, with a high public 
profile. In addition, it was strongly defended by the militant trade union movement. 
Consequently, the structural resilience of the wage bargaining pattern was very high. In fact, 
until 1992, vincolo estemo was only able to change the scala mobile in a piecemeal fashion. The 
structure itself stayed essentially intact, and remained a key factor behind the unsustainable 
inflationary performance of Italy until 1992. Vincolo esterno was only able to break up domestic 
labour market structures with the shift to the EMU project in the early 1990s. As Carli notes, 
“the Italian classepolitico did not realize that by agreeing to the (Maastricht) Treaty, it put itself 
in the position of already accepting a change of such magnitude that it would hardly leave it 
unscathed45.” It took three factors to achieve a breakthrough in domestic labour market reform: 
first, the comprehensive crisis of the Italian political system, second, its consequent 
transformation by the technocratic elites (silent revolution), and third, an increase in external
45Quoted in Dyson and Featherstone (1996, p. 277).
pressure due to Italy’s desire to be a first round member of EMU. As Walsh (1994) asserts, the 
Italian case shows how much the capability of policy makers to use external pressure to facilitate 
domestic reform is contingent on domestic structures. The weak structure of the political system 
and the traditional labour market structure in Italy brought about the only mixed success of 
vincolo estemo. Until the mid 1990s, Italy was not able to create a coherent domestic structural 
framework to sustain exchange rate stability in the ERM: it was solely dependent in its defence 
of the exchange rate on the central bank. (Walsh 1994, pp. 254,257) The Italian experience thus 
underlines the importance of domestic structures and in particular labour market structures as an 
intervening variable in the strategy of adjustment.
1.7.2.3. Conclusion
The close examination of the French and Italian cases suggests that EMS membership, 
among other factors, directly or indirectly affected the changes in their domestic economic 
structures, but policy makers had difficulty in achieving the desired outcome and / or swift 
results in labour market reforms. These cases demonstrate the importance of domestic structural 
analysis as the foundation of any assessment of the capability of policy makers to push through 
economic reform as a consequence of commitments to international monetary cooperation. 
Following the logic of the two-level games, the policy makers’ ability to use external constraints 
to achieve adjustment of domestic structures was itself constrained by the resilience of the 
domestic structures themselves. Although, as Walsh (1994) observed, domestic structures are 
not entirely static but change in response to their environment (p.258), external pressure alone 
is not a guarantee for a smooth and rapid restructuring. As a comparison of France and Italy 
shows, if domestic structures featured a substantial level of compatibility with the systemic
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requirements of the ERM, a policy strategy built around an exchange rate commitment brought
about a considerable degree of economic convergence relatively smoothly. Onofri and Tomasini
(1992) argue in this respect as follows:
France, in taking EMS discipline seriously, was able to converge to German 
performance without the EMS exerting a crucial role, but... Italy was inconsistent 
in her attitude to EMS discipline, and reached partial convergence mainly 
because of the effect exerted by EMS. Of course, having one’s hands tied is more 
useful for undisciplined people than for disciplined ones! (p. 96)
Applied to the EMU project, this means that if countries do not have domestic structures, 
and in particular, labour market structures supporting domestic price discipline, the constraining 
effects of the monetary union do not by themselves guarantee full and immediate convergence 
of domestic structures towards a stability culture. Existing domestic labour market structures 
have to be taken into account as a crucial intervening variable when it comes to the question of 
what the capacity of policy makers is to turn monetary union into a success.
In both the cases of Italy and France, policy makers faced substantial constraints in their 
push for structural reform, particularly in the politically-sensitive area of labour markets. On the 
other hand, the differences in labour market behaviour in France and Italy, in comparison with 
Germany, were one of the main causes for the sustainability problems these two countries faced 
under the ERM. The lesson for EMU is that the greater the structural differences between 
nations are in their politically-sensitive labour market regimes, the greater the challenge policy 
makers face. The contribution of this thesis, the investigation of structural differences of present 
national labour markets, points to the structural policy challenges lying ahead for Eurozone 
policymakers.
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Chapter 2
Review and critique of the literature analysing monetary union
Having pointed out the importance of domestic structural analysis in Chapter 1, this 
chapter surveys different approaches taken by different disciplines dealing with EMU or being 
relevant to the analysis of EMU. The chapter aims to identify the strengths and intellectual 
weaknesses of existing studies. By discussing the advantages and limitations of different view 
points, I argue for the need to introduce a political economic approach with structural 
connotations.
EMU is a subject covered exhaustively by social scientists. Irrespective of the 
convergence criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty, many economists have studied the degree of 
European economic convergence, resulting from the European Monetary System. Generally, 
these works deal with quantifiable nominal convergence, namely, inflation and interest rates.1 
These empirical studies often lack political economic perspectives. Most work done by political 
scientists deal with the political process of European integration, its history and the development 
of the single market.2 However, there have been remarkably few studies done by political 
scientists on EMU that deal with the issue of structural sustainability of EMU as a monetary and 
economic zone.3
1For example, see a number of articles in Barrell ed. (1992), 
Collinion ed. (1994) Artis and Ormerod (1994), Blass and Foster eds.
(1992), Gros and Thygesen (1992), Commission of the European Communities
(1989).
2Among recent works, see Tsoukalis, L. (1997), Guerrieri, P. and P. 
Padoan (1989), Moravcsik, A. (1991,1994), Garrett, G. (1992).
3Few exceptions which touched upon the structural elements are: 
Pauly, L. (1991-2), Garrett, G. (1994), Woolley, J. (1994), Martin, L. 
(1994), Cohen, B. (1994), W. Sandholtz (1993). However, their analyses 
do not go beyond the monetary structure.
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Methodologically, economists tend to quantify thus focus on issues related to quantifiable 
variables, and political scientists focus on the political process of reaching a certain policy 
outcome such as the Maastricht Treaty. The majority of economic implications for EMU has 
been studied using cost benefit analysis based on the theory of optimum currency areas.4 I shall, 
furthermore, introduce the approach taken by economic historians, as they make interesting 
attempts to parallel historical monetary union experiences to today’s EMU. Though much of 
the literature has hinted at the importance of structure, none has provided a constructive and 
comprehensive theoretical framework to examine the labour market structure in the context of 
monetary union. After surveying the literature, I shall present an alternative theory in Chapter 
3, by using the French regulation school.
2.1. Perspective of political scientists/economists
Studying amicable conditions for monetary union is traditionally not the strong-suit of 
political scientists or political economists. Indeed, until the 1990s there was a lack of analysis 
on international monetary affairs by international political economists. They tended to study 
trade, rather than monetary and financial issues. Only a small number of scholars, notably 
Strange (1971, 1986, 1988), Calleo and Strange (1984) Cohen (1978, 1993), Frieden (1987), 
Block (1977), Walter (1991) contributed to the political economic analysis of international 
money and finance.
However, in the 1990s, as international finance became more pivotal, more works
4One Market, One Money: an Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and 
Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union. (European Economy no.44, 
October 1990) the official study by the European Commission, suggests 
rather marginal direct benefits, although it also suggests potential 
indirect benefits, such as microeconomic efficiency, and increased 
leverage in international policy coordination processes.
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analysing the issue were published. There are two camps of scholars in international political 
economy who subscribe in the different level of analysis: those who predominantly take systemic 
approaches and those with domestic approaches. The most traditional thesis in the former 
approach is the theory of hegemonic stability (HST), which deals with the management of the 
international economic system. Though it has not been applied to monetary union, it has been 
applied to analyse systemic stability of international monetary systems, notably by Kindleberger 
(1986), Eichengreen (1989) and Walter (1991).
2.1.1. Theories focussed at the systemic level of analysis
The HST was developed by Kindleberger, who argued that a properly functioning world 
economy requires a leading economic power (a nation state) to provide the public good of 
international financial stability. He specified the five functions of a hegemon as follows: first, 
providing a relatively open market for distressed goods, thereby reducing the threat of 
protectionism in the world economy; second, providing counter-cyclical liquidity to secure stable 
long-term lending to the rest of the world; third, providing a relatively stable system of exchange 
rates by prohibiting competitive devaluations; fourth, coordinating macroeconomic policies; and 
fifth, ensuring political order through military preeminence. Though it is questionable whether 
hegemons - Britain during the Classical Gold Standard, and America during the Bretton Woods 
system - satisfied these five criteria5, the HST leads to the conclusion that a system where power 
is asymmetrically distributed with the presence of a strong and influential hegemon is more stable 
than a symmetrically organised system. In other words, a system comprising countries with a 
clear hierarchy of power functions better than a system with a more symmetric distribution of
5For a thorough critique of the HST regarding British and American 
hegemony, see Eichengreen (1989) and Walter (1991).
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power, according to the HST. Indeed, Kindleberger states that the decline of British hegemony 
accompanied by the lack of leadership by the emerging hegemon (America) in the 1920s and 
1930s was the key factor which contributed to the disorder of the world economy in the interwar 
period. I shall take account of these assertions when I examine historical monetary unions - Latin 
Monetary Union and Scandinavian Monetary Union - in chapter 4.
The more recent approaches can be summarised as follows: Articles in Corbridge, Thrift, 
and Martin (1994) approach several issues related to global finance from the geographic 
structuralist perspective. Cemy (1993), Helleiner (1993), Gill (1993), Underhill (1993) provide 
a structurationist/structuralist framework to analyse the international finance. Contributors in 
Bonefeld and Holloway (1995) analyse global private finance from the Marxist point of view. 
In addition, Epstein (1996) presents a realist analysis of the international credit regime. 
However, these studies generally touch on the issue of EMU as a response to cope with the 
globalisation of finance.
2.1.1.1. Integration theories
Regarding Europe, the traditional area of expertise of systemic analyses lies in studies 
applying integration theories. Since the 1950s, they have analysed the integration process of the 
European Community. There are two systemic analytical frameworks developed in integration 
theory: functionalism, and neo-functionalism. Functionalism was developed by Mitrany (1943). 
He argued that as economies become transnational, the need for the creation of transnational 
"functional agencies" arises to resolve transnational problems. Such functional agencies 
"determine its appropriate organs", (p.35) Through such integration processes, nation states 
would lose their power and meaning of existence. Mitrany speaks of an international civil service
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which would provide public services, instead of individual governments, as their differences in 
ideology are the cause of conflict. This extremely idealistic picture of the world ignores the 
political elements in decision-making on both the national and transnational level. This is, 
indeed, a serious flaw in the theory.
Haas (1958) criticised Mitrany's framework of functionalism by presenting an alternative, 
neo-fimctionalism. Haas provided the framework for political integration, that is for an 
integration process which is not "functional" in Mitrany’s sense. Neo-functionalism explains 
integration processes through spill-over effects. The neo-functionalists define political 
integration as a process in which political actors are persuaded to shift the focus of their 
expectations, activities and loyalties towards a new supranational governmental institution. 
Rather than transferring sovereignty to transnational organisations (as fuctionalism suggests), 
neo-functionalism believes that integration proceeds by the pooling of state sovereignty. Though 
neo-functionalism starts from a critique of functionalism, it shares largely the same philosophy. 
Neo-functionalists suggest that the process of integration is inherently expansive, following a 
functional logic, thus containing automatic spill-over elements.6 This theory was popular in the 
1960s and the early 1970s among liberal academics. Since then, however, it has lost its 
popularity in international political economy.7 Since the development of integration theories 
were closely connected to the real development of the European Community, its apparent 
stagnation in the 1970s may be the reason behind the decline of the theory. (Mutimer 1994, p.37) 
Neo-fimctionalism would argue that the logical step forward after the completion of the single 
market is monetary union.
sFor more details of the theoretical definition of neo­
functionalism, see Haas (1958, 1964) and Lindberg (1963).
7Even the prime author of neo-functionalism, Haas, states the 
obsolescence of the theory in his article published in 1975.
2.1.2. Theories incorporating domestic level of analysis
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With the passing of the Single European Act in 1986, the European project moved to a 
new level in the integration process. Along with this trend, political scientists provide a new 
approach to theorise integration by focussing on intergovernmental bargains. (Keohane and 
Hoffmann 1991) Criticising neo-functionalism as an idealistic pre-theory, Moravcsik (1994) 
endorses a version of positivist neo-realism, called intergovemmentalism. Intergovemmentalism 
is an attempt to add a domestic level of analysis in the European integration process. It denies 
that spillover effects in supranational action (such as in the European Community) are a decisive 
force behind the steps towards integration (such as the Single European Act). Instead, it argues 
that intergovernmental bargaining is the central driving force for integration. 
Intergovemmentalism attempts the combination of two levels of seemingly contradictory 
decision making processes. On one level, domestic preferences are formed in accordance with 
the liberal theory (focussing on state-society relations, though within a pluralist framework). On 
another level, interstate negotiations reflect such domestic factors. The study of bargaining 
among rational governments is the focus of the analysis at this stage, which Moravcsik interprets 
as an attempt to reach a compromise. His positivist logic shares concepts with game theory (in 
this case, the two-level game model).8 As his model identifies only two distinctly different stages 
of a bargaining game, it is weak in capturing complex reality. Interest coalitions can spread 
across domestic and international levels. Domestic positions are not always decided prior to 
intergovernmental negotiation, and, furthermore, they can change over time.9 Despite the flaws,
eThe two-level game approach which has gained prominence in 
rationalist international political economy focusing on the interaction 
of the domestic and the systemic level has been introduced by Putnum 
(1988)and elaborated by Evans et al. eds.(1993).
9Another example using this theory is Sandholtz, W. (1993).
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however, it is definitely the contribution of intergovemmentalism to have introduced the 
domestic politics of the member states into the study of integration processes and to have 
attempted to integrate both the systemic and the domestic level of analysis.
Milner (1997) further develops the methodology for the analysis of the interaction 
between the international and the domestic level and investigates the importance of domestic 
preferences and institutions in international negotiations. She develops the theoretical concept 
of two level games, applied by Moravcsik, by looking at specific domestic institutions in a more 
systematic manner. However, her selection and interpretation of domestic institutions is too 
narrow and rigid. Her choice of domestic institutions is influenced by her intention to gauge the 
relative power balance in domestic and international bargaining relationships, rather than to 
explain broader underlying structural patterns which influence the social preferences of a country.
Indeed, the explanation of a particular bargaining process rather than the rationale of 
integration became the main interest of empirical studies. Such studies highlight linkage politics, 
domestic power distribution, and transnational relations as explanatory factors for a particular 
transnational bargaining outcome. The linkage politics approach is the attempt to explain a 
particular outcome as a result of bargaining by linking two (or more) unconnected issues. Indeed, 
this is what Delors called hostage-taking behaviour, and seems to happen frequently in practice. 
Martin (1994) focuses on the issue of linking within the EU bargaining process as a way for 
member states to use such linkage "to gain the support of other states on which the latter have 
no other compelling interest. Since refusal to go along could jeopardize the broad array of 
benefits provided by the EC, linkages have increased incentives to cooperate"9 (p.89-90) Garrett 
(1994) and Woolley (1994) argue that Germany accepted EMU in return for progress in political
9For example, Britain used linkage tactics to generate support from 
reluctant member states for economic sanctions against Argentina in 1982.
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matters, in particular a common foreign policy. Linkage politics is a powerful way to explain the 
political process but is, on the other hand, merely a particular form of bargaining process 
analysis. It needs more sophistication to be developed fully as a theory.
The domestic power distribution approach is an attempt to explain international 
phenomena as a result of pressures from certain domestic economic groups. If a country takes 
a pro-EMU stance, it is because EMU improves the welfare of particular powerful groups within 
a country. Using this approach, very open economies should be most enthusiastic about EMU. 
Smaller countries in the European Union, such as the Benelux countries are most open and they 
are undoubtedly ardent promoters of EMU. Among the relatively less open economies in Europe 
- Germany, France, Italy and Britain - attitudes towards EMU are very different. The stance of 
powerful economic groups in the former three countries is generally pro-Emu, but those in 
Britain are split: whereas the big manufacturing sector is for EMU, the financial sector is very 
sceptical. This analysis is also fails to take account of public sentiment: British population is 
traditionally sceptical about the European project, and so are the Danish who live in a very open 
economy. Hence, with this approach, one can also understand only the partial picture affecting 
a bargaining outcome. This approach also tends to over-emphasize domestic concerns, ignoring 
systemic constraints, such as an internationally dominant ideology, or a change in the balance of 
power between market and state.10
Cameron (1995) studies the process leading to the Maastricht Treaty in order to determine 
whose influence is dominant in shaping the process. He argued that such dominance cannot be 
imputed to any national government, nor to the supranational institutions of the Community. 
Instead, it was exercised by a number of what he calls "transnational actors" (p.73), in particular, 
Karl Otto Pohl and Hans Tietmeyer of the Bundesbank. He also states that the Community
10For examples of studies using this approach, see Frieden, J.
(1994) and Goodman, J. (1992) .
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institutions helped such transnational actors to facilitate their activities. He attributed the 
foundation of the strong influence of Pohl and Tietmeyer to the particular domestic structure of 
the German polity. Due to its legal independence, the Bundesbank could articulate its unique 
position, whereas most EU central banks' stances were subordinate to their finance ministries.
Like Cameron, Dyson (1994) emphasises the role of policy actors in the European
integration process and in particular EMU. However, unlike the mere bargaining process
explanations mentioned above, and like Moravcsik’s intergovemmentalism, Dyson made a
conscious attempt to theorise the European integration processes. Central to his thesis is the
application of “policy learning” (Heclo 1974) to the EMU process:
Policy is a learning process in the sense that specific policies have their origin in, 
and derive their character from, specific historical events to which they are a 
response; and in the second sense that policy makers are continually needing to 
relate new ideas and information to the accumulated experience of policy and 
decide what kinds of adjustments to policy are required. Propelling this learning 
process are the dynamics of structural change in the international political 
economy; these dynamics are expressed in the historical events and new ideas and 
information that affect policy development. But the idea of policy as a learning 
process points to a ‘self-reinforcing’ dimension in policy change, (p. 92)
Such policy changes are executed through bargaining in accordance with the two-level policy
process, as Moravcsik has argued, where the will and capability of policy actors are shaped and
constrained by structural power11, i.e. the embeddedness of decision-making in the structures of
the national and international political economy. Structures influence and define the framework
of bargaining relations in Europe. By putting policy learning and transfer at the centre of his
thesis, Dyson manages to capture the dynamism of the EMU process, as “a process whose policy
outcomes and end effects cannot be fully predicted but which is neither random nor chaotic in
its development.” (1994, p. 17) His encompassing analysis enables him to explain negotiation
1:lFor a definition of the political and economic controls over the 
international system, which constitute the sources of structural power, 
see Dyson (1994), p.15-16.
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processes, resulting outcomes and structural change ex-post. However, it has to be 
complemented by explanations focussing on where the need for policy adjustments comes from,
i.e. by explanations concerned with the question of structural differences.
As Tsoukalis (1997) put it, “EMU is a major political issue, because of its wider 
economic ramifications and also because it touches the very heart of national sovereignty.” 
(p. 163) Thus, the analysis of bargaining and policy processes makes an important contribution 
to the understanding of the EMS / EMU process and the corresponding structural changes coming 
with it. This was addressed in Chapter 1, where the influence of the EMS on member states was 
discussed. However, this literature is inadequate when it comes to questions regarding structural 
differences in domestic economies, which require for structural change. For example, it cannot 
answer why certain countries could and others could not manage to transform their economic 
structures sufficiently through the EMS processes of borrowing credibility and were thus able 
to defend their ERM peg in the face of exchange rate crises. The reason for the French ability 
and Italian inability to survive the ERM crisis of 1992-93 can only fully be explained by taking 
into account the structural differences in their economies, in addition to policy commitment and 
state capacity. Hence, the political literature can be improved by incorporating a more 
comprehensive structural perspective: it would enable us to gain a better understanding of the 
dynamic interaction between structure and the need for policy intervention. Looking into 
structure enables students of International Political Economy to identify ex-ante, the area of 
policy intervention needed to bring about structural changes.
2.2. Perspective from economic historians
Economic historians have certainly studied structure, since history generally provides the
opportunity to examine wider areas of activities than is the case for economics or political 
science/economy. There are a number of works which study historical monetary regimes in an 
attempt to answer the questions surrounding the EMU project. These works, however, mainly 
focus on monetary structure, especially monetary management, by examining the working of 
central banks. Most of them do not study broader socio-economic conditions and structure in 
relation to the working of monetary unions. Certainly it is difficult to collect statistics for the 
19th century, because they are either not available or not compatible with present statistics. 
Panic's work (1992) is the only solid study which compares the gold standard with the European 
Monetary System (EMS) in this respect. In Chapter 4 ,1 shall attempt a similar comparison of 
the EMS/EMU with the Latin Monetary Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union.
Other economic historians examine monetary unions of the 19th and 18th centuries to find 
lessons for the current EMU project. They study the Latin Monetary Union, the Scandinavian 
Monetary Union, the German monetary union, the Italian monetary union, the early American 
monetary union and so on. Some studied a historical monetary union in detail in the light of its 
monetary management etc., and some briefly surveyed many monetary unions in history to 
extract the essence of their success or failure. The latter approach was taken by Cohen (1994), 
Graboyes (1990), and Bartel (1974). Their works are useful in singling out some common 
features among historical monetary unions. By doing so, one can determine factors which led 
to their success or collapse. Examining the New England, Latin and Scandinavian Monetary 
Unions and the East African Currency Area, Graboyes (1990) argues that the over-issue of money 
is the catalyst behind the collapse of monetary unions. The money supply of the New England 
monetary union was restrained by Massachusetts, the Latin and Scandinavian Monetary Unions 
were restrained by the metallic standards, and the East African Currency Area was restrained by 
convertibility within the Sterling area. In all these unions eventually the influence of such an
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external regulating standard, i.e., "the depoliticizing factor, disappeared, leaving the individual 
political justifications free to determine their own money supplies... Members preyed on their 
partners by issuing excessive amounts of money, which union members were forced to accept." 
(p.14)
Perlman (1993), Milward (1996), Lester (1939), Sannucci (1989), Fratianni and Spinelli 
(1984, 85) Holtfrerich (1989), Miron (1989), Eichengreen (1992), Rolnick, Smith and Weber 
(1994), and Sheridan (1996) take the former approach, and study the Latin Monetary Union, the 
Scandinavian Monetary Union, the Italian Monetary Union, the German Monetary Union, and 
the American Monetary Union in detail. Among these monetary unions, the Latin Monetary 
Union as well as the Scandinavian Monetary Union attempted monetary union without political 
union. In this respect they resemble the current European monetary union. Thus, these two 
monetary unions will be studied further in Chapter 4. Apart from these two unions, the American 
monetary union and the German monetary unification of the 19th century make for an interesting 
comparison with EMU. The haphazard development of the American monetary system and its 
background will be analysed in detail in Chapter 5.
2.2.1. German Monetary union
The case of German monetary union is another interesting case to study due to its unique 
origins. The economic integration of the German states started with the establishment of the 
Zollverein, the customs union in 1834. It started with Prussia, the Hesses, Bavaria, Wiittemberg, 
Saxony, and the Thuringian States, but expanded its membership in 1842, 1854, 1867. Its 
administration was taken over by the newly established Deutsches Reich in 1871. After 1867, 
the customs administration for collecting duties was streamlined to give more power to the
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central Zollverein institution.12 On the other hand, Prussia reinforced its predominant position 
in the Zollverein. It held nearly a third of votes in the Customs Council, which gave Prussia the 
power of veto. It signed commercial treaties with other countries on behalf of the Zollverein. 
This powerful position of Prussia in the Zollverein was based on its exceptional economic power. 
According to Henderson (1939), Prussia accounted for nine-tenths of the production of the 
mining and metal industries, half of the textile factories and two-thirds of the workers employed 
in Germany’s big industry, (p.318)
Such enormous industrial predominance and economic hegemony came hand in hand with 
an intensification of political hegemony, (p.318) The Seven Weeks War between Austria and 
Prussia broke out in 1866. This caused the Germanic Confederation (Deutscher Bund)13, an 
Austrian-led political confederation established in 1815 among 35 principalities and 4 free cities 
on German territory to collapse. The rivalry between Prussia and Austria was a persistent 
problem for the Zollverein, as southern German states tended to follow Austria’s lead. The 
victory of Prussia over Austria decisively established its political hegemony, and heralded a new 
organisation of German states outside the Austrian Empire. Saxony and the South German states 
fought with Austria, but did not lose any territory, as Bismarck calculated on their support in case 
of war with France. Napoleon Ill's ambition for German territory was well-known by then, 
which caused the South German States, Saxony and Hess-Darmstadt to enter into a military 
alliance with Prussia. (Henderson, p.308)
The Zollverein served as a precursor of industrialisation and the political union of 1871. 
Before then, the Deutsche Bund had removed all restrictions on the migration of citizens in 1815.
12 Custom inspectors, who up to then had been civil servants of 
separate states, then became Zollverein officials in their own right.
13The Deutsche Bund was established after the collapse of the Holy- 
Roman Empire during the Napoleonic wars in order to stabilize the 
restoration of the old order in Germany.
As in the current case, the diversity of monetary conditions such as different denominations, 
silver-content in coins, and different monetary standards - the Thaler standard in Northern states, 
and the Gulden standard in the Southern states and Austria, was an obstacle to free trade. Indeed, 
an article in the Zollverein Treaty specified that member states should standardize their coinage 
system. (Holtfrerich p.221) Following the treaty, there was the Dresden Coinage Convention in 
1838, where fixed exchange rates between the Thaler and the Gulden was established. This could 
be seen as the equivalent to the EMS in the current situation. Money supply was subject to the 
silver standard. After the Vienna Coinage Treaty in 1857, Prussia established decisive hegemony 
in the monetary system of the Zollverein. Austria, though outside the Zollverein, linked its 
coinage to the Thaler and the Gulden. What was more important was that "the Southern German 
Gulden states thereafter minted more than 90% of their full-value silver coins in the Thaler 
Vereinsmimze (union coins) and less than 10% in Gulden state coins." (Holtfrerich, p.224) Thus, 
one can conclude that the Thaler was steadily building its position before the establishment of 
the Mark as a single currency. The decisive step towards the single currency was taken after 
political union in 1871. Monetaiy union followed political union, with the establishment of the 
Reichsbank in 1876.
One of the lessons Holtfrerich (1989) draws from the monetary unification process in 
19th-century Germany for the present EMU process is that it is problematic to attain considerable 
monetary unification prior to political unification.14 It is certainly possible to establish monetary 
union without political union. There was no political union in the case of the Latin Monetary 
Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union. However, these unions were short-lived. Indeed, 
the lasting large scale monetary unions in history have been accompanied by political unification
14The same point was made by Goodhart (1995)
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prior to monetary union, as in the case of Germany, Italy and the United States.15 Following this 
line of argument, EMU may not be long-lasting without the achievement of a deeper level of 
integration, in particular, political union. Yet, political union without the presence of legitimacy 
is also risky as the case of American monetary union reveals in Chapter 5.
What would be very interesting to investigate, but is not clearly analysed by him or other 
scholars of the German Monetary Union is "the degree of economic integration achieved by the 
formerly independent German states during this period prior to monetary unification." (Siklos 
p. 13) The same criticism holds for most of the works introduced here, studying other monetary 
unions. They often focus on monetary structure such as the organisation of banking, the 
mechanism for the control of the money supply, the degree of'independence' of the central banks 
(or how depoliticized they are), in order to draw lessons for the new European central bank. I 
shall attempt to fill some of the gaps for two 19th century European monetary unions in Chapter 
4, and for the American monetary integration before the Civil War in Chapter 5 by trying to 
incorporate wider socio-economic structural factors.
2.3. Perspective from economists
There exists a vast economic literature on EMU. I will review in this context the main 
theories which foster an understanding of structural factors. The debate about convergence, an 
issue with which many economists are concerned, was covered in detail in Chapter 1.
2.3.1. The theories of ‘Sound Money’
15The exception would be the CFA Franc Zone in Africa. But this 
case is unique because of its inheritance of French colonial 
arrangements.
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Both the theoretical debate and the policy process of EMU are centrally concerned with 
the issue of sound money. Sound money can be described as the priority of maintaining the value 
of the currency through long-term low inflation. Crucially linked to the concept of sound money 
is the issue of credibility and time inconsistency: how can a credible and consistent monetary 
policy framework be established to provide the conditions for sustainable price stability? The 
theoretical foundation of ‘sound money’ comes from monetarist ideas represented by the 
writings of Brunner and Friedman16. The debate around how to achieve sound money is centred 
on macroeconomic fundamentals. Central bank independence is considered the best way to 
achieve price stability, hence a pre-condition for joining the single currency in the Maastricht 
process. Furthermore, the problem of inflationary deficit spending has been addressed in the 
Growth and Stability Pact. In Europe, both the intellectual and practical proponent of the concept 
is the German Bundesbank, which has comprehensively influenced the constitution of the 
European Central Bank. (Giordano and Persaud 1998) Economists focus mainly on the 
immediate implication of the concept, i.e., its monetary and to a lesser extent fiscal 
implications17. They also address supply side measures like the deregulation and flexibility of 
labour markets, but only in their policy recommendations. What is lacking is the analysis of 
differences in domestic structures of EMU countries, despite the fact that the sustainability of 
sound money has structural implications beyond the structure of the ECB. A broader framework 
is needed for an understanding of these wider structural implications. This can be demonstrated 
by the issues of credibility and central bank independence.
2.3.1.1. Credibility
16See Dyson (1994), p. 233.
17Fiscal implications were discussed in detail in Chapter 1 in the 
debate on the fiscal criteria of the convergence criteria.
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The concept of credibility has been widely used since the 1980s. The concept, based on 
the rational expectations hypothesis, was operationalised in the game theoretic framework of 
“time inconsistency” (Kydland and Prescott 1977, Barro and Gordon 1983), i.e., the problem that 
an optimal policy calculated at the beginning of a planning horizon does not continue to be 
optimal at a later stage. Such inconsistency results from the forward-looking behaviour of 
private agents and the inability of policy makers to pre-commit themselves credibly to announced 
policies. Consequently, the greater the credibility of the central bank’s commitment to an anti­
inflation policy stance, the lower the costs of disinflation: credible monetary policies lead private 
agents to change their expectations and behave on the assumption that they will not be cheated 
by authorities on the commitment to low inflation. In other words, economic policies are more 
effective if they are credible to private economic agents.
Following this argument, by becoming an EMS member, an inflationary country can 
borrow credibility and reputation from the Bundesbank, which makes it easier for it to fight 
credibly for disinflation. (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988) With the presumed credibility bonus, it 
can reduce the unemployment costs of disinflation. By successfully sticking to the pre­
commitment, the government and central bank can acquire reputation, which makes it easier to 
fight inflation in future.
Several economists tested the credibility effect empirically by using proxy variables but 
the evidence generally remains inconclusive.18 It is difficult to single out the disinflationary 
effect of ERM membership, as EMS countries and many other non-EMS OECD countries have
18C.f. De Grauwe (1992), Weber (1992), and Fratianni and von Hagen
(1990), Cohen and Wyplosz (1989). Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), on the 
other hand, confirmed the hypothesis in their empirical study. Yet, what 
is missing is a full and conclusive affirmation of the hypothesis, using 
the data of the 1990s.
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been experiencing disinflation during the 1980s and the 1990s, influenced by the globalisation 
of finance, free capital mobility, and the new hegemony of neo-orthodox economic thinking.
The credibility hypothesis assumes an asymmetric functioning of the EMS, where the 
Bundesbank independently chooses its monetary policy while all other EMS members tie their 
hands on pursuing autonomous monetary policy. With the move towards EMU, two significant 
changes in the European monetary regime have taken place: first, the system moved to a more 
symmetric arrangement and second, the ECB, though modelled on the Bundesbank, is a new 
institution without any historical track record to underpin its reputation and credibility. With the 
old Bundesbank anchor gone, countries have to find alternative means to deal with potential 
inflation problems. The Maastricht convergence criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact were 
designed to deal with the fiscal causes of inflation, but do not address potential inflationary 
pressures emanating from the wage front as a result of the operation of national labour markets, 
or from the financial front, for example from asset or property price bubbles. Building on the 
borrowed credibility bonus of EMS membership, member countries may have changed their 
economic structures towards a less inflationary national economic regime, but it is beyond the 
capacity of the credibility hypothesis to analyse the nature of these structural changes.
Borrowed credibility must be used to implement fundamental adjustments in national 
structures, if it is to be sustainable. It cannot be borrowed forever. In the long-term, credibility 
has to be based on domestic structures which support price stability. The credibility of German 
price stability, which acted as an anchor for the EMS, has been based on specific German socio­
economic structures. (Posen 1993,1998, Jochimsen 1993) As to the structural underpinnings of 
credibility, the ECB is now faced with a completely new situation. Its credibility depends on the 
consistency of the economic structures of all member states with the goal of price stability. In 
particular, the difference between national wage-price processes and thus labour market
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structures poses an immediate challenges for the ECB. (Dombusch et al. 1998) Without the 
corresponding structural changes, the policy commitment risks becoming incredible over time.
2.3.1.2. Central Bank independence
The hypothesis of central bank independence as a means of dealing with inflation brings 
a structural-institutional perspective to the credibility hypothesis. What has been debated is 
whether central bank independence in itself can provide the structural underpinnings for 
sustainable low inflation19. Often these arguments are used here to complement the argument on 
borrowed credibility: both credibility stemming from EMS membership as an agent facilitating 
structural change, and the credibility hypothesis based on central bank independence lead us to 
examine the structures necessary to produce a credible outcome. The leading economists in the 
field of the credibility effects of central bank independence come from the political economy 
school, represented by the theory of the political business cycles pioneered by Nordhaus (1975). 
The Nordhaus hypothesis asserts that elected politicians have an incentive to create inflation prior 
to elections to stimulate the economy and thereby engineer their re-election. Central bank 
independence is regarded as an institutional solution to this problem.20 In other words, the ability 
of the central bank to conduct monetary policy free from government interference is an 
institutional requirement to achieve price stability. The Maastricht process has adopted this view 
and the independence of national central banks thus became a prerequisite for countries to 
participate in EMU.
19For comprehensive survey on the debate about central bank 
independence, see articles in Forder and Slater eds (1998).
20For detail, see Alesina (1989), Alegina and Grilli (1991) and 
Newmann (1991) .
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The hypothesis was refuted by Posen (1993, 1998) who studied the case of Germany. 
He argues that it is the relative power of interest coalitions against inflation in the financial 
sector, rather than the institutional structure of monetary policy-making, which determines 
inflation differentials among industrial economies. Similarly, Henning (1994) focuses on the 
preferences of private sector institutions. Like Zysman (1983, 1994), and Posen (1993,1998), 
he believes that the relationship between banks and industry, i.e. the national financial structure, 
strongly affects the monetary policy stance of the private sector, (p.329) As Dyson (1994) put it, 
“the issue was not only one of institutional design but also one of the presence of a coalition of 
interests capable of giving the bank political protection and of a supportive economic culture that 
prioritizes stability”, (p. 238) These studies point to the wider structural requirements for 
successful central bank independence, and are therefore highly relevant for the future of 
successful EMU. However, these studies focus on the financial structure in addition to the 
monetary structure. They leave out another important structure - the labour market structure. 
Rather than re-examining bank-industry relations, I examine national labour markets, which are 
a crucial factor in the inflation proneness of an economy21.
Generally the weakness of the economic approaches surveyed is that they have limited 
ability to address the relationship between money and the structures in which money is used. An 
economic theory, which has provided a cost-benefit analysis that addresses this gap, is the theory 
of optimum currency areas (OCA). It is the only theory which deals directly with the issue of 
what kind of structures are required for “optimal” monetary unions. As my thesis deals with this 
question, the OCA will be reviewed in detail.
2.3.2. What is the theory of OCA?
21The relations between wage bargaining systems and inflation 
performance will be elaborated in section 2.3.5.
The OCA theory proposes a number of criteria which are to be considered as the 
prerequisites of successful monetary unions. The OCA theory focuses on the opportunity costs 
of introducing a common currency: that is to say, the costs arising from the loss of the traditional 
means of economic adjustment - the exchange rate. The theory was first developed by Mundell 
(1961). He studied adjustment processes in response to a demand shift, using a two-region model 
with sticky nominal wages. McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969) added extra dimensions to the 
theory, by considering the openness of an economy, and the degree of product diversification 
respectively. Let us now define the theory developed by Mundell, as it is the basic framework 
of analysis as well as the focus of academic debate. Suppose a negative demand shock, such as 
a shift in consumer preference from certain goods produced in Britain to those produced in 
Germany. One strategy Britain may take in order to regain competitiveness is devaluation. This 
particular tactic has been used widely, with questionable results.
Now suppose Britain and Germany had a common currency. In such a situation, there 
are the following three ways to deal with the problem. First, instead of exchange rates, one has 
to manipulate relative prices through other means, such as nominal wages. As the demand shift 
induces more unemployment in Britain, it leads to lower wages in Britain and to higher wages 
in Germany. This would make output prices to increase in Germany and fall in Britain. In this 
way, the external equilibrium would be restored by Britain regaining competitiveness in the 
international market. Second, unemployed British workers could move to Germany where there 
are better job opportunities. Given such labour mobility, the British unemployment problem 
disappears, and the German wage inflation problem is solved as well. The last, a less orthodox 
means of adjustment involves inter-state transfers. Assuming a central fiscal authority exists 
along with a common currency, the tax structure would semi-automatically bring about 
redistribution. German workers would pay more tax because they earn more, and the British
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unemployed would receive more of central tax income in the form of unemployment benefits. 
In order to cope with excessive national income differentials, a more direct means, such as inter­
state regional transfers can also be used. This has been the case within many nation-states as well 
as at the EU level. Some states, such as the United States and Germany, practice inter-state fiscal 
redistribution, with a built-in semi-automatic transfer mechanism from the richer to the poorer 
states.
In sum, the theory of OCA suggests that countries with economies that are prone to 
asymmetric real shocks and suffer wage and/or price rigidities should not form a common 
currency area, for they need the exchange rate as an instrument of adjustment. The exception to 
this rule applies to cases with a high degree of labour mobility or nominal wage flexibility to 
correct labour market disequibria, and/or fiscal transfers large enough to stabilize and equalize 
diverging incomes among member states. Europe has a poor record in all these respects, relative 
to the United States.22 There is now academic consensus that Europe as a whole is not an OCA.
2.3.3. Operationalising the theory of OCA
Mundell (1961) and others provided the theoretical framework in the 1960s, but it was 
only in the 1990s that scholars widely undertook empirical studies to operationalise the OCA 
theory. These works were obviously encouraged by developments in the real world, particularly 
the movement towards EMU since 1989 through the publication of the Delors Report.
Most recent works by economists are highly technical because of the introduction of new
22For the details of the argument, see Eichengreen, B. (1992b) and 
De Grauwe, P. and W. Vanhaverbeke (1993).
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econometric methods to estimate the degree of symmetry in disturbances.23 As these technical 
contributions are not relevant to this thesis, they will not be discussed in detail. However, the 
results of such exercises are rather inconclusive. The original model by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1992) shows a clear correlation of disturbances among the core counties, but not 
for countries in the periphery. The extension of their observations in their later work (1996) 
suggests that German reunification did not disturb the above result. Yet the extensions of their 
model by Chamies, Dessrres and Lalonde (1994) and Erkel-Rousse and Melitz (1995) show some 
results which contradict the original. In addition, the methodology of the original model itself 
has been heavily criticized by some econometricians. Thus, one can conclude that there are no 
decisive results arising from new technical developments to measure and predict asymmetric 
shocks among the current and prospective EMU states.
A more interesting result for my purpose is that empirics cannot prove that the correlation 
of EU countries' disturbances is considerably lower than in the case of existing monetary unions. 
For example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) find the correlation between US states only to 
be slightly higher than among EU core countries. De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993) suggest 
that asymmetric shocks to regions within EU countries are considerable, yet do not hamper the 
economic management of a single currency zone.24 Though these results do not necessarily 
make the correlation indicator irrelevant, they suggest the presence of other factors which play 
a more important role in the success of monetary union. Let us then examine the empirical
23. The standard model for estimating the correlation of supply and 
demand shocks was pioneered by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992), using an 
econometric method called a structural vector autoregression (VAR). A 
VAR is a system of two or more variables where each variable is related 
to lagged values of all of the variables in the system.
24This is because asymmetric shocks are most likely to hit regions 
within a nation state, which can still be partially dealt with by 
national fiscal policies with the presence of inter-regional labour 
mobility.
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studies which focus on other indicators of an OCA.
Labour mobility was one of the prime concerns of Mundell, as well as the symmetry of 
disturbances. Blanchard and Katz (1992) show that rather than capital flows, labour flows among 
US states play a major role in the adjustment process of the US economy. Eichengreen (1993) 
and Decressin and Fatas (1995) compare regional labour market performances in European 
countries and in the US. Both reach the conclusion that interregional migration within European 
countries are much less responsive to the region-specific shocks than that in the US. The latter 
arrives at the following alarming results: whereas a region-specific shock in the US immediately 
induces interregional migration, most of the shocks in Europe are absorbed over years by 
changing participation rates. Negative real disturbances in Europe would, therefore, induce 
higher regional unemployment rates, rather than migration. Whether such higher regional 
unemployment rates persist or not is open to question. Eichengreen (1993), and Decressin and 
Fatas (1995) are careful in their conclusions. They see other mechanisms such as relative wage 
adjustment, interregional capital mobility, and government intervention also playing important 
roles in Europe to offset the limitations of regional labour mobility. These results imply that 
Europe as a whole and even core countries would be far from being optimum currency areas. 
Given the sluggish response of regional labour markets to idiosyncratic regional shocks within 
European countries, the adjustment to asymmetric shocks through labour mobility can be 
considered to be far from satisfactory. Another form of adjustment in the labour market would 
be through wage flexibility. This will be examined in detail in Chapter 8 on labour market 
flexibility.
Fiscal transfers - the last criterion - is another way to correct economic discrepancies 
caused by asymmetric shocks. The issue is debated widely by economists, but riot by 
practitioners: even after EMU has come into operation, the very small size of the EU budget in
terms of the EU wide GDP does not allow it to play a major stabilization or equalization role 
inside the EU.25 In order to make this instrument work, there would have to be agreement on 
major reforms by national governments to increase the power of European institutions, which 
seems very unlikely. The central issue in the academic debate is whether there is a need for a 
centralization of fiscal authority to provide for an automatic redistribution and stabilization 
mechanism. In order to test the need for the centralization of fiscal policy, in other words, for 
fiscal federalism, scholars study the role of federal governments in federal states such as the US, 
Switzerland or Germany. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992) show that approximately 35 to 44 per 
cent of the impact of region-specific shocks is offset by the federal tax and transfer system in the 
US. They did not, however, differentiate equalization from stabilization properties of fiscal 
policy. The former property absorbs and lessens persistent income differentials between regions 
and the latter plays a corrective role to dynamic changes in economic conditions, caused by, for 
example, idiosyncratic economic disturbances.26 Bayoumi and Masson (1995) take account of 
this problem and find that the stabilization effect is, rather than the higher figures mentioned 
above, 35 to 20 per cent for the US, with the equalisation effect also being slightly smaller. Other 
estimations by the Commission (1993), Goodhart and Smith (1993), Pisani-Ferry, Italianer, and 
Lescure (1993) show significant effects on interregional equalization and stabilization. There is 
no doubt that fiscal transfers play an important role in maintaining monetary union. But it is still 
unknown whether they are absolutely essential to the working of the system or not. Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1996) argue that "fiscal transfers were likely to be more important the less
25Tsoukalis (1997, pp.209-22) makes the same point by looking into 
the EC's institutional constraints.
260ne should note that these distinctions are not necessarily 
applicable to all fiscal and social policy measures. For example, income 
taxes and unemployment benefits are measures attempting both 
stabilization and equalization.
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responsive was migration to regional wage and unemployment differentials; by implication, the 
absence of a system of fiscal federalism in Europe could be devastating, given the region's 
relative low levels of labour mobility." (p. 13)
The more politically sensitive debate for Europe today is whether these function should 
be covered predominantly by federal institutions, or whether they can still effectively be 
maintained by national authorities. Sala-i-Martin and Sachs (1992), Goodhart (1995) and 
Krugman (1993) are the proponents of a federal fiscal authority, whereas Bean (1992), De 
Grauwe (1993), Eichengreen (1996), Kletzer (1995) and Alesina, Perotti and Spolaore (1995) are 
against it. Krugman (1993) takes the example of the US states, and finds that even in the US 
state governments do not use their budgets as a means of stabilization, because every state except 
Vermont has a balanced budget requirement. Thus, their fiscal policies move in a pro-cyclical 
direction, rather than a counter-cyclical one, as it would be needed for stabilization. The 
stabilization role in the US is largely through the automatic stabilisers in the federal budget. For 
this reason, Krugman (1993) deplores the lack of a large-scale centralized fiscal body in Europe. 
Following Kenen (1969), Goodhart (1995) believes that interaction between the monetary and 
fiscal policy domains is essential in order for them to operate effectively. He also points out 
some factors which are relevant with regard to fiscal federalism: first, the externality or spill-over 
effects of fiscal policy to neighbouring areas should be taken into account. In order to avoid 
negative overspill, fiscal coordination would be necessary. Here, some kind of centralized fiscal 
body would be useful. Second, with the deepening of economic integration, it would become 
difficult to have different national tax regimes. Third, some member countries would have to 
bear the full cost of asymmetric shocks or regional depression if there is no federal fiscal 
authority27. Fourth, and probably most interesting, centralization should be based on what he
27An argument against fiscal federalism is that it allows for 
financial bailouts of regions by the centre and therefore poses a problem
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calls "social union, where people in a particular area agree that all of them should be treated 
alike." (p.468) However, in the EU, there is so far only minimum agreement on taxes and the 
provision of public goods. In addition, there is virtually no or very little feeling of common 
European citizenship and solidarity among European nationals. Unless the current situation 
changes drastically, there would be no political consensus to push through centralization. Or the 
central fiscal authority, if established, would remain partial, without the legitimacy needed.
Those scholars arguing against a federal fiscal authority believe that national governments 
can provide for fiscal transfer better than a central authority, even after EMU. De Grauwe 
(1993a) takes the view that instead of a federal fiscal body, national governments can continue 
to play the role of stabilization. He also suggests a role for income policies, in addition to fiscal 
policy instruments, to induce the stabilization of national economies. In Belgium and the 
Netherlands, income policies were successfully used as a main stabilization instrument to bring 
back growth after the economic shocks of the early 1980s. Eichengreen (1996) sees the moral 
hazard problem in connection with fiscal transfer, and argues that national governments can raise 
taxes to finance the costs incurred by asymmetric shocks. Indeed, the German government 
introduced solidarity surcharges in order to finance German reunification. For poorer countries, 
or countries in recession, however, this would be difficult to implement in practice. Alesina, 
Perotti and Spolaore (1995), on the other hand, argue against a centralized fiscal authority from 
a perspective of institutional differences, similar to the fourth point made by Goodhart (1995): 
"when the social security system is used for political purposes to different degrees, in different 
regions, or it is administered with different criteria, centralized funding of the system can 
generate an inefficient outcome." (p.757) Differences in awareness of what they call "social 
capital" (p.756) i.e., civic-mindedness and concern for the public good among EU countries, are
of moral hazard.
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large and cannot be explained by demographics or economic factors alone. "Social capital" is 
a key concept which explains differences between countries in their regime of administration, 
their size and efficiency in managing the welfare state and their social policies. As Boyer (1996) 
and Esping-Andersen (1996) put it, social regimes still show substantial differences despite the 
pressure emanating from the unifying force of globalisation.
In sum, the point made by Masson and Taylor (1994) is a very accurate observation of
the limitation of the empirical studies using the OCA analysis:
1) because the criteria are overlapping, there is no unique decision variable; 2) 
because currency unions also cause other changes in the economic structure, 
which are typically not captured in economic models, calculated effects should 
be regarded as only approximately of the true effect; and 3) because the formation 
of a currency union has political as well as economic dimensions, it interacts with 
other policies . . .  in complex ways, (p.40)
The following section looks more closely at the criticism of both the theoretical and the 
empirical side of the OCA analysis.
2.3.4. Criticism on the theory of OCA
A number of prominent economists criticise OCA as erroneous.28 The most fundamental 
critique is that the OCA considers exchange rate as a panacea. The impact of devaluation on the 
real economy is only transitory. The loss of exchange rates as an adjustment mechanism is 
indeed a cost of forming monetary union. It can be a very useful means if applied wisely with 
other means of adjustment. Yet, it cannot be used repeatedly. It may invite undesirable 
consequences such as uncontrollable inflation. Furthermore, they cannot undo the asymmetric 
supply or demand shocks, unless they are of monetary origin.
28See De Grauwe (1992), Bean (1992)
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Taking account ofthe empirical analyses ofEuropean economies, Bean (1992) argues that 
the usefulness of the exchange rate as a "weapon of macrpeconomic management" is 
overemphasised by the proponents of the OCA. He points out that the core ofEuropean countries 
engages in intra-industry, rather than inter-industry trade. Indeed, according to the calculation 
ofthe European Commission (1990), between 57 and 83 per cent of trade between EU countries 
was intra-industry in 1987, except for Greece and Portugal. The increase in intra-industry trade 
means that countries increasingly export and import the same kind of goods. This indicates that 
the asymmetric shocks have become less pronounced than before.
In addition, Bean (1992) raises fundamental doubts about the relevance of the OCA 
assumption. Empirical studies show that real rather than nominal wage rigidity matters in the 
case of the European Union.29 When real rather than nominal wages are rigid, they are not 
affected by the changes in a nominal variable, such as exchange rates. Thus, "relatively little is 
lost by giving up the exchange rate as a weapon of adjustment because the effectiveness of 
independent monetary policy is always limited by the relatively low degree of nominal inertia." 
(p .ll)
Whereas the OCA approach is right to point out some sources of instability under the 
common currency regime, it is criticised as being biassed towards very small common currency 
areas. One has to admit that under the criteria, even nation-states are not small enough to qualify 
for monetary union. However, in reality, they function stably with their own common currencies. 
Therefore either there is a problem in operationalising the theory, or the theory itself is 
incomplete. Bofinger (1994) and Frankel and Rose (1996) opt for the former explanation: they 
suggest that a regime shift brought by the introduction of EMU would produce a structural break.
29For more details, see the excellent survey by Bean (1992a). 
Buiter (1995) also suggested that real wage flexibility plays a larger 
role in labour-market adjustment in the US.
This means the existing data under the EMS is weak in predicting what would be the case under 
EMU. Bofinger (1994) starts by arguing that the common OCA approach to use EMS data to 
study the plausibility of EMU is problematic. He says, "considering the highly diversified 
production structure in the EU, the absence of money illusion, an increasing downward flexibility 
of nominal wages, and the erratic behaviour of fixed but adjustable rates could easily draw the 
conclusion that completely different criteria are required for a comprehensive assessment of 
EMU"30 (p. 12) He proposes a monetary approach to improve the theory of the OCA. He argues 
for EMU because it is beneficial for the credibility of monetary policy and its subsequent impact 
to the real economy. The common currency would also make asymmetric monetary shocks, 
induced by exchange rate speculation, impossible. Just as the traditional OCA theory 
overemphasises the virtue of smallness, his 'monetary approach' over-praises the largeness of 
currency areas. It is true that European money demand function is generally more stable than the 
national money demand functions, as empirical studies by Kremers and Lane (1990, 1992), 
Sardelis (1993) indicate. Through the introduction of a single currency, there will be no such 
exchange rate crises as the Franc problem resulting from a lack of credibility within the enlarged 
European financial market. On the other hand, it may create exchange rate problems on the 
external front - the Euro vis-a-vis the dollar or the yen, if the common currency area is too large 
and participants cannot agree on consistent monetary and fiscal policies.
Revealing the endogenity ofthe criteria of the OCA, Frankel and Rose (1996) argue that 
countries may not pass the criteria now, but they could pass after joining monetary union. They 
examine the two criteria - correlation of income with other countries, and the extent of trade with 
others, the criteria added by McKinnon (1963). They give econometric evidence that as trade
30The European Commission also takes the same view. "There is no 
ready-to use theory for assessing the costs and benefits of EMU. Despite 
its early insights, the theory of optimum currency areas provides a too 
narrow and somewhat outdated framework of analysis." (1990, p.31)
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links between member states strengthen, their national incomes become highly correlated, 
making their business cycle more synchronized. This is an interesting empirical finding which 
makes countries more appropriate members of monetary union ex post than ex ante. Both studies 
by Bofinger and by Frankel and Rose suggest, from different angles, the limitation of statistical 
analyses. Given these shortcomings of statistical analyses, I will supplement them with 
qualitative analyses in my empirical studies.
Among politically aware economists, Goodhart (1995) in particular opts for the 
incompleteness of the OCA, by pointing out the importance of political dimensions of monetary 
union. The OCA cannot capture the political dimension, which makes him claim that "the theory 
of optimum currency areas has relatively little predictive power." (p.452) He explains the reason 
for the politicisation of the currency union with the symbolic character of currencies and 
seigniorage gains. In most current monetary unions in the world, the boundary of a nation state 
and a single currency coincides. When ex-communist countries broke down to small nation 
states after the collapse of communism, all of the newly established states opted to issue their 
own currencies. Seigniorage is derived from note issuing, but seigniorage revenue is small under 
non-inflationary monetary regimes. The additional reason for nation states being a viable 
monetary regime is political legitimacy. People simply accept without any question that nation 
states hold their own national currencies. This political legitimacy is a key factor which one 
cannot analyse by economics. It would be interesting to study what would happen in terms of 
monetary autonomy to regions campaigning for secession, such as Quebec in Canada and the 
Basque region in Spain. The economic costs of becoming politically independent may be 
inordinately high. Nevertheless, the desire of movements for autonomy to establish their own 
currency demonstrates the fact that the legitimacy of a currency is closely connected to political 
legitimacy. The kind of automatic political legitimacy most nation states enjoy, however, does
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not exist at the European level. This leads to the hypothesis that the European single currency 
has to be more stable than the national currencies preceding it, in order to build its legitimacy as 
foundation for political viability.
With insufficient political support and legitimacy, the success or failure of EMU depends 
more on its economic and social benefits than it is the case for national currencies. For an 
assessment of these benefits one can use the criteria laid out by the OCA. Indeed, some scholars 
extend the analysis of the OCA and argue that a common currency shared by countries which 
have very different economic structures is undesirable. Empirical studies undertaken look into 
different preferences towards the (short-term) inflation and unemployment trade-off, growth rate 
differentials, different fiscal and monetary systems (regarding the importance of seigniorage for 
national income), and different labour market institutions.31 De Grauwe (1992), among others 
questions the relevance of such differences in economic structure to the functioning of monetary 
union. Except for the last factor - differences in labour market institutions, such differences in 
economic structure have are either irrelevant or have an ambiguous effect on the working of 
monetary union.32 Labour market regime differences may induce different wage / price 
developments even in reaction to symmetric shocks. It is, however, likely that national 
differences in labour management would continue after the introduction of a single currency. 
Thus, De Grauwe (1992) and Magnus and Donovan (1996) suggest that these institutional 
differences may become a significant source of adjustment problems. This question of labour 
market institution is the key to my thesis and will be explored further from Chapter six onwards.
In sum, although the validity of the theory has been contested due to its incompleteness, 
it directs us at the need for examining structural factors to assess the viability of monetary union.
31For an excellent survey of works regarding the issue, see Chapter 
1 of De Grauwe (1992).
32For details, see Chapter 2 of De Grauwe (1992).
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The empirical evidence in its support, on the other hand, is inconclusive. In practice, almost all 
criteria reviewed here are controversial and difficult to operationalise fully. (Ishiyama 1975) 
Studies suggest that the core of the European Union is roughly an OCA, but for the EU as a 
whole this is probably not the case.
Despite this contentious assumption, one cannot say that the criteria for an OCA are 
irrelevant. If two or more countries sharing a common currency reacted symmetrically upon an 
external shock, it would be easier for them to adjust. Having similar economic structures and 
economic policy preferences would go some way in establishing the conditions for such a 
symmetrical reaction. However, it is unrealistic to assume that any two European countries will 
have identical economic structures. Thus, the question lies in how similar their socio-economic 
structures should be to qualify for as an OCA, and what other factors matter to facilitate viable 
monetary union.
2.3.5. The extension of the OCA framework
In order to study such a question, one would need a broader theoretical framework. The 
OCA is a cost benefit analysis, which is essentially a partial equilibrium analysis. In order to 
examine the structural similarity of the economies concerned, a different theory has to be applied 
to complement the partial nature of the OCA theory. As the problematic to examine economic 
structure is generated by the concept of an OCA, such a theory should be able to extend the OCA 
theory to compensate for its limitations. Such a theory should be able to bring in the two 
essential missing-parts in the OCA theory. They are, first, the ability to examine broader 
structural elements of the economy, and second, the ability to incorporate social and political 
factors suggested by Goodhart (1995).
103
It is also necessary to define what kind of structures to examine in this thesis. Although 
I shall investigate general structural issues in the historical chapters (Chapters 4 and 5), I shall 
focus on the labour market structure in the empirical section.
2.3.5.1. Why labour markets?
The OCA identified where the adjustment burden lies in EMU, namely, in labour markets 
and fiscal adjustment. Practically speaking, the possibility of a large fiscal transfer is denied in 
the current European framework as elaborated in the following paragraph. Hence, with the 
Maastricht EMU design, it is the labour market which is designed to bear the adjustment cost.
A flexible labour market is a crucial factor for the success of EMU, since that is the main 
and possibly the only effective adjustment mechanism available. As a result of the introduction 
of a single currency, domestic monetary policy autonomy, by definition, disappears, because 
central banks cannot set different interest rates. There will be only one European single 
(nominal) interest rate. Meanwhile, at the Dublin Summit in December 1996, the Stability and 
Growth Pact was agreed. This pact further curtailed the fiscal policy autonomy of the member 
states with very restrictive numerical targets and penalty payments.33 This, de facto eroded the
33The concept of a stability and growth pact originated from the 
idea of a 'stability pact' by Theo Waigel, the German finance minister. 
The stability pact was concieved by the Germans who saw the need to 
ensure austere fiscal discipline after the introduction of single 
currency. The Germans proposed near automatic sanctions against states 
running deficits in excess of three per cent of gross domestic product, 
but France was reluctant to accept the German proposal mainly due to the 
lack of democratic accountability. At the EU summit in Dublin in 
December 1996, a Franco-German compromise was reached, and the stability 
pact was officially renamed 'stability and growth pact'. Under the 
agreement, countries running excessive deficit will be automatically 
sanctioned unless either of the following applies: First exceptional 
circumstances, such as the case of a natural disaster. Second a severe 
recession which causes a fall in gross domestic product of at least 2 per 
cent. According to the Financial Times, "such a severe recession has 
occurred only 13 times in any of the 15 EU members in the past 3 0 years".
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possibilities for an effective use of demand management. The use of fiscal policy as an 
adjustment mechanism in response to a medium-sized idiosyncratic shock would in practice 
become very difficult.34 Even if fiscal policy measures were taken, its effect would be minimal 
due to the restriction set by the Pact.
The only area of effective macroeconomic management to remain, with the current design 
of EMU, would be supply side measures, including the adjustment of the labour market. What 
kind of labour market measures could be taken? They can be the lowering of wage and non-wage 
costs, and the deregulation on restrictive labour legislation. Conventional wisdom believes that 
these measures should in the long run promote more employment35. However they may, at least 
in the short-run, increase unemployment by making it easier for employers to fire members of 
their workforce. Such downward adjustments in wages as well as working conditions would be 
deeply unpopular for the continental workforce and trade unions. In addition, with job insecurity 
and downward pressure of wages, workers would spend less. Consequently, such suppression 
of demand may have further depressive effects for the continental economies.
As Solow (1990) put it, the labour market is a social institution, unlike any other market. 
The economic concept of optimality does not necessarily provide the best solution for persistent 
unemployment, as "they allow for a variety of motives and interactions that are conspicuously 
missing from the standard textbook model", (p. 31) Different countries have different ways of
(p.l) Another would be the case where GDP has fallen between 0.75% and 
2%. In such a case, EU finance ministers have discretion to decide 
whether to impose sanctions or not. For details see, Financial Times 
14/15 December 1996, p. 1.
340f course, in the exceptional case of a significant asymmetric 
shock, countries can still take fiscal measures even within the current 
framework.
35Though the OECD Employment Outlook (1999) has found an 
inconclusive relationship between employment performance and the degree 
of rigidity in employment regulations, conventional wisdom still firmly 
believes in the need for more flexible labour market regulation. For 
details, see Financial Times 10/11 July 1999, p.6.
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tackling social problems within the parameter of their socio-economic preferences. The standard 
solution of deregulation may be socially sub-optimal in some countries, if they trigger social 
instability. Europe comprises countries with different degrees of labour market flexibility and 
institutions. The very act of trying to adjust by imposing flexibility in the labour market, may 
invite inter-state friction, as one member of EMU may claim another is resorting to the social 
dumping. From the British perspective, however, the continental labour market is simply 
uncompetitive due to over-regulation.
Furthermore, it is not clear whether labour market adjustment alone is enough to pull a 
country or a region out of recession, or an idiosyncratic shock. There is no federal government 
in Europe, nor substantial and significant direct or indirect fiscal transfers, which help the smooth 
adjustment of depressed regions or countries. In other words, under EMU, there will be no 
automatic income redistribution mechanism as in the case of nation-states. These political 
deficits of the Maastricht road to monetary union have invited serious doubts. Commenting on 
the agreed stability and growth pact, the Financial Times (14-15 December 1996) editorial 
comments as follows:
To constrain it (fiscal policy) as tightly as the stability pact agreed 
yesterday would seem to imply to throw all adjustment on to the EU's 
sclerotic labour markets. Worse, imposing substantial fines on elected 
governments will create direct clashes between the politics of individual 
members and the EU. It is far from obvious that the latter will always 
win. (p.6)
Structural differences in European labour market regimes, therefore, have far-reaching
implications to the success or failure of future monetary union in Europe. Such implications do
not only concern the question of adjustment but the problem of inflationary pressures as well.
Magnus and Donovan (1996) summarize their point as follows:
Different methods of wage negotiation are not, of themselves, a problem 
for a monetary union if the bargains achieve a broadly similar outcome.
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If different levels of wage deals are struck, in regions of an EMU that can 
hide behind the skirts of labour immobility, an asymmetric shocks across 
the monetary union is produced. The potential for this shock is 
significant, and comes from bargaining methods and welfare priorities.... 
Forcing a monetary union between countries like the UK and Germany, 
who have entirely divergent objectives from their respective labour 
market policies, automatically creates tensions over policy, (p.l 1-12)
Labour market institutions affect not only the levels of wage deals as mentioned above, 
but also the equilibrium unemployment rates and the speed of adjustment after transitory shocks. 
In addition, the propagation mechanism of shocks would be different, as countries' labour market 
regimes differ. Thus, labour market institutions would provide a crucial point of reference in 
examining Euro-wide economic management and coordination.
In extending the OCA framework to examine structural factors, the following sections 
explore some economic studies, which deal with the issue of labour markets and EMU. The 
purpose of these sections is not to review all conventional labour market theories, as most of 
them do not link monetary and labour market structures in their analysis, tending to focus instead 
on microeconomic factors which influence certain economic and social behaviour. Only those 
which examine the interaction between monetary and labour markets will be introduced in order 
to assess their relevance for my thesis.
2.3.6. The labour market institutions and economic performance
With the establishment of EMU, countries lose the external anchor, i.e., the exchange rate 
peg as a means to control inflation. As a result, they need an internal anchor to keep inflation 
under control. The management of the internal anchor depends very much on the kind of 
domestic regime countries have.
One source of structural inflation pressures is labour markets. There has already been
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a number of works by economists on relations between inflation and bargaining structures. This 
aspect was first put into an academic perspective by Bruno and Sachs (1985), and developed as 
a theory by Calmfors and Drifill (1988). The basic theoretical argument is as follows: very 
centralized and very decentralized bargaining systems are likely to produce lower real wage 
increases. The former institutional arrangement internalises various wage externalities, and the 
latter is restrained by competition with other market forces. Hence, one can observe a hump 
shape relation between the degree of centralization of wage bargaining and the aggregate real 
wage, i.e. unemployment.
The theory has recently been applied by political economists to OECD and European 
countries. Both findings by Iversen (1998) and Hall, Franzese (1998) have implications for 
economic management under EMU. Using the pooled time-series data for fifteen OECD 
countries, Iversen (1998) proved that monetary policies have real employment effects in all but 
the most decentralised bargaining systems. Hall and Franzese (1998), predicted unemployment 
rates would be higher under EMU, due to a lack of effective coordination of collective bargaining 
within the EMU area. European wide coordination of collective bargaining virtually does not 
exist. In accordance with the theory, this implies that bargainers in Europe as a whole would be 
less sensitive to the signalling of the European central bank than, for example, the German social 
partners have been to the signals of the Bundesbank. This suggests that the European Central 
Bank would be required to have higher interest rates to deter inflation, which in turn should 
induce higher unemployment rates and other social costs.
The theory has also been criticised as simplistic on several grounds: Soskice (1990) 
criticized it for not being able to include the variable of economic-wide (union, employer, and 
sometimes government) coordination. He sees economy-wide wage coordination to be the key 
to low inflation, as both employers and unions are concerned about low real exchange rates, (p.
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58) However, even the improved version of the theory, taking into account Soskice’s point, was 
refuted by an empirical study conducted by the OECD (1997a). It found little significant 
statistical relation between measures of economic performance and certain indices of bargaining 
systems.
Other political economists, Garrett and Way (1995) examine domestic labour market 
institutions more closely and distinguish the behaviour of public and private sector trade unions. 
The public sector trade unions behave differently from their private sector counterparts, as the 
former, unlike the latter, do not have any concern for external competitiveness. This lack of 
market pressure makes public sector trade unions more inflation-prone than the private sector 
trade unions which are exposed to external pressure. Thus, a country with a stronger public 
sector trade union movement is structurally more inflation prone than that with a strong private 
sector trade union movement. Measuring with this indicator, France seems to be more inflation 
prone than Germany. The investigation of such structural factors is the objective of this thesis, 
and labour market developments will be further explored from Chapter 6 onwards. The focus 
of the works surveyed here, however, was on the relationship between inflation and labour 
market institutions only. I am interested in capturing the broader socio-economic differences 
which cause different inflation rates and different modes of adjustment, and which ask for 
different monetary policies. Hence, an alternative theoretical framework is necessary to examine 
the relationship between labour markets and monetary union more comprehensively.
2.3.7. Keynesian approaches to employment and EMU
Conventional neo-classical economic theories assume the neutrality of money. That is 
to say, monetary variables, including exchange rates, cannot affect the real economy at all in the
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long run. Money may have a short-run impact on the real economy, but it does not have any 
consequence in the long run. Thus, in their thinking, EMU should not have any long-term real 
effect on European employment or unemployment.
Keynesian economists, however, disagree about this classical dichotomy between the 
monetary and real economy. The Keynesians argue that money matters both in the long and short 
run.
An economy which uses money but uses it merely as a neutral link between 
transactions in real things and real assets and does not allow it to enter into 
motivates or decisions, might be called - for want of a better name - a real 
exchange economy. The theory which I desiderate would deal, in contradiction 
to this, with an economy in which money plays a part of its own and affects 
motives and decisions and is, in short, one of the operative factors in the situation, 
so that the course of events cannot be predicted either in the long period or in the 
short, without a knowledge of the behaviour of money between the first state and 
the last. And it is this which we ought to mean when we speak of monetary 
economy... Bdoms and depressions are peculiar to an economy in which money 
is not neutral. (Keynes reprinted 1973, pp. 408-09)
Whereas classical and neo-classical economists take money as another producible 
commodity like apples, Keynes interprets money as a unique object. He emphasises the role of 
money in his theory, and argues that the emission of money leads to positive demand creation 
only if it is related to the payment of wages. Therefore, production is immediately identified as 
the process of making money real. Rather than supply or needs, he sees that demand is exerted 
by available income through money-wage earning. In this sense, money is the key to 
employment, as a decline in demand causes the contraction of production and hence growth in 
unemployment. At the same time, Keynesian economists see the causes of inflation not just 
stemming from monetary factors as the neo-classical school does, but being rooted in real factors 
as well. Weinstraub (1961), the leading Post Keynesian36, argues that inflation could be
36Davidson (1982) classified different interpretations of Keynes as 
socialist-radical, neo-Keynesian, Keynesian, Neoclassical synthesis- 
Keynesian, and called all of them the 'Post Keynesian school'. For 
details of their interpretations, see table 1.1, p.2.
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controlled by the conditioning of money-wage increases with productivity increases.
Flassbeck (1994), a German Keynesian economist, points out the astonishing similarity 
between the blueprints of EMU and German Economic and Monetary Union (GMU). Both 
processes hardly touched upon the problem of wage determination and labour markets. He 
argues that labour markets are of paramount importance for currency unions by emphasising two 
points: first, the wage regime at the micro level (centralised or decentralised bargaining) 
decisively influences the competitive dynamism of an economy, and second, the wage regime 
at the macro level (wage increases in line with productivity rises, and concern for price stability 
in wage bargaining) is vital for the stability of the currency system, (p.266) He argues that the 
Maastricht process of EMU is problematic as it does not have any means to sanction wage 
misconduct (wage increases out of line with productivity increases). The incentive for wage 
misconduct increases with the transparency of wage levels in the Euro-zone due to the single 
currency. He warns that the centralisation of wage bargaining at the European level would create 
a disastrous outcome, as in the case of German unification. Because EMU participants have very 
different productivity and income levels, as in the case of the two Germanies, a harmonisation 
of wage setting systems is not recommendable. The Maastricht treaty has successfully set out 
sanctions on fiscal extravaganza, but “wage policy, by far the more important factor in overall 
economic terms, is not even mentioned.” (p.265)
The problem of the Keynesian approach to monetary theory, however, is that it over­
emphasises the importance of money wage rates as the determinant of price stability and 
economic growth. With the increasing importance of financial markets in the late 1980s and the 
1990s, asset price inflation has increasingly become a serious threat for inflation. An example 
is the case of the bubble economy in Japan. Whereas real wages stay relatively constant37, asset
37The annual average growth of real compensation per employee during 
1981-1990 in Japan was 2%, whereas it was 5% during 1971-1980. For more
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price inflation picked up in the latter half of the 1980s, largely caused by land price speculation. 
Economic growth in the US seems to be sustained despite declining real wages. The high level 
of consumption of the US population is supported by (real or expected) income from booming 
financial markets and the growth of employment in the service sector. This has been explained 
through the "wealth effect" of rising asset prices. Despite falling saving rates, the wealth of 
Americans has been increasing with the stock market boom. This has facilitated rapid domestic 
credit growth and increasing consumption. Thus, a more comprehensive theory which can at 
least capture both the wage and the financial side of inflationary pressure would be desirable.
2.3.8. EMU and unemployment
Two approaches deal with the issue of the labour market effects of EMU directly: one 
investigates the relations between exchange rate regimes and labour markets, the other looks at 
labour markets in the light of real convergence. Regarding the former, Alogoskoufis and Smith 
(1991) and Eichengreen (1993a) find evidence that the responsiveness of wages depends on the 
exchange rate regime. Van Gompel (1995) examines the relevance of wage-formation 
characteristics for unemployment under different exchange regimes. He finds that the impact of 
monetary shocks on unemployment is smaller for a country belonging to EMU compared to the 
EMS. The relevance of the wage formation process on unemployment was inconclusive, as it 
depends on the precise type of shock hitting the economy, the structural parameters of the model, 
as well as the exchange rate regime to which a country belongs. Sibert and Sutherland (1997) 
take a critical stance towards conventional economic analysis, which takes the state of labour 
markets as exogenous in studying monetary integration. Although the OCA states certain labour
details, see table 30 of Statistical Annex of European Economy. June 
1997.
market conditions as a requirement for an optimal monetary union (labour mobility and 
flexibility), it does not offer the means to assess how a monetary union will affect labour market 
reforms. Using a variant of the Barro-Gordon model, Sibert and Sutherland (1997) simulate the 
impact of monetary coordination (different exchange rate regimes) on labour market reforms. 
They show that monetary union produces less impulse for labour market reforms than negotiated 
monetary policy and non-cooperative monetary policy. This is because having a lower level of 
labour market distortions improves a country’s bargaining position in a non-cooperative regime 
(floating), but a monetary union (cooperative regime) removes this competitive environment. 
This finding is interesting as it negates ‘monetaristic’ intentions behind the Maastricht process 
regarding the labour market, i.e., the assumption that monetary union would create an impetus 
for more labour market reforms. However, these models cannot grasp social and political factors 
which are not quantifiable. For example, Sibert and Sutherland (1997) treat labour market reform 
merely as a bargaining chip. Yet, labour market reforms involve social processes: they depend 
on a country’s capacity to structurally adjust, including the willingness of political leaders to 
undertake often politically unpopular reforms, and the willingness of the society to go along with 
the political leadership and implement reforms in a sustainable fashion. Models can neither adopt 
such complex reality nor are they intended to do so.
Arguing for the importance of real convergence, Heyden, Poeck, and Van Gompel (1995) 
represent the latter approach. They assert “real convergence (convergence in real macroeconomic 
variables such as per capita GDP, economic growth and unemployment), while technically not 
necessary for EMU, would have great advantages for the working of the Union. Stated 
differently, the absence of real convergence is likely to put the EMU under considerable stress.” 
(p. 100) They point to the need for changes in labour market policies and institutions for a 
successful EMU. Because of rigid labour market structures, they argue that the Maastricht fiscal
conditions may have a counter-productive effect on the EU economy by creating semi-permanent 
high and divergent unemployment rates. For real convergence, they believe that some structural 
convergence in the form of convergence of labour market institutions and policies is necessary. 
They are not arguing for deregulation of labour markets per se. Rather they demand that “the 
working of the labour market is broadly similar in all countries.” (p.l 15) Though they point to 
the crucial issue that this thesis explores, their analysis is not deep enough, as it does not present 
the means necessary to examine labour market structures. Hence, I need to explore this 
problematic by using an alternative theoretical framework, the French Regulation school, in 
Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Analytical framework - regime compatibility
This chapter introduces the analytical framework of the thesis, the French regulation 
school, in detail. The previous chapter looked at the limitations of existing approaches to analyse 
monetary union. The economist approach introduced in Chapter 1, the approach arguing for the 
need for certain domestic political and economic conditions for sustainable monetary union, 
needs to be put into a concrete conceptual framework. The approach denotes that further study 
of structural elements of economic institutions is necessary. According to North (1981), the 
main challenge for social scientists is "explaining the institutional structure which underlies and 
accounts for performance of an economic system, and explaining changes in that structure." 
(p.ix) Criticising the neo-classical approach in the analysis of economic history, he argues that 
political organisation and ideology support different modes of economic organisation. They are, 
therefore, the essential variables for studying economic structures and institutional changes. 
What underlies the stability of institutions and makes them slow to change is the combination 
of rules with associated moral and ethical codes of behaviour, (p.205) He defines 'structure' as 
an institutional framework. One can extend this argument by using the concept of'regime'.
The role of the Maastricht convergence criteria was to make sure that the single currency 
is only introduced in an area which is economically sound. In Chapter 1 ,1 have criticised the 
criteria for their very limited and partial demand side point of view. The ERM has made a 
certain degree of nominal convergence among member states possible, but not real convergence. 
It is therefore important to think of ways to establish a more sophisticated framework to examine 
the monetary, fiscal and social spheres.
The theory of OCA, as introduced in Chapter 2, emphasises the need to look into labour
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market conditions, in examining the viability of monetary unions. In order to better understand 
structural factors, however, we need a more comprehensive theory which surpasses the barrier 
between monetary and real economy. Here, the French regulation school provides a guideline.
3.1. The French regulation school
Theories associated with the French regulation school were developed in the 1970s, as 
a way to analyse long-term transformation processes in capitalist economies. The regulation 
school approaches the problematic from the angle of Marxian institutionalism and Kaleckian or 
Keynesian macroeconomics. This is one of the few dynamic theories which can explain 
changing phases of economic development in history. It examines "any dynamic process of 
adaptation of production and social demand resulting from a conjunction of economic 
adjustments linked to a given configuration of social relations, forms of organization and 
structures." (Boyer 1988, p. 127)
There are several sub-branches in the regulation school: the Grenoble school, the Parisian 
school, the Amsterdam school, the West German school, the Nordic school, and the North 
American school. They all share the common radical heritage of the regulation approach, but 
differ in their priorities of focus and methodology. As it in not the aim of this thesis to seek 
theoretical refinement, a further investigation on this issue will not be pursued. Suffice to say 
that my approach is closest to the Parisian school, where scholars have mainly examined the 
development and working of Fordism, neo- and post-Fordism as regimes of accumulation, and 
studied modes of regulation to show the heterogeneity of national variants under the same regime 
of accumulation.
The regulationists examine the mode of socio-economic interaction between capital and
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labour as a determinant of economic growth. They believe that some institutional preconditions 
for capital and labour to compromise on issues of growth and welfare are necessary. Concerning 
such preconditions, the consistency between the mode of regulation, and the regime of 
accumulation is very important. Boyer (1986) argues that slower economic growth in Britain 
than other European countries in the 1950s and the 1960s was due to the inconsistency in 
institutional arrangements - the mode of regulation - and the underlying economic structure - the 
regime of accumulation. Now, let us turn to the definition of these concepts.
3.1.1. Theoretical framework of the regulation school
The problematique of the regulation school is to study "the variability of economic and 
social dynamics in time and space" (Boyer 1990, p.27). Its main interest is to analyse economic 
crises. In particular, it examines why a certain pattern of economic management stagnates after 
a period of steady growth, and why different societies need different configurations of socio­
economic interaction within the same mode of production1. Furthermore, it tries to clarify why 
crises take different forms, conditional on differences in the modes of production.
There are two central concepts used by the regulation school. They are 'regime of 
accumulation' and 'mode of regulation'. Lipietz (1986a) concisely describe the 'regime of 
accumulation' as "the stabilization over a long period of the allocation of the net product between 
consumption and accumulation. It implies some correspondence between both the 
transformation of the conditions of production and the conditions of reproduction of wage 
earners" (p. 19) The regulation school distinguishes two types of regime of accumulation:
1For example, in the post war period, when all OECD countries 
introduced Fordism, their mode of economic management crystallised in rather 
diversified forms.
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extensive and intensive accumulation. In the former, capital expands by employing growing 
numbers of workers with the same technology to increase output. In the latter, capital expands 
by investing in new technology to intensify the use of existing labour, i.e., it increases output 
by raising productivity. The difference lies in whether the growth of capital disrupts the methods 
of production. The extensive regime would eventually reach the limitation of growth, as labour 
supply is limited. Aglietta (1974) categorises France in the first half of the 19th century as an 
example of extensive accumulation. In general, the dominant regime in the OECD countries 
during the post-war period is intensive accumulation. Boyer (1990) explains the ’regime of 
accumulation' in more detail, as a set of regularities or a form of articulation consisting of the 
following socio-economic patterns. First, the dynamics of the organisation of production which 
affect capital-labour relations. Second, the time horizon of the valorisation of capital (making 
profitable use of capital) which affects the type of economic management. In other words, 
whether capital holds a short-term or long-term perspective matters for regimes. Third, the 
distribution of income which affects the cohesion of society and relations between different 
social classes. Fourth, the constitution of social demand which affects a society's productive 
capacity; and finally, relations with non-capitalist economic forms if they are essential to the 
functioning of a capitalist society, (p.35) Table 3.1. shows detailed historical examples of 
different patterns of regimes of accumulation.
The mode of regulation provides specific characters for the regime of accumulation. 
Different types of mode of regulation can belong to the same regime of accumulation. This is 
because the regime of accumulation is general, but the mode of regulation can be country- or 
society- specific. This makes the theory pertinent to analyse variations in capitalist societies.2
2The recent works by Boyer (1996a, 1996b) present a comprehensive
critique of the convergence thesis, which argues for a converging trend of 
different cultures and societies.
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Boyer (1990) sees institutional organisation - the structures and behavioural patterns constituting 
the mode of regulation - as "any kind of codification of one or several fundamental social 
relations." (p.37) Lipietz’ (1986) explanation is more precise to the point, by denoting mode of 
regulation as:
the ensemble of institutional forms, the networks, the explicit or implicit norms, 
which assure the compatibility of behaviours in the framework of a regime of 
accumulation, in community with the states of the social relations, and thereby 
through the contradictions and the conflictual character of relations between 
agents and social groups, (p. 16)
In other words, it describes the role of market mechanisms, institutions and of power
relationships among different social actors in linking the dynamics of production and
consumption. The arena of such structural interaction can be found in monetary relations, the
wage-labour nexus, competition policies, state and international relations. In other words, the
regulationists focus on the following institutional arrangements: forms of monetary constraints,
configurations of wage relations, forms of competition, forms of the state, and positions within
the international regime.3 First, ‘forms of monetary constraints’ refer to banking and credit
systems. They examine the interaction between credit and money creation in a society and its
consequences. Second, ‘configurations of wage relations’, the area that I deal with in detail in
forthcoming empirical chapters, is a broader concept than the discipline, "industrial relations",
addresses. In fact, there is no proper translation of the French term "Rapport Salarial" into
English.4 Boyer (1988a) defines this as "the organization of the means of production, the nature
of the social division of labour and work techniques, type of employment and the system of
3Jessop (1992) added another element to the mode of regulation, the 
concept of social processes promoting the construction of ideology. Such 
social process would be embedded in education and training, and can also be 
studied by examining the influence of the media.
4Howell (1996) translated 'rapport salarial' as wage relationship, but 
the English translation does not convey the holistic picture regulationists 
lay out in this concept.
Table 3.1. Variety o f Regimes o f Accumulation in dominant economies
Production organization
Time horizon for capital formation
Income distribution (wages, profits, 
deductions)
Composition of social demand
Articulation with other relations of 
production
Examples
Extensive accumulation
Simple cooperation: low rate of 
productivity growth
Short, subject to immediate validation 
by the market
Governed by the short-run phases of 
the accumulation process
Capital formation plays the main role, 
final consumption a secondary one
Workers reproduced outside of 
capitalism (petty production, family 
etc.)
France (first half of the 19th century)
Intensive accumulation without mass 
consumption
Taylorist restructuring of production; 
big production; big productivity 
increases
Slightly longer, due to greater capital 
intensity
Attenuation of wage reductions
Consumption diffused more widely, 
investment remains preponderant
Slow insertion of workers into wage 
labour, international relations playing 
a key role
U.S., France (between wars)
Source: Boyer (1990), Appendix 3, Table 2.
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Intensive accumulation with mass 
consumption
Fordist deepening of mechanism, even 
higher productivity gains
Multi-year, the validation of 
investments occurring over their 
expected duration
Contractualization of direct and 
indirect wages
Simultaneous dynamic linking 
consumption and investment
Workers depend on wage labour for 
reproduction, modification of needs 
accompanying internationalization
Extensive accumulation with mass 
consumption
Exhaustion of Fordism and previous 
sources of production gains
Shortens, due to economic instability 
and major uncertainties
Institutionalized division challenged
Previous tendencies and patterns break 
down
Restructuring of relations with 
international and domestic economies
Europe, U.S. (after 1950) U.S. (since 1960s)
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determination of wages, and finally, workers' way of life." (p. 127) In other words, the 
regulationists deal not only with the traditional area of research into industrial relations like 
collective bargaining processes, but also look into the broader social setting that wages are 
negotiated in, including the pattern of income distribution and the norm of production and 
consumption. Third, ‘forms of competition’ focus on relations among producers. It describes 
the form of business organisations, the source of profit, the regulation of competition and other 
forms of inter-firm relations, and relations with finance capital. (Lane 1995, p. 23) Fourth, 
‘forms of the state’ define different configurations of relations between states and the economy. 
In other words, they are nation-specific institutional arrangements of compromise between 
capital and labour, characterised by state intervention and welfare provision. Fifth, ‘positions 
within the international regime’ deal with a state's relations with intemationally-dominant 
arrangements of trade, investment and monetary regulations. They also clarify the relative power 
or influence which a state exerts over others within a particular international economic order 
shaped by a hegemonic economy.
Using regulation theory, one can either study one of the above institutional arrangements, 
or the interaction of all of them - i.e. analyse the regime of accumulation as a whole. The latter 
is also called mode of development, which embraces the industrial paradigm by integrating 
modes of regulation and a regime of accumulation. (Lane 1995, p. 23) With the crisis of a 
regime of accumulation, the underlying divergence between rules and structure becomes obvious. 
The mode of regulation increasingly becomes an inadequate framework for a society. After a 
confusing transitional period, the mode of regulation is re-configured to meet the demand of the 
new form of the regime of accumulation. Such a process would be a historical co-evolution. As 
it is a social process, the mode of regulation could again differ considerably from culture to
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culture. In the empirical chapters of this thesis different labour market regimes will be discussed. 
I shall focus particularly on the configurations of wage relations, but also, to a lesser extent, take 
account of the interaction with other modes of regulation - forms of monetary constraints, state, 
competition and relations with the international regime.
How do modes of regulation interact in a regime of accumulation? It is useful to 
introduce the concept of Fordism, a well known regime of accumulation, to illustrate the 
analytical approach of the regulation school.
3.1.1.1. Analysing a regime of accumulation - Fordism
Fordism is one of most important regimes of accumulation of the twentieth century. The 
word was first used by Antonio Gramsci in an argument that high wages would improve workers' 
morality and social integration.5
The golden age of Fordism lasted from the post-war period until the beginning of the 
1970s. It was an intensive regime of accumulation, in which capital intensified the use of the 
factors of production through a rise in labour productivity and technological innovation. Let us 
briefly analyse Fordism by focussing on modes of regulation. First, the monetary regime was 
characterised by an institutionalised pure credit system (as opposed to a metallic standard). 
Under the Bretton Woods system, by design, finance was regulated heavily. Hence, banks were 
protected, and financial markets were stable with little leeway for speculation. Second, regarding 
the relationship between capital and labour, the structural power of labour has increased relative 
to the previous regime of accumulation in the interwar period, with the emerging structure of 
institutionalised unions and collective bargaining. Consequently, wage formation was more
5For more details, see Gramsci, A. (1971) "Americanism and Fordism." 
Selections from the Prison Notebooks. New York: International Publishers.
administered than market determined. In addition, a significant part of indirect wages was 
institutionalised. Fordism was based on a system of rising wages and social security coverage 
backed by the institutionalisation of labour power. Rising wage levels and social security 
coverage ensured that workers’ demand to consume reached high levels. It was the first regime 
in history in which workers could mass-consume what they mass-produced. This virtuous circle 
of mass production and mass consumption, and technological innovation induced by high levels 
of investment made it possible for the world economy to grow steadily at a fast rate for nearly 
30 years.6 Third, competition among firms in the product market was strong but not as intense 
as now, and that in the financial market was regulated. Consequently, banking activities were 
largely concentrated at the national level. Fourth, state intervention in public services were 
developed in particular for the sectors of education, health, and transportation. The 
nationalisation of key industries was widely practised in European countries, and social welfare 
was nationally institutionalised at varying degrees across Europe. Fifth, an international regime 
on trade through the GATT enforced the progressive liberalisation of trade. Private financial 
flows were limited due to the design of the Bretton Woods system, though there were some 
mechanisms of public financial flows for international redistributive purposes through the IMF 
and the IBRD. The international regime of private capital did not have any institutional 
framework as above, and was characterised by the significant expansion of American direct 
investment abroad and to a lesser extent, of the Western European. (Boyer 1996a, p.88)
The key characteristics of Fordism - mass production and mass consumption - was 
invented in the early interwar period, but did not become fully effective until the post-war period. 
Such a model could not work if it only took place at the Ford factory in Detroit: it only worked 
because it became the dominant form of economic management in the United States and later in
6Of course, as in any capitalist regime, there were cyclical downturns.
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the OECD countries as a whole. Boyer (1990) argues:
the effects of collective bargaining were extended by 'connective bargaining', 
which, starting from the auto industry, propagated increases in incomes to the non 
unionized private sector, then to the public sector. Such a mechanism is the 
condition of a simultaneous evolution of the norms of production and 
consumption, (p.x)
The argument becomes clearer if one compares the experience of Ford and Renault. In 
order to cope with industrial action, the Renault factory in France introduced the same sort of 
management structure Ford had in the inter-war period. The company guaranteed the near­
indexation of wages to prices for employees and a share of the profits. However, this contract 
worked against the firm, because Renault was the only factory doing it. It lost its competitive 
edge due to the constraints of higher wages and lost market share. This shows that a certain 
mode of regulation and regime of accumulation only works at the macro-level.7
In order to understand the working of Fordism better, one also has to take account of 
other modes of regulation, since the harmony / compatibility among modes of regulation would 
be indispensable for the success of a regime of accumulation. Fordism was a unique combination 
of Keynesian macroeconomic management, welfare states, and collective bargaining with the 
international regime characterised as 'embedded liberalism.'8 Without the institutional 
framework of Keynesian demand management and welfare states, the above mentioned wage 
policy would not have worked relatively smoothly for nearly 30 years, and vice versa. The 
regulationists examine the economy as a whole in order to assess the working of a certain 
institution. Thus, the working of monetary union cannot be assessed on monetary factors alone. 
What is important is whether a monetary regime to come would be compatible and work in
Economists call this kind of problem a "coordination problem", i.e., 
something works if everybody does it, but not otherwise.
8 C.f. Ruggie (1983)
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harmony with other existing modes of regulation. In this context, the success of monetary union 
depends on the performance of the whole economy, including the non-monetary, real economy.
3.1.1.2. The role of money / credit
Having introduced the holistic approach of the regulation school, it is necessary to further
expand on their treatment of money. Unlike neo-classical economics, the regulationists take
money as an essential element for the working of the real economy - a regime of accumulation.
The way money interacts with the real economy, in the regulationists’ interpretation, is more
structural than that of Keynesian economists. Boyer (1988a) evaluates the key elements which
distinguish Fordism from other regimes of accumulation as follows:
the alteration in wage relations - in particular the transition to Fordism, i.e., 
synchronization of mass production and wage earners' access to the 'American 
way of life' - and monetary arrangement, i.e., transition to internally accepted 
credit money - seems to have played a greater role than change in modes of 
competition or conjunctural stabilization policies a la Keynes, (p. 128)
Like Strange (1986), the regulationists put emphasis on the central role of credit money
in an intensive regime of accumulation, such as Fordism. A system of mass production and mass
consumption could not work on the scale of the golden age without support from credit money.
In the post war period, the demand for credit increased drastically in America. Household's debt-
GNP ratio in America in 1921 was 15%, but in 1978, it reached to 52%. It is a surprising
development, given the corporate debt-GNP ratio was only 50% in 1978. (Saito, 1989) The
development of the credit system through e.g., mortgages and consumer credits, ensured the
growth of consumer demand for housing, and expensive household durable goods. Through
consumer credit, workers could afford such goods, which in turn urged the diversification of a
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variety of durable and non-durable goods.
What supported the sustained expansion of consumer credit was the perception of the 
continuous rise of wage income. This expectation was institutionally supported by the collective 
bargaining processes and social welfare provided by the welfare states. In other words, regular 
wage rise by institutionalised collective bargaining and the expansion of indirect wages by the 
welfare state guaranteed a continuous flow of future income, which in turn increased current 
spending.
The availability of cheap credit encouraged not only consumption but also investment. 
Interest rates were lower in the golden age than at present. In the US, for example, the average 
nominal short-term interest rate during the decade 1961-70 was 4.3%, whereas it was 6.9% in 
1971-80, and 8.5% in 1981-90.9 Large investment in research and development brought about 
technological innovation. These institutions induced a rise in productivity through technological 
innovation. Consequently, capital could afford rises in real wages, as it could still keep unit 
labour costs10 constant. Thus, such interaction between the credit system, the norm of 
consumption and the production system was the engine for growth in the post war period.
However, this very factor of growth later caused the stagnation of the intensive regime 
of accumulation, and a vicious downward circle in the late 1970s. Excess demand for credit 
became a cause of inflation, destroyed future income, and thus drastically reduced the saving 
ratio. Inflation increased the cost of energy, of consumption goods and reduced real wages. In 
addition, the external shock of oil price increases in the 1970s accelerated inflation. Hence, real 
disposable income decreased, which reduced consumer demand. This led to the lower
9Data are from the European Commission Services.
10Unit labour costs are the index of the ratio between wage costs 
(compensation per worker) and apparent productivity (value added at constant 
price per worker).
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investment, lower productivity rises, and lower wage rises11. In order to maintain living 
standards in the short run, households had to depend further on consumer credit. By doing so, 
consumer debt mushroomed. Meanwhile, credit industries were mature enough to invest their 
own credit in real estate etc. for speculation. This, in turn, caused further rises in inflation rates. 
Hence, as Saito (1989) put it, for an intensive regime of accumulation, consumer credit is the 
catalyst in creating the virtuous cycle of economic growth as well as the vicious circle of 
economic crisis. In this context, for regulationists, money and credit take central stage in 
understanding the working of the real economy.
3.1.2. Advantages and limitations of the regulation school approach
The regulation approach is more sophisticated than the regime theory introduced in 
Chapter 1 in the following four respects. First, it can examine domestic regimes in addition to 
international regimes. Second, it can certainly accommodate more variables to analyse the 
problem. Distributive changes in the power structure, interests, principles and norms are the only 
variables that regime theorists look at. The regulation school focuses on broader social 
interactions, which can be seen as a social mode of economic management. Its analysis is truly 
inter-disciplinary taking into account economics, sociology, history and politics. In this way, it 
can offer a holistic approach to structures, examining them as structures in an integrated 
ensemble. Third, the theory can analyse the structural relationship between states and markets 
in an interactive fashion. It can explain dynamic interactions within a regime. Central to the
11In the late 1960s and 1970s, inflation was also accelerated by wage 
inflation in some European countries, particularly in France, Italy and the 
UK. The downward movement of wages tends not to be as efficient as it 
should be (sticky wages), because of institutional factors such as the 
excessive pressure of trade unions for wage rises and the lack of 
credibility of central banks in their ability to control inflation.
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regulation school is the notion of institutional change and transformation, as a result of the 
inherently dynamic nature of social relations within a national regime. The key to institutional 
change is the structural breakup at the moment of regime crisis. Crisis mediates regulatory and 
institutional changes. (Htibner 1989, pp. 197-220) Fourth, as it is interested in the unique 
configuration of a national regime under pressure from a dominant international ideology, it 
always sees national economic regimes as integrated parts of the global economy. It shows the 
emergence of different configurations of domestic regimes when different domestic traditions 
and institutions are exposed to the same kind of economic pressures and norms. The backbone 
of regulation analysis is the link between global economic change and the specific reaction of 
domestic regimes, as accumulation is a social process corresponding to a particular set of social 
institutions. As Howell (1992) put it, "the importance of the regulation approach is that it directs 
attention not simply to the strategies of actors, and their capacities for achieving goals - though 
these are important parts of the story - but also to how successfully these strategies correspond 
to the pressures and constraints imposed on them from a constantly evolving capitalist economy."
(p. id
Precisely because the theory covers such a broad area, there are some limitations and 
drawbacks in the existing empirical studies. First, though the theory is good in detecting and 
categorising the different domestic regimes, it is weak in explaining why differences in domestic 
regimes emerge and persist. In technical terms, the interaction between regime of accumulation 
and mode of regulation is vaguely defined. Lipietz (1986), for example, argues that they co- 
evolve by stabilising each other. Jessop (1990) agrees with Lipietz's stance and refutes 
technological functionalism: he argues that specific modes of regulation are historically 
contingent rather than capitalistically and technologically pre-ordained. Second, though the 
regulation analyses clearly present the different levels of modes of regulation - in particular,
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global and national levels - they do not clarify how they influence each other. Lipietz (1986) 
asserts reciprocal relations between the two levels but gives the national regime priority for the 
research agenda, whereas Jessop (1990) takes a more flexible stance. Third, although 
regulationists deal with institutions as modes of regulation, they have largely ignored the issue 
of "institutional inertia". (Lane 1995, p. 27) Institutional inertia emerges when a regime of 
accumulation is in crisis. The lack of analysis of the inertia thus makes it impossible to 
determine whether crisis starts at the national or global level. Finally, regulation analyses are 
vague when they come to the transition from one regime to another. This is intentional as they 
respect historical, social and cultural contingency. However, as Lane (1995) put it, it also means 
the lack of:
tools to conceptualize current process of transformation and instead fall back on 
a variety of plausible empirical generalizations... one cannot be sure whether any 
new trends in industrial paradigm or mode of growth are, indeed, traces of a new 
order, or whether they are merely transitory phenomena. In the end, the attractive 
openness and flexibility of the theory is achieved at the expense of conceptual 
vagueness, (p.27)
The problem here is that the regulation school pays insufficient attention to the interaction 
between structure and agency12. As a structuralist approach with Marxist origin, it tends to 
emphasise the importance of structure: it is weak in examining the individual (agent) actions 
which facilitate structural changes. The structuralist approach has been criticised for its inability 
to explain anything else but behavioural conformity to structural demands (Layder 1979). Wendt 
(1987) argued that by doing so, it may fail to explain some properties within the structures 
themselves. Though such reductionist tendencies are evident in systemic theories, such as the 
structural Marxist theory of Louis Althusser and the world- system theory by Immanuel 
Wallerstein, the regulation school is able to grasp changing structures. It does so by identifying
12For details, see Wendt (1987) . For recent debates, see Hay and 
Wincott (1998) and Hall and Taylor (1998).
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domestic structural tensions and agents who implement changes. One should emphasise that the 
regulation school was created as a criticism of structural statism pioneered by Altusser’s 
structural Marxism, which emphasises the reproduction of structures rather than the 
transformation. Yet, the regulationists* ability to analyse such dynamic structural change is 
contingent on the changes being of internal origin. If structural change originates from outside 
the domestic social relations, the regulation school cannot capture fully the sources of change, 
but it is capable of explaining the specific structural transformation resulting from this change. 
For instance, the regulation school cannot explain a global oil price shock, but it is useful in 
analysing the consequences of such a shock on structural change in Norway as a oil producing 
country. As regime change associated with EMU is very much contingent on the organizational 
principle of national economies under the previous EMS regime, the regulation analysis is valid 
here.
Institutional transformations happen as a consequence of intended or unintended action 
by social agents. Since the regulation theory does not conceptualise how these processes affect 
pre-existing structures, it has problems in unambiguously analysing the potential for and 
direction of future structural change. The potential for re-regulation of inadequate existing 
institutional structures through policy actions is not systematically understood and remains 
contingent on future developments. The regulation theory thus contains a historical dimension: 
it describes the present nature of institutions and regulatory frameworks in retrospect, as a 
product of path dependent developments driven by social interaction. (Hiibner 1989)
As economics has discovered in the Lucas critique, it is impossible to predict the future 
precisely, based on past variables. The advantage of the structural analysis of the regulation 
school is that it points out the constraints policy makers face from existing historically-rooted 
domestic institutional structures. Particularly in the situation of structural crisis, when structural
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constraints lose legitimacy, policy makers face strategic choices on how to adjust national 
economic systems. Though the regulationists are aware of social agents facilitating structural 
changes, they are better in identifying the build-up of structural tensions which interact with 
agents’ intervention. Predicting the options policy makers will choose goes beyond the analytical 
scope of structural analysis. What is needed here is an understanding of policy processes as has 
been put forward, for example, by the notion of policy learning. (Dyson 1994)
Regulation theory is not a concrete and rigorous theory. Rather, it sets out general 
notions, a method of work and a way to examine social interactions of capitalist economies. 
Teague (1990) argues that the theory may be better understood within the framework of the 
tradition of French sociological theory. However, the fact that the theory is less rigorous than 
conventional economic theories may be advantageous in its application to political economic 
questions. It may not be a theory which is meticulous in detail, but it presents a very useful 
means of analysing socio-economic questions. The question of this thesis is how domestic 
structures of labour markets intervene in the process of managing a single currency in Europe. 
Its purpose is to point out the structural constraints policy makers of the Euro zone countries are 
currently facing from their traditional domestic labour market institutions. Hence, despite its 
limitations, the methodology suggested by the regulation school is pertinent here.
3.2. Analysing domestic regimes
The analysis of domestic regimes is at the core of this thesis. They will be explored in 
detail using the empirical cases of three European countries, Britain, Germany and France from 
Chapters 6 to 8. The purpose of analysing the domestic regimes of three countries is to 
determine whether the three countries make good partners in constituting a sustainable monetary
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union. Given there is no clear hierarchy in power among these three countries, monetary union 
among them would have to rely even more on cohesion in economic and social policies. For 
that, it is necessary to examine whether the domestic regimes of the three countries are 
structurally compatible. By ‘compatibility’, I mean the three countries being able to co-exist 
without major problems or conflict. One way to assess compatibility of domestic regimes is to 
examine the historical traditions, institutional structures and the social preferences13 of different 
countries. These three factors are the key to clarifying the differences in domestic socio­
economic regimes.
3.2.1. Anti-inflation regime and structural compatibility
The Maastricht convergence criteria were envisaged by those in the ‘economist* camp 
to ensure that only non-inflation prone EU member states would participate in monetary union. 
The main focus by the Bundesbank is to introduce a ‘ stability culture’ (Jochimsen, 1993) through 
the Maastricht criteria to member states. ‘Stability culture’ stands for price and economic 
stability backed by social consensus. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it does not necessarily 
mean that countries have to have identical structures, i.e., the same democratic corporatist 
culture, as Germany. The regulationists know that it is impossible for countries with different 
socio-historical traditions to achieve an identical economic structure. Structural factors do not 
need to converge totally, but they have to be compatible. Similarity in dominant norms of 
economic management, in economic and social objectives, and the degree of social consensus,
13I define social preferences as the underlying attitudes and 
inclinations of society towards a certain issue area like monetary or labour 
market policies. Social (or societal, socio-economic) preferences are 
conditioned and shaped by historical traditions and national institutional 
structures. (Henning p.329) The regulationists also call preferences "social 
demand". (Noel p.32 9)
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rather than an idiosyncratic institutional structure, is more relevant to assess regime 
compatibility.
In order to examine whether or not countries have a 'stability culture', one has to consider 
questions regarding the anchor of price stability. As Henning (1994) put it, "societal preferences 
... influence external and domestic monetary policy" (p.246). With EMU, countries lose the 
external anchor, i.e., the exchange rate peg, as means to control inflation. As a result, they need 
an internal anchor to keep inflation in control. The management of the internal anchor depends 
very much on the kind of domestic regime countries have.
Structural inflation pressures come from either labour or credit markets. For the former, 
it is induced by wage inflation, and for the latter by asset-price inflation. The attempts to theorise 
structural inflationary pressures from labour markets are discussed in section 2.3.5. of Chapter 
2. The regulation approach to labour market regime analysis will be discussed in detail in the 
next section. Before doing so, however, one should briefly note another structural cause for 
inflationary pressure, although it will not be elaborated in this thesis.
The credit market is also another important source of inflation. The regulationists’ 
interpretation of the relations between inflation and credit is already surveyed in section 3.1.1.2. 
In a nutshell, when an intensive regime of accumulation is in crisis, asset-price inflation emerges 
and is difficult to contain. It could easily get out of control, as Japan experienced in its 'bubble 
economy' of the second half of the 1980s: institutional investors, financial institutions, and small 
investors joined the speculation. They expanded credits excessively by, in particular, buying 
into and selling off real estate. Once the bubble bursts, it is difficult to manage the economy out 
of stagnation, as the Japanese example shows.
How do we assess the proneness of asset-price inflation? The relations between banks 
and industry consumers is an indicator. An economy where banks have a higher ratio in credit-
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loan activity would be more sensitive to inflation than one with more securitised financial 
markets. In this sense, French and German economies are less inflation prone than the British 
one. Households’ equity holding was about 75% of disposable income in Britain, whereas it was 
less than 20% in both France and Germany in 1997.14 Another indicator would be the structure 
of fiscal deficits. A government may be tempted to inflate away its debts if they are excessive. 
Not to mention, this is why the Maastricht convergence criteria include a section on the size of 
debts and deficits.
Aside from these structural factors, the historical experience also helps to mould an anti­
inflation climate. This, however, may be only ingrained in Germany and not the rest of Europe. 
This thesis concentrates on the study of structural elements arising from labour market regimes 
thus ignoring other important issues related to credit market regimes.
In a narrower sense, the issue of regime compatibility seems to be to do with full 
economic union rather than monetary union. However, monetary union does not work well 
without a well-functioning economic and social counterpart. For this reason, I interpret the 
sustainability of monetary union in a broader sense, including the consideration for non-monetary 
factors. In assessing structural compatibility, I concentrate on the analysis of labour market 
regimes, as the sustainability of EMU is critically dependent on this crucial mode of regulation.
3.3. Analysing labour market regimes
It is important to define a navigational guideline for further empirical exploration in 
Chapters 6 to 8. In section 3.1.1., the configuration of wage relations (Rapport SalariaJ) was 
introduced as one of the modes of regulation. Wage relations cover wide areas related to the
14Statistics are from Economist 19th-25th September, 1998, p.157.
134
functioning of labour markets including industrial relations, wage formations and welfare 
payments. In other words, they examine the organisation of labour, wage bargaining processes, 
and the coverage of social rights. This methodology to deal with wage relations and welfare 
states as a single interdependent unit is a significant contribution of the regulation school. By 
doing so, one can classify the different kinds of democracy that different societies belong to.
This point is complex, and may require further elaboration. A French sociologist, Theret 
(1994) introduces the concept of social debt, i.e. individuals owing society a debt. For him, 
society is comprised of a set of inter-individual debts and a set of rights-duties that bind together 
those who make up society. A democratic state is responsible for formulating individuals’ 
reciprocal rights and duties and for guaranteeing the reimbursement of the social debt. By 
playing such a role, states become socially legitimate. Of course, there are a number of different 
types of society in different democratic countries. In very practical terms, one can interpret 
taxation as one of the factors constituting social debt. Anglo-Saxon countries prefer lower taxes, 
the lower social debt, which results in lower redistribution of income from rich to poor and thus 
higher income inequality. Nordic countries, on the other hand, tolerate higher taxes and higher 
social debt, resulting in higher income redistribution, and lower income inequality. In addition, 
the former can afford lower standards of public services, such as health, education and childcare, 
than the latter. These differences are nothing but differences in the social preferences of citizens, 
which are shaped by long historical and cultural traditions. And institutions, including social 
institutions, are built upon such social preferences and labour market institutions are no 
exception.
In section 3.1.1.1., I have described the way Keynesianism and Fordism interaction went 
hand- in-hand to maintain a virtuous cycle of mass production and mass consumption during the 
golden age of economic growth. Theret (1994) describes such interaction as a combination of
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the capital accumulation regime guaranteeing sustained individual consumption (Fordism) and 
the regime of state legislation agreeing to complement wage relations in a framework of welfare 
states, (p.33) The Keynesian-Fordist regime was based on the generalised principle of 
compensation. In other words, social security payments by states covered the loss of 
consumption power due to low wages, loss of work (unemployment), or retirement. In addition, 
basic social services provided by welfare states, such as health and education, were public and 
they guaranteed, at least in most Western European countries, quasi-universal access at low cost.
Let us now turn to the practical point of how exactly scholars of the regulation school 
deal with the labour market regime empirically. It is one of the most important modes of 
regulation that regulationists deal with. Consequently, there are large number of empirical 
studies by economists and sociologists. Boyer (1988) above all presents a most comprehensive 
framework. He studies labour market institutions by breaking them down into the following 
criteria: first, the trade union movement; second, employers’ organisations; third, government 
intervention; fourth, the type of collective agreement; fifth, the role of wage formation; and sixth, 
social security. For the fourth criterion, type of collective agreement, he examines levels of 
negotiation, and the frequency of agreements. For the role of wage formation, he studies the 
correlation of wages with productivity, cost of living and labour market behaviour in general 
(such as the level of unemployment, labour supply and demand, the awareness of external 
competitiveness). For social security, he looks at its extent, the level of benefits and how it is 
financed.
By examining these elements, I shall investigate whether France, Germany and Britain 
share similar socio-economic preferences and compatible labour market regimes. In doing so, 
I examine the concept of labour market flexibility (LMF), which is, as a principal means of 
adjustment, believed to be essential for a successful and sustainable monetary union. I
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distinguish between the two types of LMF, internal and external flexibility, proposed by Boyer 
(1993), to assess whether the labour market regimes of the three countries are compatible.
Scholars agree that LMF is very difficult to define as a generic concept. LMF is a means 
of evaluating the adaptability of labour market conditions to changing economic conditions. An 
assessment of LMF is both difficult and controversial. It is difficult because wage setting and 
legal frameworks in individual countries differ from each other, featuring diverse institutional 
settings and practices. It is also controversial because it raises major analytical and empirical 
questions on which no consensus exists. (OECD 1986) More than a decade since the OECD 
raised the point, there is still no agreement on a standard measurement of LMF. This thesis 
attempts to differentiate external and internal flexibility which are ideologically and practically 
difficult to reconcile. These concepts will be elaborated in Chapter 7 in detail.
Before moving to the central focus of the thesis, i.e., the comparison of labour market 
institutions and flexibility, let us survey the historical cases of monetary union attempts in the 
next two chapters. The Latin Monetary Union, the Scandinavian Monetary Union, and the early 
American monetary experiments will be studied, as they share some conditions and environments 
similar to the current EMU attempt. Does historical experience confirm the importance of the 
structural factors which I have been emphasising? To find out, an analysis of historical cases is 
necessary before moving to the specific analysis of labour market regimes in Europe from 
Chapter 6 onwards.
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Chapter 4
Lessons from history: Part I
Latin and Scandinavian Monetary Union
This and the next chapter examine historical attempts to form monetary union. Studying 
history can be useful to determine the key economic, political and institutional features, which 
cause the success or failure of monetary unions. In particular, I shall attempt to capture the 
broader structural factors which may have contributed to the sustainability of historical monetary 
unions.
In Chapter 2, two types of historical monetary unions were briefly introduced: those with 
and those without political union. In terms of its procedural development, a past monetary union 
comparable to the current EMU project is the German monetary union. It started with the initial 
customs union, the Zollverein, which eventually developed into the United German state, as 
explained in Chapter 1. However, in the case of the Zollverein, full monetary union came after 
political union. In this chapter, I shall only deal with monetary unions which were not 
accompanied by political unions - probably the most imperative feature of the current EMU 
attempt1. Therefore, I shall study the Latin Monetary Union (LMU) and the Scandinavian 
Monetary Union (SMU), both of which flourished in the latter half of the 19th century without 
political integration. Both were established within the international framework of metallic 
monetary standards and free mobility of capital and labour. Both eventually ceased to exist over 
the political differences leading up to World War I. However, there were already vast differences 
in the performance of the two monetary unions before this decisive break. They will be clarified 
in the forthcoming sections. Though the differences between the international monetary regimes
1Since the European integration process has been considerably deepened 
since its creation, some may interpret Europe as having imperfect political 
union. (Dyson 1994) However, political union is still a highly contested 
issue in Europe today, and fully-fledged political union would not be likely 
to materialize in the near future.
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then and now should be taken seriously, we should be able to gain fruitful insights by studying 
history.
4.1. A comparison of the international monetary regime of the 19th century with the present 
regime
The current international monetary regime shows some distinct differences to the 19th 
century. First, and most evident, the monetary arrangements in the latter half of the 19th century 
to the beginning of 20th century were based on metallic standards. Among those the gold 
standard evolved into the most dominant form, but there were also many countries subscribing 
to a silver or bimetallic standard. The metallic standards de facto meant a fixed exchange rate 
regime, whereas the current international system is characterised by floating exchange rates. 
There was a clear hierarchy during the classical gold standard period: the three European capital 
markets - London, Paris, and Berlin - were de facto running the world of ‘haute finance’ 
(Polanyi). The rest of the world - colonies of the British Empire, Latin America, Asia and to a 
lesser extent, the US - were minor players in terms of outward investment. There was a core­
periphery division in the system, with the former being the core and the latter being the 
periphery. Within the core countries, there again was a clear hierarchy with Britain being on top. 
Hence, the system was stable since the hierarchy was clearly defined and accepted by financial 
markets. There was a transnational consensus o f‘haute finance’ lending credibility (Eichengreen 
1996), which led to capital flows acting as a stabiliser. In contrast, the present can be 
characterised as an era of currency competition (Cohen 1998). Although the dollar is still 
regarded as the dominant international currency, there are several other currencies, such as the 
Deutsche mark and the Japanese yen, which are widely used in international transactions and
finance. Second, there was little national economic policy management in the time of the gold 
standard, whereas now the interventionist state is firmly established. Before the first world war, 
with the limited development of democracy, the concept of nation-based social protection had 
not yet been recognised. Thus, when there was a severe economic downturn, people were forced 
to emigrate abroad.2 (Panic 1992) One can argue that domestic regimes of the present type were 
foreign to the 19th century.3 There was no mechanism for the redistribution of wealth or of 
social welfare provided by states. Thus, the international regime was operated under text-book 
type liberal principles with virtually no intervention in markets and free movement of capital and 
labour. This absence of democratic franchise in most domestic regimes made it easier for 
countries to adjust. There was no conflict between external and internal stability, and external 
stability irrefutably prevailed. The adjustment burden was often shifted to the periphery from 
the core countries. If the core countries had to adjust considerably, it was helped by the 
emigration of the domestic population. With the lack of social welfare, and the concept of civil 
rights unknown, poor people either starved or had to migrate. Unlike then, the contradiction 
between national economic policy making autonomy and global economic interdependence has 
become the key problem of the international monetary system. National social cohesion has only 
become apriority since the 1930s.4 It became institutionalized in the concept of the welfare state 
developed after World War II. It is very difficult or even impossible to compromise on internal 
stability in pursuit of external stability at present. Fiscal policy before World War I was
2The cumulative totals of net migration between 1870-1913 for Germany, 
UK, and Italy were -2,598,000, -6,415,000, and -4,459,000. Besides other
factors, the later development of partial social protection reduced the 
number of emigrants. The figure for the same countries between 1914-49 were 
-304,000, -1,405,000, and -1,771,000, respectively. (source: Table B.5.,
Maddison 1991)
3e.g. Eichengreen (1996)
4For more details, see K. Polanyi (1957).
predominantly concerned with tax collection, but it has since become more complex with the 
emergence of social and deficit spending. In other words, the domestic regimes now and then 
are totally different. Third, the nature of capital flows then was not as much dominated by 
short-term speculation as it is now. Since the world economy was growing, there were 
opportunities for lucrative long-term real investment, such as investment to finance railway 
construction in the Americas. Some parts of the world economy were rapidly growing and 
needed investment in infrastructure at the same time as some other parts, i.e. the European 
countries, had already reached a certain level of development and were actively seeking overseas 
investment opportunities. Thus the long-term nature of investment contributed to making the 
system less volatile. Today, however, a substantial amount of investment is financial 
speculation, despite the high level of foreign direct investment, partly due to developments in 
technology, together with floating exchange rates. Yet, one has to add that, toward the end of 
the 19th century, investment increasingly became speculative. Finally, the political structures 
the world economy operates in are totally different then and now. During the classical gold 
standard, key countries could conceal their structural weaknesses and maintain a myth of 
superiority, in particular, Britain. For instance, the British merchandise trade balance was 
increasingly in deficit toward the end of the century. Yet, its current account was intact due to 
its net assets abroad. Because of the structural political factor of ruling over empire, it could 
limit the size of its trade deficits. In other words, British colonies had a clear bias towards 
importing British manufacturing goods, rather than German or French, irrespective of quality or 
price. In spite of the myth of free trade, there was a case of what could be described as ‘structural 
impediments’ in terms of the current trade debate. Such an imperial political structure does not 
exist now. (De Cecco 1974) Thus, the economic weaknesses at the core are more visible at the 
present than they were in the 19th century, which encourages instability in global finance.
4.2. The rationale behind the study of historical monetary unions
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Having examined the differences between international monetary regimes now and then, 
does it still make sense to study historical monetary unions? The answer is yes, as the LMU and 
the SMU are some of the few inter-European monetary arrangements in history practised without 
political union. The experience of their success and failure may enable us to gain some insights 
into the dos and don'ts of the management of monetary unions. Thus, the working and the 
institutional structure of two monetary unions will be studied in this chapter: the Latin Monetary 
Union and the Scandinavian Monetary Union. The LMU case may be more interesting to study, 
as it is a union among countries with considerably different political and economic systems.
4.3. Historical background
In the 1860s, apart from the bimetallic standard, Europe was divided into two different 
monometallic standards, one based on gold centred around England and the other based on silver 
in the Russian and Hapsburg Empires. For about five years after the creation of Latin Monetary 
Union in 1865, the bimetallic standard, which will be described extensively in the following 
section, seemed to prevail in Europe as a whole. However, the fluctuation of the relative value 
of the two metals due to the discovery of new gold or silver mines caused considerable problems 
in the maintenance of bimetallism. (Eichengreen 1996) Finally, the French defeat at Sedan in 
the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 decisively contributed to the prevalence of the gold standard 
in Europe outside the LMU. However, the stability of the gold value was always under threat 
throughout most of the period of the classical gold standard in those countries which still used 
silver together with gold, due mainly to the massive inflow of silver from American mines. The
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Banque de France, the lender of last resort of the Latin Monetary Union, worked as an important
shock absorber to stabilise the fluctuating silver price against the gold price for the first three
decades of the classical gold standard. De Cecco (1990) interprets the role of the Latin Monetary
Union as positive for the working of the international monetary regime:
the famed stability of exchange rates which characterised the European currencies 
in the second half of the nineteenth century would probably not have been 
achieved had the Latin Union not been there to stabilise silver prices and to 
prevent silver countries, like the Russian and Hapsburg Empires, from adopting 
monetary policies even more drastic than the ones they were compelled to take 
because of the fall in the price of silver." (p.35)
Having introduced the LMU in its international context, I examine the detail of its 
functioning in the next section.
4.4. The Latin Monetary Union
The Latin Monetary Union (LMU) was formally established in 1865 and ceased to exist 
in 1927. It was the confirmation of the Franc standard which had already been used by France, 
Belgium, Switzerland and Italy. The union was not a deliberate attempt at fresh institution 
building, but a mere formalization of what was already practised. The French Franc had already 
become legal tender in Belgium in 1832. Switzerland adopted the French monetary system in 
1850 and so did Italy in 1862. By 1865, all four countries had more less the same monetary 
structure based on the French system, and their currencies were freely circulating among them. 
As Perlman (1993) put it, "the purpose of the (1865) convention (for establishing the LMU) was 
merely to enshrine an existing system in law", (p.316) At the monetary convention of 1865, the 
reciprocal obligation to accept each other's currencies without limit was institutionalised. The 
main objective of the convention, however, was to standardize the fineness of existing silver 
coinage, because differences in the fineness (in terms of the pureness of silver content) in the
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countries' 5 franc pieces threatened the displacement of good by bad silver coins.5 Kindleberger 
(1993) characterized the motivation for the establishment of the union as follows: "the instinct 
or reasoning that prompted the decision would be known in the 1960s as the theory of'optimum 
currency areas'. Belgium was too small to have an independent currency." (p. 68)
In addition to the aspect of optimum currency areas, the LMU experience can offer 
another discrete but interesting lesson for the current European project. That has to do with the 
desire for the standardization of money not only in Europe, but also world-wide. Napoleon Ill's 
finance minster, Francis Nicholas Mollien, believed in the desirability of universal money. 
Initially, it was conceived that other countries would join in the LMU at a later date. The 
founders of the LMU, especially France, believed that "they had laid the basis for what might 
eventually develop into a world wide monetary union based on a bimetallic currency." (p. 596, 
Nielsen 1933). Like Napoleon I, Napoleon III was ardent to become a lawgiver to foreign 
countries, and aimed at France eventually becoming a dominant European power politically and 
economically through monetary influences.6 Some authors assert that this intention may be 
similar to that of Germany or France in the present context of the EMU project.7 Indeed, some 
countries considered joining the LMU, but this never materialised, except for Greece, which
5This problem confirms Gresham's law, proposed by Sir Thomas Gresham 
in the 16th century. The argument is that in the case of two monetary media 
circulating simultaneously, if their intrinsic relative values determined 
by market forces diverge from their legally determined values, the money 
with the higher intrinsic value will be driven out from circulation, since 
it will be hoarded. Thus, Gresham's law means that bad money drives out 
good money.
6See Willis (1901) p.56, and Bartel (1974) p.696, quoting Henry B, 
Russell (1898) International Monetary Conference. New York: Harper and
Brothers.
7For example, see Connolly, B. (1995). He calls the French vision of 
Europe "imperialist" and German "missionary-colonialist", (p.388)
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joined in 1868.8 The main reason lies with the institution at its core - the bimetallic standard.
Ironically, the fact that France insisted upon bimetallism against all odds resulted in a 
fatal blow to its dream of becoming the provider of universal money, both technically and 
economically. Technically, to maintain a fixed relative price of gold and silver, and to maintain 
both as effective currencies, financial markets had to be convinced that the system was 
completely credible. Otherwise the market had to be managed. As we know, the international 
monetary regime of the 19th century was based on the free movement of capital. Any major 
changes in relative metal prices had a disastrous effect on such a system. (Perlman p.314) In 
addition, it was already widely believed that keeping the bimetallic standard did not make sense 
economically. Gold currencies had already become the money of commerce, because gold was 
the wholesale money of mercantile nations.9 As most countries tended toward the gold standard, 
the bimetallic anachronism was "likely to hinder the extension of the Latin Union". (Willis, p.57) 
At the monetary convention in 1865, Belgian, Swiss and Italian delegates strongly favoured 
adopting the gold standard, rather than the existing bimetallic standard. Interestingly enough, 
French delegates also were personally in favour of the gold standard.10 Yet, the minister of 
Finance "demanded the maintenance of the status quo" (Willis p.57) This official French 
position can be interpreted in two ways. First, the French government was heavily influenced 
by the interest of the Banque de France and haute finance, which were reluctant to forsake the
8Spain and Romania formally applied for the union but were rejected, 
due to political reasons. Austria considered joining the union in 1867 only 
for gold currencies, and Austrian gold coins were made legal tender in Italy 
and Belgium. Willis (1901) argued that "it was a severe defeat for the 
bimetallic policy", (p.83) The Papal States, the Balkan countries, the 
Grand Duchy of Finland and some countries in Central America introduced the 
franc standard and contemplated joining the LMU, but never did.
9Willis (1901) argues that France was already dependent on the new gold 
currency which was adopted in 1848, by the time of the 1865 monetary 
convention.
10For details, see Willis p.78-79.
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existing system. The system had operated for well over half a century since 1803, and more 
importantly, bimetallism provided an opportunity for lucrative arbitrage operations. Those 
arguing for bimetallism also pointed out the advantage of the system in trading with the East, 
where most countries were on a silver standard. Second, France possessed considerable amounts 
of silver. The redemption of the outstanding silver coinage would have been a great loss to 
France.
The design of the union reflected French interests completely. It was an asymmetric 
arrangement with the Banque de France as the lender of last resort. The Banque de France 
provided liquidity by supplying the other member states with gold against their silver. As 
mentioned above, the fundamental feature of the union - bimetallism - was determined solely by 
the interests of France, and ignored the opinion of other member states.
The French government, however, reviewed the LMU thoroughly between 1867 and 
1870. The results of the investigations were in favour of the gold standard.11 Willis (1901) 
argues that "at the opening of 1870, everything was ready for the introduction of measures 
definitely committing France to the gold standard." (p. 108)
In the same year, the Franco-Prussian War broke out, and at the battle of Sedan, Napoleon 
III was captured. The war ended the following year with a German victory. The fact that 
Germany opted for the gold standard, according to Willis (1901), was reason enough for France 
to reverse the decision to go for the gold standard, (p. 112) France had to pay a large part of the 
indemnity to Germany in gold.12 Furthermore, the institutional structure of the gold standard 
applied by Germany was totally incompatible to the French monetary system. This made it
1:lFor detail about the development of French public opinion, see Willis 
(1901), pp.94-107.
12For the breakdown of the indemnity and the amount paid, see footnote 
I of p.110 by Willis. (1901)
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impossible for the union, even if based on gold, to continue to flourish.
In sum, with the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War in 1871, and the newly 
established German Reich adopting the Gold standard, bimetallism lost its significance. As 
silver lost its importance as a unit of account, Germany sold its silver holdings. France had to 
pay considerable parts of its indemnity in French gold coins, which weakened the French ability 
to serve as the lender of last resort in the LMU.
A number of new silver mines were discovered between 1869 and 1872 in the United 
States as well as in Latin America, which exacerbated the problem of over-supply of silver 
relative to gold. From 1860 to 1885, the production of gold decreased and that of silver 
increased, which caused the relative value of silver to fall. In 1872 and notably 1873, the value 
of silver sharply declined, which made it clear that the bimetallic standard was unsustainable: it 
became increasingly difficult for the LMU countries to maintain stability of the gold-silver 
exchange rates. Growing speculation induced a massive flow of silver to France and Belgium, 
the main countries practising the system. In return, gold from these countries went abroad. 
Belgium pushed hard for the adoption of a single gold standard. The coinage of silver five-franc 
pieces was suspended during 1873 to 1875. The free movement of currencies among the member 
states was hampered by the French reluctance to receive Belgian and Italian coins in late 1873. 
In order to avoid developments as predicted by Gresham's law, coinage of silver was limited and 
consequently stopped in 1878. From this point onwards, the bimetallic standard de facto became 
"a limping gold standard". (Nielsen 1933, p.597) The member states, France in particular, 
suffered from a massive overhang of silver coins, which slowly undermined the already 
crumbling system. As Perlman (1993) put it, "the basic element of a monetary union, the 
uniformity of coinage, and their free circulation had by now been so circumscribed by detailed 
regulation that except on paper the union was finished." (p.329) For the rest of the period until
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the legal demise of the LMU in 1927, member states were muddling through just to keep the 
LMU in existence: there was not much substance left to the LMU. It was a French creation and 
died with the French inability to act as a political and economic hegemon.
4.4.1. Evaluation of the LMU
What can we learn from the historical experience of the LMU? This question is best 
looked at by, first, analysing the causes which led to the failure of the union.
4.4.1.1. Why did the LMU fail?
The direct economic cause of the collapse of the system was the changing price of silver 
vis-a-vis gold. The political cause was the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian war. These 
elements can be categorized as external factors which caused the failure. However, these 
external factors were not alone in causing the union to collapse. Rather, there are a number of 
more fundamental problems regarding internal arrangements, which deserve attention.
First of all, the institutional structure of the LMU was not adequate. The fundamental 
feature of the union, bimetallism, was inherently unstable, as any change in the price of either 
metal attracted speculation.13 As explained above, from as early as 1865, LMU member states, 
excluding France, advocated the application of the gold standard. The fact that the system only 
reflected the narrow interests of the French finance ministry and haute finance, resulted in the
13In the words of Bagehot, bimetallism is described as follows: "we
regard that scheme (bimetallism) as so entirely beyond the boundaries of 
practical finance that we did not think it worth discussing, and we only 
discuss it now because we continued to receive ingenious pamphlets . . .
they (universal bimetallism) seem to us fit only for theoretical books, 
because the plan is only a theory on paper, and will never be in practice 
tried." (St. John-Stevas p.215-17)
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breakdown of the system as a whole.
Secondly, institutional weaknesses to control inflationary tendencies could be considered 
as the most crucial cause of the demise of the LMU. Svindland (1990) blames the failure of the 
LMU on the lack of regulation of the total money supply. As a result, countries took advantage 
of this flaw to solve problems in their public finances. Despite the fact that France was the 
dominant power (hegemon) in the system, it was an irresponsible manager and was not enforcing 
proper management of the system. There were some mechanisms to control the domestic money 
supply within some member states, but there were none to monitor the total money supply of the 
LMU. For example, there was no limitation for the notes issued by the Banque de France, but 
the notes in circulation within France were limited by law, which changed from time to time. 
The National Bank of Belgium was constrained in its note issue by law, which required the 
coverage by securities readily convertible, and also a certain amount of metallic reserves in return 
for new notes. Due to its unique political structure, Switzerland had several banks which were 
authorised to issue notes, but the Federal Assembly reserved the right at all times to fix the total 
issue of the Republic and determined the quota for each bank. In addition, banks were regulated 
in their procedure to issue notes, as in the case of the National Bank of Belgium. Italy also had 
several banks but their banking affairs were not managed properly. Six banks were authorized 
to issue notes, with a legal limit to maximum issuance, but they quite often did not follow such 
regulations. (Rothwell 1893, p.24) Italy was given special treatment in the LMU, and was 
allowed to issue large amounts of paper money. (Perlman p.329) Unfortunately, the money 
supply of the system was largely determined by Italy. The union decreed a common monetary 
policy, but left it to each central bank to ensure compliance. As the global depreciation of silver 
began in the late 1860s, several members increased the amount of circulation for additional 
seigniorage gains.(Cohen 1994, p. 15 8) Although the system allowed free circulation of national
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currencies, there was no institution to monitor how much money was actually circulating. This 
lack of control over the total money supply made the system inflationary, which eventually 
led to its collapse.
Thirdly, the fundamental cause of the breakdown of the LMU can be put down to a 
standard economic problem: that is to say, the collapse was the result of asymmetric shocks, a 
problem addressed in modem economics by the theory of optimum currency areas. The external 
shocks derived from the fluctuation of the metallic values which had different effects on different 
member states. Such shocks were exacerbated by structural differences in their economies. As 
Perlman (1993) put it, "the specific changes in the economic environment that will affect the 
system and the specific intervention required will vary according to the type of monetary and 
other economic structures present." (p.331) The external shocks brought about different kinds 
of internal disturbances, depending on the monetary or economic structures of the members. 
With the LMU, their monetary structure was unified. However, their economic structures were 
diverse, since the LMU brought together nation states in different stages of economic and 
political development and with different cultural traditions. France was a traditionally 
centralized state and Switzerland was a traditionally decentralized federal state. Belgium was 
newly independent14 and had not established a firm domestic regime yet. The same could be said 
for Italy which was only united in 1870. As table 4.1. indicates, the employment structures of 
member states were diverse. We can infer that Italy had by far the most agrarian economy 
relative to other LMU member
14Belgium declared independence from the Netherlands in 183 0, which was 
acknowledged in the London Protocol in 1831. However, the settlement of the 
border problem was not achieved until 1839.
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Table 4.1. Structure of employment in 1870 in selected LMU countries (% of total employment)
Agriculture Industry Services
Belgium 43.0 37.6 19.4
France 49.2 27.8 23.0
Italy 62.0 23.0 15.0
Switzerland 49.8 n.a. n.a.
Source: Maddison (1991), p.248.
states, and the least developed among the 4 member states. The fact that the least developed 
economy was de facto determining the money supply illustrates gross negligence in LMU 
governance. This internal diversity often led to the issuance of paper money. Internal 
disturbances in one country were then echoed by and transmitted to other member states, and 
developed into Union-wide problems.
4.4.1.2. Lessons to be learnt from the LMU experience
The problem of lack of control over the system was caused by the absence of 
international institutions devoted to the functioning of the LMU. There was no secretariat nor 
any other permanent coordination body among member states in the LMU. The absence of such 
machinery to promote consultation and coordination hampered the union from taking any 
decisive action. This is a pertinent message for the current EMU attempt, since it justifies the 
establishment of the independent European Central Bank (ECB).
Another relevant message for the current monetary union proj ect would concern the order 
of integration. France wanted to have currency union first, with the intention that it would 
become a stimulant for further integration. Clearly France was aiming for political dominance 
in Europe. However, with the lack of corresponding consistency in any other area of the 
economy as well as the political system, the union did not take off. In parallel to the present
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monetary union attempt, some in Germany (notably Bundesbank officials) argue that there has 
to be a clear commitment to political union in order to achieve successful monetary union.15
The motivation for the LMU, which is to use the currency to expand French political 
influence, was also not appropriate as a foundation for monetary cooperation. Though LMU 
operated in the international (or continental European) dimension, the institutional arrangements 
only reflected French interests. This is also a relevant lesson for the current project of EMU. 
The Maastricht criteria as well as the stability pact proposed by the Germans to strengthen the 
fiscal criteria seem to reflect mostly German interests rather than system wide interests. 
European economies at the start of EMU are just emerging from recession. In order to promote 
growth in the long run, it may be useful to have room to allow some coordinated fiscal 
stimulation for some time. Seeking fiscal soundness is good for the system, but imposing fiscal 
stringency to the level of the Maastricht fiscal criteria could be counterproductive to system wide 
socio-economic stability. Most European countries have unemployment rates of more than 10%. 
The economy may benefit from a carefully designed demand management policy to promote 
economic growth. It is, thus, important that the system is not organized in the interests of the 
dominant member alone.
The LMU was only a monetary union which was not backed up by institutionalised 
cooperation among member states in other areas of economic policies than monetary policy. The 
EU, as was the case for Germany before unification in the 19th century, has built up other areas 
of economic policy coordination through a customs union. Therefore, the EMU project, after 
considerable economic integration and institutionalised coordination, may be more sustainable 
than the ill-fated LMU.
Last but not least, the diverse political and economic conditions of member states caused
15e.g. Tietmeyer (1994), Jochimsen (1993, 1994).
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asymmetric shocks, which led directly to the collapse of the LMU. Would external shocks also 
make EMU fail? This is the standard OCA argument surveyed in Chapter 1. Due to lack of data, 
it is almost impossible to make a comprehensive assessment of the degree of divergence in 
domestic regimes in LMU and EMU countries. A crude measurement is attempted in section 
4.6. Rather than comparing past and present monetary unions, it may be more pertinent to 
compare the records of success of the LMU and the Scandinavian Monetary Union (SMU), as 
they took place during the same period of time. This assessment will be done after the 
introduction of the SMU.
4.5. Scandinavian Monetary Union
In conjunction with the discontinuation of the silver standard, Scandinavian Monetary 
Union (SMU) was established at the end of 1872, and ceased to exist in 1931. A common 
system of coins and money of account among Denmark, Norway and Sweden was introduced 
after the Scandinavian mint convention in 1875. It was a monometallic gold standard, and set 
the Krone as a uniform monetary unit. It was established with the aim of standardising existing 
coinage. In 1885, the participating states agreed to accept one another's bank notes and drafts. 
The SMU established the total disappearance of exchange rate quotations among the three 
monies. By the turn of the century, the SMU had come to function, in effect, as a single currency 
for all payment purposes.
Unlike the LMU, the SMU worked very well due to close central bank coordination. The 
three central banks opened credit lines to each other and balanced mutual drawings regularly. 
In other words, the central banks were pooling reserves, as is practised in modem central 
banking.
The SMU broke up because of the malfunction of the currency system, owing to political 
developments. In 1905, Sweden cancelled its membership in response to the separation of 
Norway from Sweden. Yet Sweden continued the arrangement with Denmark. The SMU finally 
collapsed during World War I due to inflation in Denmark and Norway. Danish and Norwegian 
bills were quoted at discounts in 1915. Their exchange rates were continuously discounted in 
the markets against the Swedish Krone from 1916 onwards. In order to cope with the problem, 
the union managed to agree on the suspension of gold coinage and an embargo on gold imports 
from outside the union. However, Sweden continued to be exposed to the inflow of Danish and 
Norwegian gold coins. In 1917, the three countries agreed on a gold exclusion policy (the 
prohibition of gold imports), which de facto forfeited the SMU. (Bartel, p.702) As a 
consequence, the rates of exchange among the three currencies fluctuated heavily. Formally, 
however, monetary union was not abolished until 1924. Then, the last form of payment still 
convertible among the three countries - token money16 - was abolished. Due to the differences 
in exchange rates after 1916, the Swedish Krone was considerably stronger than the Danish and 
Norwegian Krones. Y et the token money of one Swedish Krone still had the same nominal value 
as one Danish or Norwegian Krone. As a result large amounts of Danish and Norwegian Krones 
were smuggled to Sweden. As Gresham's Law indicates, people hoarded Swedish Krone and 
used Danish and Norwegian counterparts.17 In 1924, the parliament of all three countries ratified 
the law to make the old convention money ineffective as legal tender. (Hecksher et al. 1930)
16Token money stands for a legal tender which bears no relation to its 
intrinsic commodity value.
17According to Hecksher et al. (1930), "the sums sent back by Sweden 
in the course of the year 1923 and 1924 amounted in Norwegian money to Kr. 
19,300,300, and in Danish to almost exactly the same sum, or Kr. 19,500,000.
. . By comparing this with the total amount minted during the fifty years
of the Monetary Union, it will be found that exactly 40 per cent of what had 
been minted in Denmark since 1873 had gone to Sweden during the few years 
of the depreciation of the currency. . . The corresponding figures for
Norway appear to be lacking." (p.265)
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Outside the formal agreement, the public offices of the border towns continued to accept token 
money and banknotes of other member states of the SMU in smaller amounts. The SMU was 
never formally invalidated. At the end of 1931, however, the three countries left the gold 
standard, and introduced paper currency, which practically terminated the SMU.
4.5.1. The LMU versus the SMU
Though the LMU de facto failed in 1878, the SMU was relatively successful until 1905. 
This means that the LMU functioned for about 13 years, but the SMU worked for 33 years. 
What made the SMU more sustainable than the LMU?
The LMU and the SMU took place at the same time, but they had very different 
characteristics. First, as the SMU was a monometallic standard, it was not as vulnerable to the 
relative price changes between gold and silver as was the LMU under bimetallism.
Second, unlike the LMU, the SMU successfully managed to control union level money 
supply through central bank coordination.
Third, one of the distinct differences between the two monetary unions is that there was 
a high degree of cultural uniformity among SMU member states. In the 1830s, a movement called 
Scandinavianism emerged to promote fraternity among Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Its 
objective was to join the Scandinavian countries into a political, economic and cultural entity. 
This liberal movement of Scandinavian brotherhood faced a setback when Norway and Sweden 
failed to aid Denmark in its war with Prussia in 1863-64. However, the spirit of unity continued, 
and was embodied in the Scandinavian labour and social democrats movements in the 1890s.
Fourth, this cultural similarity made it easier for the SMU countries to proceed with 
economic and quasi political integration in other areas. Political and economic integration took
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place at various levels during the 19th century. The Scandinavian Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
comprising Sweden, Norway and Denmark, was formed in 190718. It worked as an advisory body 
for political ends. A secretariat of the Inter-Parliamentary Union was established, which enabled 
it to publish its proceedings. (Lindgren, p.235) The Scandinavian Administrative Union was 
established in 1918, and played a complementary role. The Union was dominated by social 
democrats. What is most different from the current situation is that the labour movement was 
also more international then: national labour organizations initiated their Nordic meetings. The 
movement for a Scandinavian labour congress developed in the 1890s. During 1898-99, national 
trade unions started to unite as a Scandinavian federation, which "served as an administrative 
clearing organ during industrial conflicts and collected funds to assist colleagues in other 
countries." (p.236)
The forces behind such regional integration were Social Democratic Parties and labour 
groups. This internationalisation of the labour movement in the Scandinavian countries was, of 
course, influenced by the "internationalist" movement on the continent. Yet, such institutions 
were never built among the LMU countries, nor was there any further integration attempt beyond 
the monetary sphere. Though each Scandinavian nation pursued its own national policies "their 
natural similarity caused a growth of identification with each other." (p.236) The participants of 
the SMU were, though only for a short period of time, engaged in even deeper integration than 
the current EU countries.
Fifth, According to Vanthoor (1996), the SMU was "successful in the sense that its 
participants were equal economic partners, who had already put their economies in order before 
the monetary treaty was concluded, thus giving their national currencies an equal status." (P. 41) 
Sweden was not the absolute hegemon of the SMU, to the extent France was in the LMU.
18 The Inter-Parliamentary Union was similar to the current European 
Parliament, including its ineffectiveness as a law maker.
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Sweden was the largest economy and politically the most powerful of the Scandinavian countries, 
as was France in the LMU. Yet the institutional arrangements of the SMU were more 
symmetrically organised than those of the LMU. Such symmetry was induced by the similarities 
among the member states.
Table 4.2 below compares the employment structure of the SMU member states. The 
three countries had similar economic structures: they were predominantly agrarian economies 
with efficient agricultural systems, and increasingly industrialised in the latter half of the 19th 
century.
Table 4.2. Structure of Employment in 1870 (% of total employment) in the SMU countries
Agriculture Industry Services
Denmark 51.7 n.a. n.a.
Norway 53.0 20.0 27.0
Sweden 54.0 21.0 25.0
Source: Maddison (1991)
A comparison between tables 4.1 and 4.2 indicates that the SMU was a union of much more 
homogeneous countries than the LMU. This similarity between countries seems to have 
contributed to the sustainability of the SMU compared to the LMU.
Lindgren (1959) clarifies the drive behind Scandinavian integration as follows:
It seems apparent that common systems of social thought and similar reactions 
to social change are basic to integration. Thus Scandinavian political reforms and 
social progress displayed domestic trends and effected a growth of identification 
with each other, since, basically, these impulses sprang from identical or similar
pattern of social thought Some common social values seem to be necessary
also, even though these might not always be in complete agreement. Social 
equality must be recognized fully... without mutual respect for the opinions of 
another country's representatives, any framework of amalgamation could not but 
fail, (emphasis added)(p.278-79)
He also points out that social welfare, democracy, and political participation are the key
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variables of social values in peaceful times. If countries have similar social values, "the political 
responses of leaders and peoples will be more certain to coincide and to be much less erratic." 
(p.282) He argues that economic motives - desire to preserve trade, commerce, a high standard 
of living, and other economic and social demands - were the engine for Scandinavian integration.
In accordance with the second criterion of Panic (1992), introduced in Chapter two, the 
socio-economic preferences of the member states were alike, which seems to have made the SMU 
more durable than the LMU.
4.6. Lessons from historical monetary unions
This section summarises the finding in this chapter to extract the lessons for the current 
EMU proj ect. The first part attempts to obj ectify the differences between the LMU and the SMU 
by using statistical methods.
Generally speaking, the LMU was very loosely integrated and affected the monetary 
sphere alone, uniting member states of a variety of economic, political and cultural backgrounds. 
As table 4.3 suggests, the member states of the LMU had very different levels of per capita 
industrialisation19, as well as per capita GNP. Such differences were less prominent in the case 
of the SMU, but there were still considerable differences in terms of per capita levels of 
industrialisation. What is interesting in studying such statistics is that the economically most 
wealthy countries - Denmark in the SMU, and Switzerland in the LMU - were not hegemons of 
their respective monetary regimes. The hegemons of both monetary unions were certainly the
19The level of industrialisation stands for the per capita volume of 
industrial production. The particular method of calculation is explained 
in Bairoch (1982), pp.311 - 329. This is the only comparable set of
statistics indicating the patterns of economic activities, available from 
the mid 18th century to the present.
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biggest countries, and perhaps more importantly, the politically most dominant ones in their 
regions. Thus we can infer that the operation of monetary unions in the 19th century were rooted
more in political ambition than in economic rationale.
Table 4.3. Per capita levels of GNP and industrialisation
Per capita levels of industrialisation (UK 1900 =100) Per capita GNP levels (1960 US $ and prices)
year 1880 1913 1880 1913
LMU France 28.00 59.00 483.00 670.00
Switzerland 39.00 87.00 584.00 895.00
Belgium 43.00 88.00 481.00 815.00
Italy 12.00 26.00 289.00 445.00
SMU Sweden 24.00 67.00 404.00 705.00
Norway 16.00 31.00 376.00 615.00
Denmark 12.00 33.00 431.00 885.00
LMU mean 30.50 65.00 459.25 706.25
variability 577.00 2,570.00 45,584.75 117,018.75
variation 0.79 0.78 0.46 0.48
SMU mean 17.33 43.67 403.67 735.00
variability 74.67 818.67 1,512.67 37,800.00
variation 0.50 0.66 0.10 0.26
Note: Variability is a measure of the variability of the data set, and technically, measures
the sum of squares of deviations of data points from their sample mean.
Variation is the square root of variability divided by the mean.
Unlike variability, variation is independent of units of measurement.
Source: Calculated from table 1.1 in M. Panic (1992)
European Monetary Union: Lesson from the Classical Gold Standard.
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Table 4.4. Per capita levels of GDP and industrialisation in EMS countries
Per capita levels of industrialisation (UK 1900=100) Per capita GDP levels
(Thousands of ECUs at current market prices)
year 1980 1980 1995
EMU core Germany 395.00 9,472.76 22,919.03
France 277.00 8,880.85 20,282.14
Netherlands 245.00 8,711.56 19,543.11
Belgium 316.00 8,632.07 20,644.14
Austria 342.00 7,333.86 22,628.74
Luxembourg n.a. 9,060.96 25,444.66
EU rest Portugal 130.00 2,210.96 8,624.54
Finland n.a. 7,742.21 19,059.75
Italy 231.00 5,776.66 14,226.87
Spain 159.00 4,068.37 10,780.30
Ireland 147.00 4,204.65 13,251.33
Greece 114.00 3,588.47 8,082.55
UK 325.00 6,859.58 14,601.45
Sweden 409.00 10,866.43 19,112.12
Denmark 356.00 9,330.47 25,818.81
EMU core mean 315.00 8,682.01 21,910.30
variability 13,474.00 2,629,301.64 23,883,047.48
variation 0.26 0.19 0.22
EU all mean 257.50 6,957.81 17,085.77
variability 116,977.00 87,577,644.06 392,999,890.74
variation 1.33 1.35 1.16
EMU 11 mean 249.11 6,917.72 17,945.87
variability 68,242.89 60,920,552.49 293,526,419.27
variation 1.05 1.13 0.95
F, G, UK mean 332.33 4,368.37 13,835.97
variability 7,042.67 3,754,866.52 36,135,188.27
variation 0.25 0.44 0.43
Note: The industrialisation figure for Austria is the weighted average of Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
1980 is the last year available on the comparable calculations on industrialisation.
The GDP per capita figures of Germany refer to West Germany in 1980 and the united Germany in 1995.
Naturally, the same figure of West Germany only in 1995 is much higher.
Source: Panic (1992) and P. Bairoch (1982). European Economy: Annual Economic Report 1995 no.59.
World Population Proiections 1984.1994-1995 by World Bank Data Base. EU Data Base.
Table 4.3 compares the economic conditions of the member states of the LMU and the 
SMU in the years 1880 and 1913. Now, let us compare tables 4.3 and 4.4. As both tables 
indicate, in terms of the similarity of member states' level of economic development, the LMU 
is much more similar to the current EU as a whole than the SMU. Even after discounting the size
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of the absolute numbers for the current situation20 and using the variation index, the variation of 
the EU countries is much larger in the case of both factors. Though slightly smaller, the same 
picture emerges in the case of the eleven countries participating in EMU from 1999.21 As the 
economic conditions of the EU countries or EMU participants are more diverse than those of the 
LMU countries, an asymmetric shock in future may well, as it did for the LMU, destroy EMU 
comprising all EU member states or even only the current eleven EMU states. However, table
4.4. indicates that the variation of both variables for EMU core countries is considerably smaller 
than for all EU countries. In addition, their performance is much better than that of the SMU 
countries.22 Such a finding clearly indicates that an EMU comprising all 15 EU member states 
would be economically irrational, but comprising core countries alone would be close to the 
conditions desired by the subscribers to the theory of optimum currency areas.
What do these findings tell us for the hypothesized case of a monetary union between 
Germany, France and the UK? Certainly the statistical results are better for a monetary union 
among these three countries than they are for the EMU 11 or a union including all EU countries. 
Furthermore, the variation of the industrialisation indicator of these three countries is even lower 
than for the SMU. However, for per capita income the variation is for both years higher than it 
is for the SMU or the EMU core. This suggests that monetary union among the three would be 
less desirable than EMU for the core countries or the SMU, as far as economic similarities among 
the member states are concerned.
Before ending the discussion regarding the two tables, one has to note the weakness of
20One has to discount the fact that a particular index of variability 
chosen tends to overemphasize the deviations from the mean, as the absolute 
numbers being compared become bigger. The variation index, however, can 
rectify this drawback.
21These countries are Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Austria, Luxembourg, Portugal, Finland, Italy, Spain and Ireland.
22 Except for the variation of per capita GDP levels in 1980.
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these indices. The index of industrialisation only includes the manufacturing industry, excluding 
mining, construction, electricity, gas, water and sanitary services. (Bairoch 1982, p.322) Those 
manufacturing sectors excluded weigh relatively highly as a percentage of GDP at the present. 
In addition, the index does not include the service sector, which is an even bigger contributor to 
GDP now. Due to statistical incompatibility and the limited availability of historical statistics, 
Bairoch (1982) could not incorporate such variables in the index.23 Therefore, one should note 
that this index portrays only a partial picture of economic conditions. Having examined the 
crude statistical analysis, let us move to a comparison of the institutional arrangements within 
the monetary unions. As for its institutional structure, the SMU may be closer to the current 
monetary union project than the LMU, since EMU like the SMU is built upon other areas of 
economic integration among member states. However, it is clear that even the core EMS 
countries do not share the similarities in social preferences to the degree Scandinavian countries 
did. Nevertheless, the similarities among the Scandinavian nations, which made their monetary 
union smooth and more successful than the LMU, strengthens the argument for the importance 
of similarities in domestic regimes as a precondition for a successful EMU, as introduced in the 
previous chapter. Taking account of the LMU experience, EMU with all member states, or the 
current eleven member states, can be expected to face difficulties brought about by diverging 
economic and monetary policy interests.
The historical examples give us two crucial factors to watch out for in the analysis of the 
current EMU attempt. First, the union has to be careful in its design of an institutional structure 
for controlling the total money supply. The EU countries have already agreed to set a clear 
institutional framework for the ECB. Therefore, this point seems to be well covered in the case
23See pp.280 - 81 of Bairoch (1982) for details of other indices he 
would have liked to attempt, such as productivity or labour productivity 
indices, but was prohibited from developing by a lack of historical 
statistics.
of the future EMU. Second, integration in other economic and political areas in addition to 
monetary union strengthens the working of monetary union. Having similar economic 
structures and social preferences helped Scandinavian countries to build wider socio-economic 
institutions in addition to monetary union. This seems to have contributed to make the SMU 
more sustainable than the LMU. According to Vanthoor (1996), "besides the problems 
surrounding bimetallism, the real reason why monetary integration failed (in the LMU) was that 
the participants insufficiently observed one of the most important rules of the game - the 
harmonization of their economies." (p.46) The integration achieved at the EU level is far deeper 
and wider than that achieved in both the LMU and the SMU. However, it is doubtful whether 
the current EU has achieved the level of social coherence of the Scandinavian countries in the 
19th century. These issues will be explored in Chapters 7 and 8 by examining the labour market 
regimes of France, Germany and Britain.
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Chapter 5
Lessons from history: Part II
American monetary experience and sectional conflicts
In the previous chapter, I examined two European monetary unions in the 19th century. 
Here, the development of American monetary union (AMU) against the general background of 
America’s economic structure is examined in order to draw lessons for the current EMU project. 
The interesting thing about the United States is that it only managed to de facto introduce a 
uniform currency in the 1860s, nearly a hundred years after its independence. The persistent 
conflicts between federalists and anti-federalists over the management of the US economy and 
irreconcilable socio-economic structures and preferences among the different sections of the 
economy contributed to the difficulty in agreeing on the form of a national banking system and 
the use of a single currency. These problems in 19th century America are similar to those the 
current EMU project faces. There are persistent conflicts between the federalist and anti­
federalist forces over the mode of European level economic and social management. Such 
disagreements over how the European economy as a whole should be managed are undoubtedly 
influenced by the different national traditions and diverse national structures and regimes of 
economic management. This chapter elaborates the historical conflicts in 19th century America, 
which finally exploded in the Civil War, in order to extract some lessons for the current EMU 
project.
5.1. Banking in America from independence to the outbreak of Civil War
The history of banking in early America is characterised by its lack of a consistent 
regime. The different kinds ofbanking systems or non-system served America for more than 100
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years after independence. From 1781 to 1811, the First Bank of the United States served as the 
national bank. From 1816 to 1836, the Second Bank of the United States was the national bank. 
Though they did not perform all the tasks of a modem central bank, their sheer size made them 
function as an equivalent of a central bank. From 1837 to 1863, free banking dominated the 
banking system in America. In other words, anyone who could raise the capital could obtain a 
state charter which granted the necessary powers to do the business ofbanking, i.e., "free" entry 
into the banking businesses. Free banking acts were passed in most states between 1837 and 
I860.1 The requirements of a charter differed from state to state. In general, however, the only 
requirement of the charter was for the bank to hold against its notes the full amount in collateral 
security in the form of mortgages or state bonds, in addition to 12 to 33 % of specie reserves.
Consequently, the development of the banking system in America was dismptive, as the 
pros and cons of a national banking system and regulation were constantly debated and tried out. 
Disagreement over the institutional framework of central banking was rooted in the following 
different but interrelated factors. First, there was persistent conflict in Washington between those 
favouring a centralised strong federal government and those supporting a loose configuration of 
decentralised states. Second, the above ideological differences were exacerbated by diverging 
economic structures and interests between different sections of the economy, roughly equivalent 
to the divide between the industrial North and the agrarian South. Such conflicts of interests 
worsened as America’s territory expanded westward: what kind of economic structure the West 
would eventually adopt became the focal point, one of the many factors which ultimately 
culminated in the Civil War. The following section examines the former aspect in more detail 
by studying the development ofbanking systems. The subsequent section explores the latter
1For a list of states and exact dates for the establishment of laws, see 
Atack and Passell (1994), p.105.
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aspect mentioned above, the diverging economic structure and corresponding interests between 
the North and the South.
5.2. The federalists vs. anti-federalists
5.2.1. The First Bank of the United States (1791-1811)
Ideological rifts regarding federal economic policy-making had been constantly present 
from the very beginning of the United States: the founding fathers had two opposing views 
about the way the federal government should work and interact with state governments: this was 
the conflict between Jeffersonian 'anti-federalists' and Hamiltonian 'federalists' since right after 
American independence. The former, led by Thomas Jefferson, believed in minimum regulation 
and control at the federal level, i.e., weak federal government, the protection of states’ rights, and 
an agrarian economy as the basis for the United States’ economic structure. The latter, led by 
Alexander Hamilton, instead, promoted strong state control, a federal government and nation 
building through industrialisation and commerce. As for international trade, the former view 
endorsed free trade, whereas the latter was inclined to mercantilism to provide room for the 
development of America’s infant industry. The federalist stance was supported by the 
commercial classes, whereas the anti-federalist stance was endorsed by the land owners. The 
latter were particularly against the establishment of a central government, which they identified 
as "the replacement of the British yoke with a Hamiltonian one." (Hammond p.l 19) The gulf 
between the two positions was considerable: Alexander Hamilton, predicted already during the
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War of Independence (1775-1783) that the near future would bring his fellow Americans all the 
leisure and opportunity they wished to cut each other’s throats.2
Naturally, Hamilton and Jefferson took different stances over the new structure of 
banking systems in the USA. Hamilton, the first treasury secretary, urged the establishment of 
a federal central bank, modelled on the Bank of England. He saw the need for such an institution 
as the fiscal agent of the government, as the provider of stability for a paper currency, and for the 
expansion of commercial credits. A national bank would, Hamilton insisted, also promote lower 
interest rates by increasing the supply of money. Thomas Jefferson, the first secretary of state 
and the third president of the United States, was against the creation of a strong national banking 
system. He and fellow anti-federalists argued that such a Bank would be unconstitutional, as the 
power to create the bank was not among the powers delegated by the Constitution to Congress. 
Furthermore, they were against the Bank as it would further enhance federal powers. Generally, 
they opposed the development of a national banking system, because in their view, banks 
increased usury and speculation, led to the drain of specie due to the competition from paper 
money, and diverted capital from agriculture. (Studenski and Krooss, p. 60)
During the first two administrations of Presidents Washington and Adams (1789-1801), 
the federalists were more influential than the anti-federalists. Thus, despite opposition from anti­
federalists, the Act to charter the Bank became law in 1791 effective for 20 years. The role of 
central banking in the 18th century was not as established as it is now. Indeed, the First Bank 
of the United States was very much organised like a private bank, run by the board of directors.3 
Its operation was similar to a private bank: printing notes and lending them with interest. Unlike
2Alexander Hamilton (1904) Works I (Edited by H. C. Lodge), p. 217. 
cited by Hammond (1957), p.89.
3 Foreigners could also buy shares in the Bank, but they did not have 
any voting power. Indeed, almost 3/4 of shareholders were foreigners. Later, 
opposition to the Bank arose due to this high proportion of foreign ownership, 
as the Bank was perceived as the agent of foreign interests.
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other commercial banks, however, it had the federal government as its primary customer: 20% 
of the Bank’s capital of $10 billion was owned by the federal government. The Bank became 
fiscal agent for the federal government, holding federal tax receipts, and paying government bills. 
The federal government kept its cash as deposits with the Bank, thereby providing a massive 
financial base. Due to its federal charter, it could open branches in different states, which was 
not allowed for other state-chartered banks.
Due to this competitive edge, the First Bank of the United States gradually evolved into 
a banker’s bank, thereby playing the role of a central bank. However, in 1811, its application for 
the renewal of the charter was rejected by a narrow margin. It was due to the effective campaign 
of the opposing anti-federalists (notably Jefferson) and state-chartered banks. They argued that 
the First Bank of the United States was controlled by foreigners and was unconstitutionally 
created a monopoly, and was far less efficient than the state banks. The administration was no 
longer dominated by federalists, and the Act to renew the Bank charter was defeated when Vice- 
President George Clinton voted negative after a 17-to-17 vote in the Senate.
The failure to re-charter the Bank eliminated the only institution which could have 
provided a uniform currency. This was convenient to states’ banks as they had the monopoly of 
loans within their states. Between 1811 to 1816 the number of state chartered banks rose from 
88 to 246. Most state banking practices were far from sound, and they were worse in newly 
created communities. Besides, bank charters were obtained by special acts of the state 
legislature, often by bribery. Thus, banking activities were filled with loose fiscal adventures. 
For example, the share of the Union Bank of Florida was owned by a small group of people who 
raised their subscription by mortgaging land to the bank. The more inflationary and the greater 
the depreciation of its notes, the easier it became for them to repay their loans. The only
168
exception to such loose practices was the state of Massachusetts, where banking laws are made 
to improve bank operations. (Studenski and Krooss, pp.72 -74)
The war of 1812 (1812-1814) and the loose credit system for selling public lands in the 
West along with poor banking practices led to inflation. Consequently, all specie payments by 
banking institutions except in New England were suspended in 1814, and the government 
accepted state bank notes in payment of public debts, which further exacerbated inflation.4 
According to Dewey (1931), the direct loss to the government from poor or worthless bank-notes 
received during 1814-1817 was over $5,000,000. (p. 145) Post-war currency mainly consisted 
of a mass of states’ bank notes and a small number of Treasury notes, all of them with fluctuating 
values. Out of this chaos grew support among national leaders to re-establish some form of 
national banking system.
5.2.2. The Second Bank of the United States (1816-1832)
By 1815, restoring order in the banking and currency system by returning to specie 
payments became pressing. State banks and debtors were against the resumption of specie 
payments as the former enjoyed their power to issue vast amounts of notes, and the latter hoped 
that depreciation of state bank notes would lessen their debt burdens. As Congress did not have 
any Constitutional power to regulate state banks, the only way to influence state banks was to 
establish its own competing note-issuing and specie-paying national bank. In 1816, Congress 
chartered the Second Bank of the United States along the same line as the First Bank. The Bank
4The large amount of specie outflow from America was initiated by the 
dissolution of the First Bank of the United States, as payments for its 
foreign shareholders.
169
Act guaranteed it a twenty year charter and capital of $35 million of which 20% was to be 
subscribed by the government.
In the beginning, the Bank was badly managed. Not only was it not able to redress the
banking crisis, it became a victim of speculation.5 In addition, state banks were very hostile to
the newly chartered federal bank, and several state governments followed the lead of Maryland
in 1817 to impose taxes on the branches of the federal Bank. In 1819, the Maryland branch of
the Bank refused to pay stamp duty, which developed into the federal Supreme Court case and
it was ruled in favour of the federal Bank (McCulloch vs. Maryland). After Nicholas Biddle took
over the presidency in 1823, he re-established the special position of the Bank of the United
States within the banking community through sound monetary policies, together with the
necessary injection of liquidity and the increase of specie reserves.6 Under his leadership, the
Bank developed into a central bank with control over the national money market by building
credibility of their own paper money or drafts:
At all times, the $5 notes and drafts were receivable everywhere at par, and while 
notes of higher denomination circulated at slight discounts, it was actually 
cheaper to settle exchanges with them than by shipping specie. The circulation 
of the United States Bank (notes) varied from section to section, being greatest 
in the West and South, of lesser importance in Middle Atlantic states, and 
unimportant in New England, where capital funds were more plentiful. 
(Studenski and Krooss pp. 87-88)
In 1832, four years before the Bank charter needed renewal, Biddle allowed the Bank’s 
existence to become a key political issue in the Presidential election campaign. Andrew Jackson, 
a populist who was opposed to anti-democratic, anti-frontier centrist forces in the nation was 
elected. He took his election victory as popular support for his anti-Bank policy. He withdrew
5Its Baltimore branch collapsed in 1818 as a result of overexpansion of 
credits.
6For this reason, a school of monetary historians, the soundness school, 
saw the Second Bank as a precursor of modern central banks.
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government deposits from the Second Bank and put them in various state-chartered banks. 
Instead, twenty three pet banks were selected to serve as federal depositories, many of which 
supported Jackson’s election and gained from the weakening of the Second Bank’s influence. 
Consequently, the number of commercial banks operating in America mushroomed from 330 in 
1830 to 704 by 1835. (Atack and Passell p.95)
What was at the core of the opposition to the National Banking system was the distrust 
against concentrated federal power over the US economy. American capitalism was still in its 
infancy. The newly created country was still in the process of expanding its territory westward, 
and was not politically, let alone economically, integrated enough. Facilitating interstate 
commerce was not big enough a reason to push for a nationally regulated monetary and banking 
system. Thus, the debate between federalists and anti-federalists re-surged over and over again, 
and the Federal Bank repeatedly ended up being the focal point of their power struggle.
5.2.3. Free Banking (1832-1863)
The demise of the Second Bank of the United States left the American banking system 
without any coordinating agency, which resulted in financial instability in American banking 
until the establishment of the National Banking Act of 1863. Free banking after 1837 brought 
about the disintegration of the national money market and uneven development of states ’ banking 
systems. The free banking system facilitated great success and profits in the banking business 
in some states like New York, whereas it also caused misery in other states such as Minnesota. 
For example, the expected value of $1 in New York has never fallen below 99 cents since 1855, 
but that in Minnesota, fell to less than 55 cents in 1859. (Atack and Passell, p. 105)
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Free banking, on the one hand, reduced the cost of capital through competition, thereby 
lowering interest rates, increasing loans and facilitating investment. In New York, where the free 
banking system was highly successful, loans per capita rose sharply during the 1840s and 1850s, 
whereas in Philadelphia where free banking legislation was not passed until 1860, loans 
outstanding per capita declined during the same period. On the other hand, in other states, many 
banks went out of business at the cost of note-holders. The cumulative losses for note holders 
in Michigan reached $ 1 million during 1837-60, and even in New York, the most successful free 
banking state, it reached $395,000. (Atack and Passell, P. 150)
Another important cost of free banking was increased transaction costs for inter-states 
commerce. Due to the presence of numerous notes issued by different state banks, counterfeiting 
was a big problem, and the lack of federal authority made it impossible to control. As a result, 
the use of specie increased as a reliable means of interstate business. During the heyday of the 
Second Bank of the United States (1823-37), the proportion of money held in specie was 15% 
or less. It increased to more than 23% during the free banking period. The lack of convertibility 
of bank money at full face value beyond the immediate vicinity of the issuing bank increased 
transactions of specie. It was the major problem caused by the lack of a centralised banking 
system. (Atack and Passell, p. 108)
5.2.4. Civil War and the dawn of a national currency: the introduction of legal tender and the 
National Banking Act
Before the Civil War, America did not have a national currency nor a national banking 
system after the demise of the Second Bank of the United States. The first issue of fiat money 
by the government was out of necessity rather than choice, as it was the only viable solution for
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the Union to finance the Civil War. Accordingly, the Legal Tender Act was passed in Congress 
in 1862. The new government notes, called ‘greenbacks* as they are printed in green ink, were 
non-interest bearing Treasury notes. These notes were legal tender but not redeemable in specie. 
They were welcomed in the West, as Westerners suffered from their volatile state bank notes and 
instable state banking systems. Easterners were against the greenbacks, since they saw the Act 
as a threat to a prosperous Eastern state banking by replacing state bank notes for greenbacks. 
Growing Western support for this relatively stable money outweighed the East’s opposition to 
it, thereby making the issue of government currency part of regular Republican financial policy. 
(Richardson p.82)
Yet, the treasury was not happy with the greenbacks as they feared potential instability 
in a currency system based on both greenbacks and state bank notes. Indeed, immediately after 
the introduction, greenbacks and other paper notes began to depreciate relative to specie. For, 
speculators and those who required specie for business transactions bought up gold and hoarded 
it. At the same time, greenbacks and paper currencies depreciated in terms of goods. Price 
inflation hit the working classes most severely, as they were paid in paper currencies, and 
increases in the wage level lagged far behind the price level. State banks were blamed for the 
general disorder of currency circulation. Treasury secretary Chase, supported by mass opinion, 
perceived state bank notes rather than government notes as redundant. Although government 
restricted the issue of greenbacks, there was no practical limit in issuing state bank notes, which 
made state banks guilty of causing inflation.
In order to cope with this financial crisis, in 1863 the National Banking Act was 
introduced to create a national banking system. The national currency was based on private 
capital invested in government bonds, redeemable in gold. This legislation, along with its 
amendment in 1864 established the principle of national government control over the Union’s
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financial system. The bill aimed at the gradual abolition of state bank notes, and imposed taxes 
on state bank notes. At the same time, it encouraged state banks to convert themselves by 
adapting national banking charters. Another important aim for the Treasury, besides the need 
for a national currency, was the need to create a market for federal bonds. The national banking 
system, however, did not develop fully until after the Civil War. By October 1863 only 66 
banks, mostly in the Middle West had taken national charters, and the total national note 
circulation was less than $4 million. By October 1866, however, there were 1,644 national banks 
with a circulation of $280.4 million. The opposition Democrat party supported state banks to 
lobby against the bill, which made the ruling Republican party accuse them of Southern 
sympathy. By 1864, state banks were accused of being disloyal to the Union.
American monetary politics had been, from the very birth of the nation, characterised by
a power struggle between those in favour and against strong federal government intervention.
It is important to examine the reason why it was possible in the 1860s to achieve unprecedented
centralisation of the financial system. Republican politicians used nationalist sentiment during
the war by associating centralisation of monetary policy with the national power of America.
Senator Sherman, introducing the bill which became the National Banking Act, was particularly
eloquent in this matter. According to Richardson (1997):
Hamilton’s concept of a strong national government spoke directly to the wartime 
Republicans, and Sherman tapped into that idea, arguing that states’ rights theory, 
which elevated local above national government was behind the Southern effort 
to overthrow the government. He told his colleagues that the best policy was to 
nationalize as much as possible. This would make men love their country before 
their states, (p.87)
In other words, Sherman vision for a uniform national currency was identified with strong 
government and the glory of America as a nation. Interestingly, already during the Civil War, 
"the Republicans envisioned a dominant international role for a unified American nation, and
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Sherman promised that the bank bill, with its implicit strengthening of the national government, 
would advance that goal." (Richardson, p.88)
Republicans cleverly used the Westerners’ hatred against Eastern bankers to promote the 
national currency, and discredited state banks as destabilisers and enemy sympathisers. Indeed, 
nationalism made it possible for the national government to establish Gramscian hegemony7 and 
secure mass support for the national currency. What was needed, along with or even more than 
the economic rationale, was firm unequivocal political support for a centralised monetary 
management, which was probably only possible under the extreme conditions brought about by 
the turmoil of war. With the victory of the North, Union policies gained the upper-hand and 
established legitimacy for the whole United States, thereby creating federalist hegemony after 
a century-long power struggle.
As Faulkner (1960) put it, the Civil War marked "a definite break midway in the 
development of the nation." (p.327) Although the inevitability of the war is widely debated 
among the different schools of historians, there is no doubt about the underlying tensions existing 
between the North and the South due to divergent economic policy objectives. Such 
disagreements were fundamental, as they were rooted in their completely different socio­
economic regimes.
5.3. The diversity of American states and the Civil War
7Antonio Gramsci introduced the concept of hegemonic class, whose power 
and ideology is perceived as legitimate by most members of society. A regime 
where Gramscian hegemony exists is believed to be stable and sustainable 
relative to that without such hegemony. This is because "a hegemonic class 
is able to transcend its immediate, narrowly conceived, economic interests and 
present itself, with a reasonable degree of plausibility, as acting in the 
general interest." (Ashworth p.51)
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The American Civil War is one historical event which has been studied and evaluated 
throughly. It is not the intention here to reinterpret this wide-ranging debate. Rather, some 
underlying socio-economic factors behind the outbreak of the Civil War, which may be relevant 
for current attempts of EMU, will be discussed.
The popular myth often too easily identifies slavery as the sole cause of the Civil War. 
There is no doubt that slavery was an important focal point in this conflict, as it symbolised the 
economic and social differences between the two opponents. Indeed, "the institution of slavery 
was central to the sense of cultural divergence between North and South." (Reid p.397) 
However, one should not forget that the whole set of socio-economic objectives and structures 
in the South and the North were not only different but incompatible, and that their divergence 
had grown during the first half of the 19th century as the North industrialised. Eventually in the 
mid- 19th century, the different outlook of the two sections became irreconcilable economically 
and socially, and tension grew and peaked with the secession of seven Southern states and the 
creation of the Confederate States of America in 1861. Before going into the details of the 
disagreements between the North and the South, let us examine the structural differences 
between the two regions.
5.3.1. Statistical observations of sectional differences
Before the declaration of independence in 1776, the American economy was 
predominantly agricultural, and regional economic differences between the North and the South 
were minute. However, as tables 5.1 and 5.2 suggest, economic indicators diverged considerably 
from the mid- 19th century.
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Table 5.1. Per Capita Wealth in the 13 colonies in 1774
in pounds sterling
North South
Land 26.0 25.1
Livestock 3.8 4.8
Other producer goods 4.3 3.3
Consumer goods 4.2 3.1
Total 38.3 36.4
Source: Jones (1980), p.310
Table 5.2. Regional per Capita Income as percentage of National average (in percentages)
New
England
Middle
Atlantic
East
North
Central
West
North
Central
North
Average
South
Atlantic
East
South
Central
West
South
Central
South
Average
1840 132 136 67 75 103 70 73 144 96
1880 141 141 102 90 119 45 51 60 52
1900 134 139 106 97 118 45 49 61 52
Source: Easterlin (1960), p. 137.
N.B: New England: Maine, N.H., Vt., Mass., R.I., Conn.
Mid Atlantic: N.Y., N.J., Pa., Del., Md.
East North Central: Ohio, Ind. 111., Mich., Wis.
West North Central: Iowa, Mo. ( and Minn. Dak. Neb. Kan. except for 1840)
South Atlantic: Va., N.C., S.C., Ga., Fla.,
East South Central: Ky. Tenn., Ala., Miss.
West South Central: Ark. La. (and Tex. except for the data for 1840, Okla. Except for 1840,1880)
As table 5.2 indicates, in 1840, before the outbreak of the Civil War, the differences in 
average regional per capita income between the North and the South were still trivial. However, 
after the Civil War, from 1880 to 1900, the Southern economy stagnated while the Northern 
economy grew. Such differences in regional per capita income are rooted in the uneven 
industrialisation of the American economy. Table 5.3 shows the rapid growth in the share of 
non-agricultural income in the Northern regions. Such changes in the South were slow, and the 
growth of agricultural income stagnated.
Table 5.3. Income originating from sectors by regions
as percentage of total income
Agricultural income Non-agricultural income
New England
1840 38.7 61.3
1880 18.5 81.5
1900 11.3 88.7
Mid Atlantic
1840 50.8 49.2
1880 29.1 70.9
1900 14.5 85.5
East North Central
1840 65.9 34.1
1880 55.5 44.5
1900 35.9 64.1
West North Central
1840 68.2 31.8
1880 60.6 39.3
1900 57.1 42.9
South Atlantic
1840 79.1 20.9
1880 72.4 27.6
1900 54.6 45.4
East South Central
1840 82.4 16.9
1880 76.0 24.0
1900 58.6 41.4
West South Central
1840 61.7 38.3
1880 72.5 27.5
1900 64.4 35.6
Source: Calculated from Easterlin (1960) pp.97 -104
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Elements underlying economic divergence after the Civil War was already present before 
the outbreak of war. They are apparent in differences in social and economic orientations in the 
North and the South, which led to conflict and eventually developed into the Civil War.
5.3.2. Socio-economic regimes of the North and the South
Beard and Beard (1927), Hacker (1940) and McPherson (1982) argue that the prime cause 
of the Civil War as the irrepressible conflict between the static agrarian staple-producing South 
and the dynamic commercialised, industrialised North. McPherson (1982) simply put that 
"slavery and modernizing capitalism were irreconcilable." (P.44)
5.3.2.1. The Northern economic structure
During the first half of the 19th century in the North and middle Atlantic states the 
economic focus and the pattern of economic activity shifted from trade and commerce to 
manufacturing. There were two main kinds of manufacturing sectors developing: first, resource- 
oriented manufacturing consisting of simple processing of raw materials such as lumber and meat 
processing, and second, manufacturing in which capital requirements were relatively modest, 
such as textile, leather goods industry etc. The former was the major kind of manufacturing in 
the West, and the latter was the maj or one in the East. According to North (1961), the Northeast 
regions accounted for 75% of US manufacturing employment in 1850, among which 71% were 
engaged in the latter kind of production in 1860. (p. 159) Textiles was the most important 
industry in the North, producing cotton goods, clothing and woollen goods. According to Gibb 
(1950), between 1813-53, “the manufacturing of textile machinery appears to have been
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America’s greatest heavy goods industry.” (p. 179) Such machines were necessary to produce 
standardized products on a large scale.
American industrialisation was well underway before the Civil War, and the growth of 
manufacturing was aided by the growth and the size of the domestic market. Indeed, the North 
was the production centre of consumer goods, providing goods to the national market, including 
the South and the West. With the decline of transportation costs due to the fall in ocean, river 
and canal freight rates and the development of railroads, interregional trade flourished, and 
induced the further expansion of specialisation, hence, manufacturing in the Northeast. The 
abundance of banks in New York and New England provided capital needed for a rapid 
expansion of manufacturing. Quality and availability of labour and entrepreneurial talents were 
supported by a free education system in the Northeast and the inflow of both skilled and 
unskilled European immigrants8, which provided the rich layer of workforce necessary for a 
rapidly industrialising society.
5.3.2.2. The Southern economic structure
Whereas the Northern and the Western economic regimes were increasingly diversified 
through industrialisation, the Southern economy stayed with its traditional production of 
agricultural stables (such as cotton, tobacco, rice and sugar) by making use of slave labour. 
Except for cotton manufacturing and iron founding, there was virtually no industrialisation in the 
Southern economy. As table 5.4 below shows, the scale of cotton manufacturing in the whole 
of the Southern states was far behind that of New England, let alone the North as a whole.
8 Generally, English and German immigrants were relatively skilled, 
whereas Irish immigrants were relatively unskilled.
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Table 5.4. Cotton manufacturing in New England and the South in 1850
Plants Capital
Southern states 166 $ 7,256,056
New England 564 $ 53,832,430
Source: Faulkner (1960) p.310
Such one-sided economic orientation cost the Southerners dearly. The South was 
completely dependent upon Northern goods and services. Northern ships carried the cargo of 
imports and manufacturing goods to Southern ports and returned with Southern cotton for 
shipment to Europe.9 Furthermore, production of staples was financed by British and Northern 
banks.
Staple productions required large scale organisation leading to the development of the
plantation system. Faulkner (p. 321) describes the Southern economy as follows:
The characteristic tendency of commercial planting regions to stress maximum 
current money income, to expand recklessly, and to live extravagantly when 
income was high had prevented the accumulation of liquid capital and kept the 
South in an inferior economic position. “That the South in general,” says Lewis 
C. Gray, “and particularly the lower South, as compared with the North, was 
largely the result of a system of rural economy characterized by extravagance 
both in production and consumption, a system which concentrated a large 
proportion of money income in the hands of a relatively small proportion of the 
population.” (P.321)
The profitability of cotton production under the plantation system, however, was 
declining by the first half of the 19th century. The price of slaves went up, and that of cotton 
went down significantly in the 1840s and fluctuated in the world market. The Constitution 
outlawed the overseas slave traffic in 1808, which limited the increase in the supply of slaves to 
the natural growth of the slave population, except for small illegal traffic. The demand for slave 
labour was intensified by 1850 not only by Southwestern plantations but also by the border states
9 Generally, imports from Europe came to New York and not directly to 
Southern ports. This is because the Northeast had better transport 
connections with the West. Thus, New York became a central port for European 
imports, from which imports were diverted to the South and the West.
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for tobacco cultivation, railroad construction and ironworks. Consequently, the price of slaves 
shot up, and by the 1850s, prices received for southern staples were out of line with costs of 
production. Cotton production required a constant supply of fresh land, because planters bought 
rich land, used it up and travelled to new land. For that reason, securing slaveholding territories 
in the West was very important for the Southern economy.
Another characteristic of the Southern economy was income disparity. The large 
plantation owners who controlled politics and the economy in the South were a minority. The 
majority of the Southern population were small farmers who held no slaves at all, and many of 
them lived in destitute conditions. Indeed, only 24.2% of the whole white population in the 
South held slaves in 1860, yet their voice represented the whole of the South.10
Investment in human capital in the South was much lower than in the North or the West. 
According to North (1961), the ratio of pupils to the white population in 1840 was 5.72% in 
slaveholding states, whereas it was 18.41 % in the non-slave holding states and illiteracy among 
the white population was much higher in slaveholding states, (p. 133) This lack of investment in 
human capital reflected the attitude of the dominant planter class, who saw no return in, thus 
showed no interest in, educating white Southerners outside their plantation system. The 
oligarchy of plantation lords dominated the political, economic and social life of the South. 
From the election of Jackson in 1829 until Lincoln was inaugurated as President in 1861, the 
Southern oligarchy managed to dominate the federal government as well.
5.3.3. Emerging disputes between the two regions
10 Figures are from Hacker (1940), p. 288.
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In the first half of the 19th century, the clash of economic interests reflected on disputes 
regarding the disposal of public lands, tariffs, the US bank, and federal internal development. 
Western interests brought a new dimension to the struggle between the two sections - the North 
and the South.
Until around 1830, the North was generally in favour of high priced public land because 
of the fear of labour shortages caused by an exodus of Eastern labour to the West. Western 
settlers insisted on a cheap or free land policy, and the South maintained a neutral position. After 
around 1830, however, the South was against a cheap land policy as that would encourage 
settlement in the West by small farmers, in other words, by non-slaveholders. The North also 
changed its attitude, and supported Western land policies in order to obtain the West’s support 
on tariffs.
The dispute between agrarian and industrial states was most pronounced on the tariff 
issue. Tariffs had been used extensively from the time of independence as a revenue device for 
the federal government. In 1816, the Congress passed the tariff for protective purposes to 
promote the growth of the nation’s infant industries - particularly cotton textile manufacturing - 
by imposing tariffs for imports mainly from Britain. Obviously, tariffs benefited Northern 
industrialists and workers, whereas Southern plantationists and farmers paid the cost. The 
minimum rates of the tariff reached an historical high in 1828, dubbed by the Southerners ‘The 
tariff of abominations’. The Southern states protested against its supposed unfairness and 
illegality and South Carolina threatened secession over the tariff acts.
The disputes about the banking system have already been discussed in section in 5.1, and 
as mentioned, the sectional conflict was not as clear in this case as it was on the tariff issue. 
However, the South in general, and in particular the lower South, was continuously in debt partly 
due to the requirements for new capital for expansion. Though Eastern banks disliked the federal
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central bank as a competitor, it was generally the case that the Northeast as a creditor area 
favoured a centralized monetary system with a central bank which kept inflation under control, 
whereas the South opposed the idea as a debtor region.
The issue of internal improvements and developments is perhaps the most critical 
regarding sectional conflict. It had to do with the construction of a national infrastructure such 
as roads and canals at the expense of national revenues. During the 1830s, with the rapid 
development of the West, the need for internal developments had grown tremendously. The 
opening of the Erie Canal, the Ohio Canal and the railway connecting the Northeast with the 
West replaced the old river link with the South and became the main route for transportation and 
trade. From 1836 to 1860, East-West trade increased drastically.11
Before around 1830, the alliance between the West and the South was dominant. The 
South favoured a cheap land policy in return for Western support for low tariffs. The North 
tended to be isolated, with its demands for high tariffs and expensive land, and without interest 
in internal improvements. After around 1830, however, this coalition of interests broke down 
with the changing attitude of the North regarding internal improvements. The North showed a 
growing eagerness to promote internal improvements and, to a lesser extent, for a cheap land 
policy. In return, the North gained Western support for higher tariffs. As the West did not show 
much interest in the tariff issue, it backed whichever side supported the cheap land policy. By 
then, the South was opposed to further internal improvements and also began to be at odds with 
the West regarding public land policy. Thus, the interests between the West and the South began 
to diverge, whereas those of the Northeast and the West converged. It was the alliance between 
the Northeast and the West which defeated the South in the Presidential election of 1860 and
11For detailed statistics on the changing flow of trade, see North 
(1961), pp.106-111.
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caused the subsequent Civil War. (Jones p.88) Thus, the West was the catalyst in bringing about 
the hegemony of the North in the United States.
5.3.4. Conflict of the Southern and Northern economic structure and the causes of the Civil War
As Beard and Beard (1927) and Stampp (1980) put it, the differences between the two 
economic regimes rested on the labour system - slavery vs. free labour. The South’s 
determination to keep its economic regime based on the slave labour system led to the Civil War. 
There were inherent contradictions in the economic system of the South, as the Southern 
economy itself could not reproduce and expand without Northern help. An undiversified 
economic structure and the lack of a free population were obstacles for developing an 
infrastructure such as roads, schools and commercial centres. This hampered the development 
of local centres and markets. Hence, commercial agriculture was located where convenient for 
exportation. The interior regions was occupied largely by a free population whose livelihood 
was limited by a self-sufficient economy little advanced from the pioneer stage. The slow 
accumulation of local capital was the bottleneck problem of the Southern economy. Scarcity of 
capital impeded the adoption of labour-saving measures, which escalated the scarcity of labour 
in the later period. (Gray 1941) Survival of the economic system in the planting South was 
largely dependent upon the ample supply of cheap slave labour and land. When the former 
became scarce and expensive, and with the prospect of the latter becoming scarce without the 
expansion of slaveholding territories, the Southern economic regime did not have any choice but 
to decline.
Hacker (1940) argues that the Civil War was the catalyst for the industrial growth of the
North.
185
...where did the capital fund come from that made possible such extraordinary 
industrial advances during the Civil War, exactly at a time when the Union was 
engaging in a life-and-death struggle on the battlefield? The answer here is plain: 
the fund came out of the war itself. The federal government, through bond issues 
and greenbacks, added fully three billions of dollars to basic credit resources of 
the nation; and the speed of turnover, due to wartime purchases, and the high 
profits made possible great accumulation. Government expenditure, war 
contracts and wartime profiteering are the key to this puzzle. (P.324)
In other words, he argues that the Civil War was the catalyst which transformed America 
from a principally agrarian economy to industrial capitalism. There is no doubt that 
industrialisation had already been in progress in the North, and in the short-run, the war set back 
this industrialisation (Cochran 1967). However, as the Beards and Hacker put it, the Civil War 
brought the triumph of capitalism, as opposed to the Southern mode of production. Before the 
Civil War, the Southern economy belonged to the English economic zone, and aimed at 
economic growth through exports of agricultural staples. The development of a national 
economy, through industrialisation, without dependency on English exports became possible by 
the defeat of the South in the Civil War. The foundation of American industrial and economic 
strength in the 20th century would not have been possible without the Northern mode of 
production gaining hegemony in America.
Foner (1980) reaches a similar conclusion by analysing the ideological background. He 
believed that the Civil War consolidated an American civilization and the ‘American way of 
life’. In other words, he suggests that anti-slavery promoted the hegemony of Northern middle- 
class values:
It was not the wage system, but the expansion of slavery, which threatened to 
destroy the independence of the northern worker, his opportunity to escape from 
the wage-earning class and own a small farm or shop. For if slavery were 
allowed to expand into the western territories, the safety-valve of free land for the 
northem-worker and farmer would be eliminated, and northern social conditions 
would soon come to resemble those of Europe. The Republicans therefore 
identified themselves with the aspirations of northern labor in a way abolitionists 
never did, but at the same time, helped turn those aspirations into the critique of 
South, not an attack on the northern social order. (P.74)
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Thus, first, the anti-slavery slogan was associated with the American dream of climbing 
the social ladder, or the upward mobile ‘American way of life*. Second, by isolating slavery as 
an unacceptable form of labour exploitation, abolition implicitly diverted attention from the 
exploitation of labour taking place within the factory system. By doing so, the anti-slavery 
movement helped to promote and legitimise the needs and value of emerging American 
capitalism. "The anti-slavery was a central terminus, from which tracks ran leading to every 
significant attempt to reform American society after the Civil War." (p.73) The direct cause of 
the Civil War was the secession of the South, but underlying was the socio-economic 
incompatibility of interests, policies and ideology between the South and the North, largely 
represented in the different economic structures. Slavery and what it was perceived to represent12 
was by no means the only cause but one of the most encompassing and inevitable causes of the 
conflict.
5.4. Lessons for Europe
What lessons can be learnt from the history of the early American experience? One 
obvious difference between the US case of a single currency and the current attempts at EMU 
is that the former was established after political union, whereas the latter is being undertaken 
without even the firm prospect of political union. However, with persistent westward expansion, 
the frontiers of US territory had been changing constantly until 1853.13 This suggests that 
political union in the US before the Civil War was still relatively unsettled, and due to its sheer
12Just as anti-slavery was associated with the 'American way of life' 
in the North, Southern elites identified abolition of slavery as Federalism 
in disguise. (Ashworth p.50)
13For a graphical presentation of territorial growth of the United 
States, see Jones (1964) p.5.
187
size, and geographical and structural diversity, states preserved their distinct local characteristics 
very well even after political union. Despite the presence of political union, the nation was de 
facto nothing more than a loose constellation of states, which justifies the comparison of the 
American monetary experience with the current EMU project.
Jones (1964) summarises the ultimate core of the problem:
In 1787, for the first time in modem history, a political nation was 'made' 
by one single written act, or rather one body of acts - the American 
Constitution. But the State must always rest on society, and a definite 
degree of social cohesion must precede political association. This 
necessity is tragically illustrated by the history of the United States 
between the end of the War of Independence (1783) and the end of the 
Civil War (1865). (p. 3)
In other words, America after independence and before the Civil War was a nation 
without social cohesion. As in the artificially-made states in Africa, such states are politically 
unstable and socio-economically diverse. Such states are prone to civil wars, without citizens 
having a sense of belonging to a single society. This suggests that Europe should not msh into 
political union, but should build social cohesion and a common European identity before 
jumping for any political commitment.
The history behind the uniform currency in America cannot be properly examined 
without studying developments in the real economy and of diverging socio-economic structures. 
The lack of national cohesion culminated in the outbreak of Civil War in 1861. Lack of cohesion 
in the mode of production, or "the clash of social systems" (Rozwenc p. 211) was rooted in the 
socio-economic incompatibility of two different regimes of economic management - emerging 
capitalism and defensive proto-capitalism - which led to an irreconcilable conflict over 
hegemony.
There are a number of lessons from the American experience which are very relevant to 
EMU: first, irreconcilable socio-economic structures and policies without the clear presence of
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hegemony proved to be unstable. America managed to take off politically and economically 
because hegemony of Northern norms after the Civil War enabled the country to be reborn as a 
nation state with greater socio-economic consistency. The differences in structure and the 
economic orientation of the potential participants of EMU are not as distinct as in the case of the 
American South and North. However, it is for the forthcoming chapters to assess the different 
structures of EMU member states as to their similarity and divergence.
Second, both the historical US and current European structural differences stem from 
different kinds of labour management. Again, the case of America was extreme: the differences 
among the European countries have never been as pronounced as the contrast between free and 
slave labour. However, it is interesting to note that conflicting socio-economic regimes have 
their roots in the labour market. In this sense, it is important to study labour market regimes to 
assess the viability of EMU.
Third, the lack of clear direction and leadership in the European project seems to be 
rooted in similar conditions as those suffered by the early US: there has been a continuous 
dispute between the idea of a federal Europe and of ‘a Europe of nation states’, similar to the 
early American dispute between federalists and anti-federalists. As the American case proved, 
such conflicts cannot be solved over time. Even with political union, such disagreements 
eventually led to the Civil War.
In the case of present-day Europe, there is no concrete plan for political union yet. 
Clearly, however, there are some who see monetary union as a step towards a political union.14 
Such federalist forces would push the integration agenda further after monetary union
14For example, some in the Bundesbank and German Christian Democratic 
party (CDU-CSU) share such a view. For more details, see Tietmeyer (1994), 
Jochimsen (1993, 1994); and a discussion paper written by Wolfgang Schauble, 
CDU/CSU (1994) Uberlegungen zur Deutschen Politik. Discussion document by the 
Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union in the Bundestag, in 
Deutsche Bundesbank: Ausziige aus Presseartikeln. Frankfurt, No. 64/1994.
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materialises. This would in all likelihood bring about a fierce reaction by anti-federalists who 
want to preserve the sovereignty of nation states as much as possible. Hence, as monetary union 
proceeds, the persistent power struggle between federalist and anti-federalist forces is likely to 
intensify. Germany and France are likely to be on the side of the federalists, whereas Britain 
belongs to the anti-federalist camp. The question regarding the pertinent turf for European 
regulation in relation to the national level might be brought up again and again, as in the early 
American case has shown. Connolly (1995) and Feldstein (1997) mention the possibility of war 
if such differences are left unsolved. Although these arguments are perceived as extreme, 
differences in economic and social policy orientations may break up monetary union once it is 
launched. This leads us to the lesson that 1) there has to be agreement on the level of influence 
and regulation of Europe; and 2) it is better not to have monetary union with countries with too 
diverse and different economic and social objectives and structure.
Fourth, it was impossible for the United States to turn the dollar into a fully fledged 
national currency before the Civil War. There were divergent interests for and against the single 
currency, with one side seizing power at one point of history only to let the other side take over, 
leading to a backlash. There was no ideological hegemony until the Civil war. During the Civil 
War, the Republican party cleverly brought in the single currency with the National Banking Act, 
and used it as a symbol of unity. Under the current Maastricht framework, could the Euro 
become a symbol of unity for Europe? There is also a possibility for it to become a symbol of 
economic hardship. Without careful management, ‘sound’ monetary policy itself may cause the 
breakdown of post-EMU monetary management.
In this context, Sheridan (1996) comes to the following conclusion: first, he predicts that, 
given the disinflationary tendency of the EMU project, there will be political discontent from less
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competitive regions within EMU after its introduction. Second, and more interestingly, he
argues:
A Common currency can likewise become a symbol of unity for Europe. But this 
symbol must represent a unity that is in the process of formation, both 
economically and politically, as it was in nineteenth century America. If 
European Union does achieve EMU, building a common political economic 
identity among its citizens will be its principal challenge in the twenty-first 
century, (p. 1157)
In other words, whether the EMU countries can achieve a common identity and a 
cohesive socio-economic regime will be the key to its success and sustainability. The following
chapters ask these questions by examining labour market institutions and structures closely.
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Chapter 6
Labour market regimes in Europe 1: Background analysis
This short chapter provides brief information regarding French, German and 
British labour markets. The objective is to review recent behaviour of labour markets 
as background for Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 compares institutional arrangements 
of labour market regimes among the three countries. Chapter 8 performs a more 
analytical comparison by making use of basic statistical methods. In typifying the 
different European labour market regimes, I shall use the concept of labour market 
flexibility (LMF), which will be elaborated in detail in Chapter 7. The concept itself 
is partly quantifiable, but mostly interpretation requires a careful qualitative analysis. 
Such a qualitative analysis has to take account of the idiosyncratic institutional 
structure embedded in different socio-cultural traditions, which is to be examined in 
Chapter 7. The economic and employment performances are the result of, or are 
conditioned by, such institutional uniqueness, which, in turn, exert pressure for 
changes in the institutional framework. Hence, this overview of labour market 
performances is necessary to prepare the ground for the empirical analyses in the next 
two chapters.
6.1. Overview of labour market performances
The three countries that are to be examined, France, Germany and Britain, 
have very different labour market regimes. The clarification of differences is 
important prior to the analysis of the institutional framework and of LMF since 
structural differences and institutional idiosyncrasy are decisive factors, shaping the 
different conditions and needs for a particular form of LMF.
This section briefly examines the current labour market conditions by looking 
at several statistics. The purpose is to contrast labour market performances, and show 
the structural differences between labour market regimes.
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6.1.1. Employment and unemployment
The labour force participation rates of the prime age workforce (25 to 54) are 
more less the same for the three countries examined. According to the OECD 
(1996a), they are: 86%, 83.3%, and 83.4%, in France, Germany and Britain 
respectively in 1995. The overall employment/population rates are 59.5%, 65.1%, 
and 67.8%, in France, Germany and Britain in the same year. The lower rates in 
France are reflected by the lower participation rates for young workers (aged between 
15 to 24) as well as women, and higher rates in Britain are reflected in higher 
participation rates for young as well as old workers (aged between 55 to 64). This 
reflects national differences in social organisations and conditions. First, the British 
youth enters labour markets earlier than the Continental equivalent, as a smaller share 
of the population continues upper secondary and higher education. According to 
Eurostat (1996a), the percentage of the population aged 25-59, having completed at 
least upper secondary education is 84% in Germany, 61% in France, and 52% in 
Britain. The education participation rates (the proportion of persons of a given age, 
enrolled in secondary education) for 17 year olds in 1992 were 92.8% in Germany, 
87.2% in France, and 55.3% in Britain.1 Second, the duration of the educational 
system in France and Britain differs from Germany. Due to the different national 
taxonomy for education, French and British students enter the labour market earlier 
than the German equivalent. The usual age for completion of a university degree 
(bachelor's degree) in Britain and France is 21, whereas it is 26 in Germany. (OECD 
95 a) However, France has higher rates in youth unemployment, as will be shown in 
table 6.2, which pushes down the overall participation rates. Third, early retirement is 
encouraged in France and Germany as work-sharing2, but not in Britain. Indeed,
■^Data are from OECD Education at a Glance. 1995.
2 •Work-sharing is based on the idea that labour input is fixed.
Thus, if each worker works fewer hours or retires early, the work can 
be spread over more workers and employment will rise.
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according to the European Commission (1995), the proportion of men aged 60-64 
retired in 1994 is over 80% in France and 50% in Germany, but under 20% in Britain. 
This is partly due to the less generous nature of the British public pension relative to 
continental economies. According to the OECD (1996c), the public old age cash 
benefits as a percentage of GDP are the lowest in Britain: Germany spent 8.2%, 
France 9.7% and Britain 5.88% of GDP in 1993. In absolute terms, public 
expenditure on old-age pensions per person in 1993 were 11,170 ECU in Germany, 
11,324 ECU in France, and 7,908 ECU in Britain.3 Lower public pensions in Britain 
are reflected by the fact that private pension funds are well developed: pension funds 
assets (of which about two-thirds are private funds) in Britain were more than 1 
trillion dollars, whereas they were less than 0.2 trillion dollars in Germany and France 
in 1996.4
Tables 6.1 to 6.3 show different categories of unemployment. Table 6.1 shows 
total unemployment rates in the three countries. As the business cycle in Britain 
differs considerably from the other two countries, the average unemployment rates 
over a certain period would serve as better indicators for comparative purposes. 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 also examine those components of unemployment which indicate 
structural unemployment: youth and long-term unemployment.
The average unemployment rates in France are the highest among the three, 
and up to 1996, were lowest in Germany. Yet, due to prolonged recession and 
structural crisis, unemployment rates, in former East Germany in particular, have been 
increasing. High and persistent youth unemployment rates are, again, the biggest 
problem in France, but also persistent in Britain. On the other hand, Germany suffers 
from the highest long-term unemployment among the three, although all three 
countries have very high ratios of long-term unemployed.
3
Author's calculation from table 4 (p. 72) of Social Protection 
in Europe 1995 and the Statistical Annex of European Economy June 
1997.
4 .Figures are taken from the Economist September 6th-12th 1997,
p.127.
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Table 6.1: Total unemployment rate (Percentage of civilian labour force)
Germany France Britain
Average 1961-70 0.7 1.8 1.7
Average 1971-80 2.2 4.1 3.8
Average 1981-90 6 9.2 9.8
Average 1991-96 7.6 11.3 9.3
N.B. For Germany, 1961-1990 for West Germany, and 1991- for united Germany. 
Source: Eurostat (several issues)_________________________________________
Table 6.2: Youth unemployment
Unemployment rate of young persons under 25
(as percentage of civilian labour force in the relevant age group)
Germany France Britain
1990 4.5 19.3 10.8
1991 5.9 21.5 14.3
1992 6.4 23.3 16.7
1993 7.9 27.3 17.9
1994 8.7 29 17
1995 8.8 27.5 15.9
1996 9.6 28.9 15.5
N.B. Data until 1991 refers only to West Germany. 
Source: Eurostat (1996a)_____________________
Table 6.3: Long-term unemployment as a percentage of total unemployed
Germany France Britain
1990 45.9 39.7 33.5
1991 30.8 38.7 28.1
1992 33.5 34.6 35.7
1993 40.3 33.3 43
1994 44.3 37.5 45.4
1995 48.7 40.2 43.6
1996 47.8 38.2 39.8
N.B. Long-term unemployment refer to those continuously unemployed for one year or more. 
Data until 1993 refers only to West Germany.
Source: Eurostat (1996a, 1997)____________________________________________________
195
The three countries have different strategies to deal with high unemployment. 
In Germany the dominant labour market policy is the reduction of working time 
regulated at sectoral and company level, based on the idea of work-sharing. A phased 
reduction of working hours in the metal industry is being implemented, and other 
company level negotiations are also taking place. The introduction of more flexible 
working time and part-time work is also encouraged. In the spirit of work sharing, the 
metal industry in the south-west of Germany also reached an early retirement deal in 
September 1997 aiming at cutting youth unemployment. This deal had national 
implications for the sector with other sectors following suit. (Financial Times 29/9/97) 
Other policies include labour cost subsidies, with up to the value of unemployment 
benefits for 1 year being paid to the employer of a previously unemployed person; the 
establishment of labour promotion and training companies (especially for the East) to 
absorb the long-term unemployed and other problem groups who often cannot be 
easily integrated, and to provide practical training in preparation for a job in the 
primary labour market; the Contract Labour Act, providing unlimited labour contracts 
between the unemployed and the START Contract Labour Co. Ltd., a non-profit 
placing agency. It also trains employees when they are not contracted out. In the 
beginning of 1996, the "employment alliance" (Bundnis fur Arbeit) was proposed by 
Klaus Zwickel, the president of the IG Metall. The proposal was to curtail wage 
increases in return for the guarantee of employment maintenance and creation. In 
January, trade unions, employers’ associations and the government supported the idea 
and agreed on the central target of halving unemployment by 2000. However, the 
agreement failed in March 1996 when the government announced its "programme for 
further growth and unemployment", which proposed cuts in social benefits, including 
sick pay, and the deregulation of dismissal legislation.
Work-sharing is also a dominant labour market policy in France. As a part of 
work-sharing policy measures, there are solidarity agreements5 on early retirement,
Solidarity agreements are measures agreed by collective 
agreements.
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and the encouragement of a shorter working week and part-time work. The EDF- 
GDF state electricity and gas utilities companies signed a three-year deal on the 
reduction of weekly working hours to 32 hours at the end of January 1997, with the 
aim of creating 15,000 new jobs by 2000. (EIRR 281, p.28) Like Germany, France 
has "Employment Initiative Contracts", which offer employers taking on an 
unemployed person a bonus per month and complete waiver from social contributions 
on the part of the salary over the minimum wage. Due to its high rates, the measure in 
France targets in particular youth unemployment. Vocational training forms an 
important part of French unemployment policy. Couseil National du Patronat 
Fransais (CNPF), an employers’ association, has started a campaign for jobs for 
young people. The proposal includes increasing the number of fixed-term 
traineeships6, such as apprenticeship contracts, qualification contracts, and orientation 
contracts. The CNPF also proposes to bring the workplace and higher education 
closer together, by offering vocational training to students before they complete 
higher education. The government supported the proposal with the financial incentive 
paid to employers to set up qualification contract schemes. In France a social plan 
was introduced as a law in 1993. The plan is meant to develop social responsibility in 
the business world. In companies with over fifty employees, any plan to lay off ten or 
more workers would be declared invalid unless details of opportunities for retraining 
for jobs elsewhere are submitted beforehand to workplace representatives (Milner and 
Mourizux 1997). The law embraces the new trend in French industrial relations 
where government promotes a consensual approach between trade unions and 
employers’ associations.
In Britain since 1979, the deregulation of employment law has been the prime 
vehicle against unemployment. A number of legislative measures were initiated by
6As this is not a permanent form of employment, these 
traineeships are paid below minimum wages. The pay is between 25% 
and 75% of minimum wages, depending on entry and skill level. Trade 
unions are cautious to welcome the campaign as they fear that new 
training opportunities may be used to exploit young people by 
employing them at lower rates of pay. (EIRR 281, p. 28)
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secretaries of state for employment, including the removal of wage rigidities, and 
lowering or abolition of employment protection. As in Germany and France, there 
are employer subsidies and direct payments to employers recruiting the young and 
long-term unemployed. Since 1994, by employing a person unemployed for more 
than two years, employers can claim back national insurance payments for the first 
year. Training schemes are another important employment policy in Britain. 
Programmes such as work training schemes and work experience schemes are run by 
Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). As Tonge (1997) mentions, the 
establishment of TECs, local employer-led networks, is an attempt to privatise and 
decentralise the unemployment problem in Britain. TECs, however, possess no 
compulsory powers over employers, which is a serious limitation for any 
governmental initiative concerning employers. The Department of Education and 
Employment runs job finder grants and work trials. Under the latter programme, 
employers can try out those unemployed for more than six months free for a trial 
period of up to three weeks. The unemployed continue to receive their benefit during 
this period and may quit the job without benefit suspension. (Tonge p.90) In addition, 
the new Labour government has introduced a welfare-to-work programme aimed 
particularly at the young unemployed, by making use of a one-off windfall tax on 
excessive corporate profits to finance the programme.
Prime differences in unemployment policies in the three countries are those 
regarding work-sharing and deregulation. Work-sharing is the central strategy of 
unemployment policies in Germany and France, but is non-existent in Britain. 
Deregulation of employment protection has already been undertaken to a considerable 
extent in Britain, especially by curtailing trade union influence, but is still, to a large 
extent, a taboo in Germany and France. Deregulation is still very much limited in the 
flexibility of working hours and organisational flexibility in both countries. Such 
differences in unemployment policies are rooted in differences in institutional 
structure and social preferences. They will be elaborated in the next chapter.
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6.1.2. Economic and employment structure
Sectoral differences are another factor which characterise different kinds of 
labour market regimes.
Table 6.4: Share of GVA at current prices and factor costs by branch in total GVA in 1994 
In percentages
Germany France Britain
Agriculture, forestry and fishery products 1.3 3.4 1.9
Fuel and power products 2.8 2.8 4.6
Manufactured products 27.1 20.9 19.3
Building and construction 5.7 5.6 5.3
Services 63 67.2 68.9
Market services 48.9 50.2 55.4
Non-market services 14.1 17 13.5
Total
Source: Eurostat (1995a)
100 100 100
As table 6.4 shows, in all three countries, the largest part of national income is 
produced by the service sector. Eurostat uses the concept of the gross value added 
(GVA) rather than the gross domestic product (GDP). The GVA constitutes GDP 
minus intermediate consumption, i.e., value added tax on products and net taxes 
linked to imports. The contribution to the GVA by the manufacturing sector differs 
considerably. As expected, Germany has the highest whereas Britain has the lowest 
share in manufacturing. Likewise, Britain has the highest overall and market services 
and Germany has the lowest share in both categories. These differences are reflected 
in the distribution of employment over different sectors.
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Table 6.5: Structure of employment 
In percentages
Agriculture Industry Services
Germany France Britain Germany France Britain Germany France Britain
1966 10.6 17 3.7 48.9 39.1 46.4 40.5 43.9 50
1976 6.7 9.9 2.8 44.9 38 39.6 48.4 52.1 57.6
1986 5.3 7.3 2.5 40.9 31.3 30.9 53.7 61.3 66.6
1996 3.3 4.6 1.9 37.5 25.9 27.2 59.1 69.5 70.4
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics 1966-86, Quarterly Labour Force Statistics 1997 no.2 
N.B: Definition:
Agriculture: Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing.
Industry: Mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, construction.
Services: Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels, transport, storage, communication,
financing, insurance, real estate and business services, activities not adequately defined._____________________________
Table 6.5 shows the changing share of employment over the last three decades. The 
share for agriculture and industry has been decreasing since the 1960s, whereas that 
for services has been steadily increasing. As table 6.5.1 indicates, the decline of 
employment in agriculture is particularly serious in France with its traditionally larger 
share in the agricultural sector.
Table 6.5.1. Growth rate of employment share 1966-1996
In percentages
Germany France Britain
Agriculture -68.9 -73 -48.6
Industry -23.3 -33.8 -41.4
Services 45.9 58.3 40.8
Source: Table 6.5.
The growth of employment in service is also fastest in France. De-industrialisation is 
most significant in Britain and least in Germany. Assuming the above trend 
continues, the French economy will become similar to the British, whereas the gulf
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between the German and British economy can be expected to remain prominent. 
Table 6.6 shows the distribution of employment in different sectors in greater detail.
Table 6.6. Persons in employment by economic activity 
The result of Labour Force Survey 1995
Males and Females 
in Percentage
Germany France Britain
Agriculture (A,B) 3.2 4.9 2.1
Mining and quarrying (C) 0.7 0.2 0.4
Manufacturing (D) 25 18.9 19
Electricity, gas and water supply (E) 1 0.9 0.9
Construction (F) 9.3 6.9 7.1
Total Industry (C-F) 36 27 27.4
Wholesale and retail trade, repairs (G) 14.4 13.6 15.7
Hotels and restaurants (H) 2.9 3.3 4.5
Transport and communication (I) 5.8 6.3 6.4
Financial intermediation (J) 3.7 3.3 4.5
Real Estate and Business Activities (K) 6.2 8.4 9.4
Public Administration (L) 8.8 9.4 6
Other services (M,N,0,P,Q) 19.9 23.9 24
Total services (G-Q) 60.8 68.1 70.5
Total
Source: Eurostat (1996) Labour Force Survey
100 100 100
Regarding the detailed sectoral breakdown, Britain has the highest employment in all 
service sub-sectors except for public administration. The opposite extreme is 
Germany. Among the three countries its ratio of employment in industry is highest, 
due to the high employment in construction and manufacturing sectors. The 
distribution of employment in France is somewhat in-between that of Germany and 
Britain, though it is closer to Britain in terms of the employment created by industry 
as a whole, and services. It has the lowest proportion of employment in financial 
intermediation among the three countries. This is probably because the financial 
sector in France is even less developed than in Germany. For example, turnover of
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domestic and foreign equity on the stock exchange in 1996 was around $170 billion in 
Germany, while it was around $70 billion in France.7 Two distinct characteristics of 
French employment are the higher ratio of employment in agriculture and in public 
administration. In the 1980s during the Mitterrand administration, France 
nationalised key industries. As a result, employment in the public sector remains very 
high. In contrast, Britain privatised industries in the same period under Prime 
Minister Thatcher. Consequently, the proportion of employment in the public sector 
in Britain is the lowest among the three countries.
7Data are from Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin. February 1997.
202
Chapter 7
Labour market regimes in Europe 2: labour market institutions and the concept of flexibility
In Chapters 2 and 3 ,1 made the case for studying the functioning of labour markets in 
order to assess the sustainability of monetary union. To reiterate, under monetary union, 
given that the exchange rates cease to be the main adjustment mechanism among different 
economies, smooth labour market adjustment become the key to a well-functioning European 
economy. Major disagreements among the EMU participants on how labour market 
adjustments should take place may jeopardise successful economic cooperation among EMU 
participants, thus threaten the sustainability of EMU.
According to the French regulationist framework, the way labour markets are 
organised and function is a reflection of social characteristics and preferences. Economic 
management under EMU requires close coordination of economic policies among the 
participants. Without the presence of a dominant leader, as is the case in Europe, and without 
the presence of social coherence, the joint management of monetary and economic affairs 
would be difficult. The examination of labour markets contributes to our understanding of 
the consistency of the Euro zone as a single monetary and economic unit, and on the degree 
of difficulty which joint management may pose.
Chapters 7 and 8 consider different types of labour market regimes in Germany, 
France and Britain. In doing so, I shall focus on the issue of labour market institutions and 
flexibility (LMF). This chapter examines the concept of LMF within the context of monetary 
union. Having established the framework of analysis, I compare labour market institutions. 
This is necessary because the understanding of the regime of industrial relations is a 
prerequisite for a deeper understanding of the debate about labour market flexibility. In 
Chapter 8, the flexibility of labour markets will be investigated in an empirical study which 
compares the three countries, in order to determine the degree of labour market regime 
compatibility among them. By closely examining the kind of LMF the three countries under 
investigation apply, I shall contrast fundamental differences in labour market management.
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Before going into the details, let us review the definition of different concepts concerning 
LMF.
7.1. Labour market flexibility - concept
The objective of this section is to define the concept of the LMF, and provide a clear 
framework to assess different ideologies and attitudes in labour market management. It is 
important to define LMF since different scholars has introduced or applied different 
typologies. There are two different ways to classify LMF: one by issue and the other by 
disposition. For the latter, Streeck (1987), Sengenberger (1990), and Auer (1991) 
differentiate between external and internal LMF. External flexibility means flexibility 
external to a person's employment, such as the easiness of firing and hiring etc. Internal 
flexibility stands for organisational flexibility within the premises of employment. For the 
former, Atkinson (1987), Wood (1989) and Lagos (1994) distinguish between labour cost 
flexibility, numerical flexibility and functional flexibility. The following sections introduce 
the concepts of these three commonly-used definitions of labour market flexibility. Though I 
use the former definition as the basis, I shall incorporate elements of the latter definition into 
the framework.
7.1.1. Labour cost flexibility
Labour cost deals with macro- and microeconomic aspects of wage and non-wage 
costs flexibility. Wage cost is defined as the gross remuneration paid to wage earners. In 
plain terms, this is the gross salaries employees receive. Non-wage costs are also known as 
indirect costs. They are mandatory costs and charges that are paid by employers and 
employees. In other words, they include fringe benefits, payroll taxes, workers' 
compensation insurance, contributions to social security and health and pension schemes. 
Some of the typical institutional rigidities affecting labour cost flexibility would be wage-
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indexing systems, guaranteed minimum wages, the high level of replacement incomes (such 
as unemployment benefits or income support) and various charges related to the use of the 
workforce. (Meulders and Wilkin, p. 7) Obviously, employers want downward labour cost 
flexibility, whereas employees prefer upward flexibility, or at least, downward labour cost 
rigidity regarding their salaries. Klau and Mittelstadt (1986) distinguish between real and 
relative labour cost flexibility. The former is a macroeconomic concept, measuring the 
degree of adjustment of aggregate real-product wages and related non-wage labour costs to 
changing productivity levels or terms of trade, (p. 10) In contrast, the latter, relative labour 
cost flexibility, measures the adaptability of wage differentials. If there is scarce labour 
supply relative to demand in a certain skill category, a worker who holds such a skill should 
be paid more relative to other workers. In the empirical observation, however, I shall only 
estimate real wage flexibility, due to the lack of comparable data on relative wage flexibility. 
However, the benchmark for relative wage flexibility is examined by using data on earning 
dispersion.
Minimum wage legislation, for example, would prevent labour market demand and 
supply being reflected fully in the wage level. For this reason, opponents of minimum wages 
argue that they destroy jobs. However, the empirical study on European countries by Dolado 
et al. (1996) finds that the theoretical argument of minimum wages destroying jobs is an 
exaggeration. They point out the fact that in Europe there has been little change in minimum 
wages relative to average earnings over the past 30 years. This indicates that minimum wage 
legislation has little to do with the recent rise in unemployment in Europe. Yet, they also find 
that it may still be a contributory factor in rising unemployment of young unskilled labour, 
especially in France. Klau and Mittelstadt (1986) made a similar point by arguing that "the 
spectrum of total labour costs tends to be narrowed by employers' contributions to social 
security which, in most countries, contain ceiling provisions. This makes low-paid persons 
particularly vulnerable to lay-offs in time of economic slack." (p. 12) Thus, it seems to be the 
case that labour cost inflexibility destroys at least some jobs.
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Furthermore, there is a social dimension to the question of wage levels. Solow (1990) 
points to the problem of the reservation wage, i.e., the lowest wage at which people would be 
indifferent as to working at that wage and not having a job at all. In order to have a balanced 
labour market policy, one has to take account of both labour market efficiency and social 
acceptability. The degree of social acceptability is different from country to country, and is 
reflected by the level of replacement incomes (such as unemployment benefits) available. 
Thus, one can assume that reservation wages in France and Germany would be higher than in 
Britain. Due to the qualitative nature of the issue, it is difficult to argue decisively for or 
against labour cost flexibility.
7.1.2. Numerical flexibility
Numerical flexibility refers to the adjustment to the volume of work in response to 
cyclical or structural variations in demand or technological changes, or both. In practice, this 
would take place either through the adjustment to the number of employees or the adjustment 
to working hours and work schedules. One can also classify the former as external flexibility 
and the latter as internal flexibility, to use Streeck's terminology. For example, in a recession, 
employers fire employees or shorten their working schedules in order to keep their business 
running. The former is reflected in job, labour turnover and enterprise tenure, and the latter 
can be examined in changes and in the flexibility of working hours.
Such flexibility of employment would be difficult to achieve if there were restrictive 
employment protection regulations. Such legal restrictions governing employment contracts 
apply in particular to methods of dismissal, such as advance notice, amounts of 
compensation, prior agreement with various bodies etc. (Meulders and Wilkin, p.7) By 
increasing external numerical flexibility, employers can hire and fire depending on the level 
of market demand. This would, on the one hand, create job insecurity. On the other hand, a 
less costly arrangement for dismissal should give employers the incentive to hire more 
workers in times of growth. The empirical findings regarding the cost and benefit of
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numerical flexibility are still contested, but a number of studies have revealed a positive 
correlation between unemployment and rigid labour markets.1
As for internal numerical flexibility, the setting of maximum working hours is one 
example which has been widely debated. Employers support either the expansion of 
maximum working hours or the abolition of such regulations completely. The following 
three reasons for the employers' stance are mentioned in the report by the OECD (1995). 
First, the extension of maximum working hours is useful for the better use of existing capital 
stock. Second, it is useful for the improved adjustment of working time to fluctuations in 
orders. Third, it may induce the replacement of expensive full-time workers by cheaper part- 
time workers, (pp. 18-22) Although the last point may not directly relate to the questions on 
working time, it would be relevant too as far as labour costs are concerned. Trade unions 
welcome the reduction in maximum working hours, which fits in with the concepts of fair 
work-sharing and a healthy working environment. Due to the rise in unemployment, the 
concept of work-sharing has gained support in the continental economies, notably in France 
and in Germany. As part of work-sharing, early retirement is encouraged in both countries. 
This, however, is rather problematic, because it increases the burden of pension payments. 
Pension payments are already beginning to emerge as a very serious problem for the future 
working generations in the continental economies: on the one hand, the post-war structures of 
the welfare states need overhauling. This means states cannot keep accumulating deficits to 
finance pensions. On the other hand, the proportion of the younger generation relative to the 
older generation is decreasing steadily. Unfortunately, most continental economies suffer 
from vast unfunded pension liabilities, which strains public spending. This means either a cut 
in pension payments or the imposition of heavy tax burdens on the young working generation 
to finance the vast number of pensioners. Either way, it is not a popular policy to be 
implemented by any government facing the problem.
1 The most comprehensive survey of such studies is by Grubb and Wells 
(1993) .
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The question of working time cannot be totally separated from that of wage levels. 
For example, the wages of unskilled labour in Britain are lower than they are for Britain's 
continental counterparts. Thus, many unskilled workers in Britain depend on their overall 
pay including overtime. On the one hand, without an increase in wage levels, it is difficult 
for this part of the workforce to maintain a decent living standard. On the other hand, if wage 
levels increase without adequate increases in productivity, Britain would lose 
competitiveness. It is an example of the difficulty of applying European-wide legislation 
without real or structural convergence in Europe.
7.1.3. Functional flexibility
The last but equally important element of the LMF is functional flexibility. Meulders 
and Wilkin (1987) call it technical-organisational flexibility, and Lorenz (1992) 
organisational flexibility. Functional flexibility refers to the ability of employers to adopt 
and manage the function of labour, as market and technological conditions change. It is to do 
with the efficiency of the internal allocation of labour, in response to changes in demand and 
supply, technological developments, or simply company strategies. Like numerical 
flexibility, this flexibility also has external and internal elements. Internal functional 
flexibility has to do with the reorganisation of the workforce within the firm. In other words, 
it is the adaptation of the workforce to a variety of tasks at varying levels of complexity, such 
as multi-skilling, job rotation, work units, changes in the functional division of labour, 
retraining, and upgrading. For employees in general, it is considered that internal functional 
flexibility is more desirable than labour cost or numerical flexibility. This method has been 
widely used in Japan, where traditionally employees stay with the same company for a much 
longer time than in the US or Europe. Employees are required to show versatility and 
willingness to learn new skills, but this enables them to get more involved with the 
production process, play a more active role and share responsibility in the workplace. The 
OECD (1990) sees it as both a way of responding to workers' aspirations and a tool for
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making labour markets respond to the reorganisation of productive systems, (p.24) For this 
particular flexibility to work, employees have to be relatively skilled or educated, and 
employers are expected to provide training programmes for their workforce. Other 
conditions which nurture internal functional flexibility would be the less hierarchical 
organisational structure, such as the promotion of industrial democracy and the direct 
participation of employees and the elimination of job demarcation barriers. Industrial 
democracy and direct participation promote reciprocal cooperation between management and 
employees through consultation or the delegation of decision-making powers. These 
measures may seem not to relate directly to functional flexibility, but surely encourage a 
regime where employees take initiatives and can undertake multiple tasks. Job demarcations 
- the rigidity of explicit or implicit requirements on deploying labour and of occupational 
restrictions (types of work that a workforce categorised under a particular occupational 
classification can or cannot undertake) - would hamper functional flexibility. In other words, 
countries with active occupational unionism have a structural impediment against promoting 
functional flexibility. Among the three countries that I study here, Britain fits into this 
category.
Trade unions are often sceptical about the reduction in demarcation barriers because 
this could make it easier for employers to push through an intensification of the pace and/or 
volume of work. They also fear that the flexible deployment of labour will increase internal 
labour market segmentation between skilled and unskilled workers. (Lagos, p.89) In this 
context, whether industrial relations are cooperative or conflicting is an important factor in 
facilitating functional flexibility. Rainbird (1991) argues that educating unions on the 
benefits of training and the inclusion of the workforce in the decision making process 
(industrial democracy) in the workplace will be a prerequisite for the active pursuit of a skill- 
oriented functional flexibility.
External functional flexibility deals with outsourcing labour supply, such as 
subcontracting, etc. The dispute regarding the outsourcing of the catering section of British 
Airways in July 1997 is an illustrative example. Outsourcing would create similar effects as
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external numerical flexibility would bring about, regarding the workforce in main and 
subcontracted companies. For employers, subcontracting is a cheap and flexible alternative 
to expanding or downsizing the operation in main companies. Thus, I will only deal with the 
internal functional flexibility in the empirical section in Chapter 8.
7.2. Diverse paths to LMF
Boyer (1987, 88) presents a different approach and classifies the LMF in accordance 
with issue areas. He defines five areas as follows: first, the adaptability of productive 
organisation, second, the propensity of workers to change jobs within a given type of 
organisation, third, the strength or weakness of legal constraints on contracts of employment, 
in particular, on dismissals, fourth, the sensitivity of wages (nominal and real) to the 
economic situation of each firms or general labour market conditions, and fifth, the 
possibility for enterprises to avoid some of the social and fiscal contributions or other rules or 
regulations restricting their freedom on labour management. Clearly, both the classifications 
by Boyer (1987) and Atkinson (1987) etc. introduced above cover the same area, but 
differently. The first classification of Boyer corresponds to both functional and internal 
numerical flexibility, the second to largely internal functional flexibility, the third relates to 
external numerical flexibility, and both the fourth and the fifth correspond to labour cost 
flexibility. Whereas Boyer tends to classify through causes of inflexibility, Atkinson and 
others do so through the consequences of flexibility. As there are many different forms of 
labour market flexibility, there are different paths to achieve different and sometimes 
conflicting patterns of LMF. In this context, Boyer (1987, 1993) suggests that some notions 
of flexibility are not reconcilable, and are thus, counterproductive in terms of operating in 
combination with each other. He argues that the third and fourth types of flexibility are not 
necessarily compatible with the first two. In other words, internal numerical and functional 
flexibilities are not compatible with external numerical flexibility as well as labour cost 
flexibility. The rationale for this argument is clear and justifiable from both the employees’
2 1 0
and employers’ point of view. Making it easier to hire or fire workers by relaxing regulations 
on dismissal or lowering nominal and/or real wages, he says, may inhibit employees' morale, 
loyalty and performances. Employers would not be willing to give enterprise-based skill 
training in order to make employees functionally flexible, if it is cheaper for them to hire new 
employees and dismiss the ones with outdated skills. Besides, if employers provide training, 
employees may simply acquire the skill and leave the company. This free-rider problem is an 
additional factor in discouraging employers from providing substantive training schemes. 
Thus, external numerical, external functional and labour cost flexibility may prevent workers 
from being highly adaptable in work time and functions, and multi-skilled within their 
companies or organisations. (Boyer 1993, p. 110) This incompatibility between external 
and cost, and internal flexibility is crucial for classifying labour market regimes in this 
and the next chapter: if a country emphasises internal flexibility, then its labour market 
regime would not coexist well with that of a country which emphasises external 
flexibility.
Boyer's point was supported both by the OECD and the European Commission. The 
OECD (1990) makes a similar argument, saying "in future, therefore, a reasonable balance 
will have to be found between internal and external flexibility". (P.77) In particular, to 
maintain the balance between two extremes is the real challenge. They are:
i) that too high a degree of external labour market flexibility adversely affects 
the up-skilling, job redesign and redeployment of workers within the 
enterprise; and
ii) that too strong an 'internalisation' of the labour market impinges on the 
economy-wide reallocation of labour and segments the labour force between 
those with secure, career jobs and those with casual, dead-end jobs, (p.86)
A similar problematique was raised by the Commission in their green paper (1997). 
They endorse the achievement of the right balance between flexibility and security. In other 
words, they argue that with the changing organisation of the workplace, new industrial 
relations arrangements to promote the partnership between employers and employees are 
necessary.
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7.2.1. Two distinctly different regimes of labour market adjustment
One can thus say that there is an intellectual consensus that a strategy of flexibility 
has to be pursued with caution. By extending the argument, one can construct at least two 
different ways of achieving LMF: first, through a regime dominated by internal numerically 
and functionally flexible workers, second, through a regime dominated by pay and external 
numerical flexibility. Without losing the meaning, one can characterise the former as a 
labour market regime predominantly internally flexible and the latter regime as 
predominantly externally flexible. Under the first regime, employers provide workers with 
relative job security, but require them to be multi-skilled or to work flexible hours. Under the 
second regime, workers may be paid higher wages in economic booms, but risk being easily 
laid off temporarily or indefinitely in recessions. The regulations on dismissal, labour 
mobility and skill levels are some of the factors which can be used to determine the types of a 
specific regime. Germany and Japan, for example, fit into the first model, whereas Britain 
and the US can be classified as belonging to the second camp. This corresponds with the 
finding of the OECD (1986) that functional flexibility has been, at least up to the 1980s, 
higher in Germany and Japan, and unlike other indicators of LMF, lower in Britain.
Indeed, comparative studies by economists, notably by Houseman and Abraham 
(1993a, 1993b), Buttler et. al. (1994) highlight the cases for different employment 
adjustments due to the institutional differences between the US and Continental European 
countries. They find that in continental Europe, employment adjustment takes place through 
working time, whereas in the US, it is done by changing the numbers employed, i.e., by 
hiring and firing. In other words, in an economic slump or boom, Europe adjusts with 
internal numerical flexibility and the US adjusts with external numerical flexibility. This is 
due to the rigid regulation on dismissal as well as high non-wage costs in most European 
countries. On the one hand, it creates the condition of relative job security even in times of 
recession. On the other hand, it causes slow employment growth in times of economic 
growth. By examining labour demand functions, Houseman and Abraham (1993a) find that
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employment adjustment generally is significantly slower in the German than the US 
manufacturing industries studied, but also find that total hours adjustment was more similar, 
implying that average hours adjustment was generally greater in Germany.
The question is whether it is possible to achieve a 'reasonable balance' between the 
two different ways to organise the labour market, and whether it is realistic for labour market 
regimes with different priorities (internal or external flexibility) to coexist within a single 
economic zone sharing the same currency. The LMF regime reflects broader differences in 
social preferences. The debate on flexibility is about what kind of society people wish to 
create and live in, because "ultimately, social and economic goals cannot be treated as 
alternatives; they have to be treated as complementary". (ETUI P.5) Looking back 
historically, in any single economic or monetary unit, there has always been a single 
dominant regime of economic and labour market management. The only exception was the 
case of America in the 19th century, where dominance was resolved by the Civil War 
between South and North. Therefore, it is important to study the different types of LMF that 
countries subscribe to, and clarify some underlying socio-economic inconsistency which may 
cause serious frictions as European integration proceeds. To reflect on the differences in the 
underlying socio-economic structure, it is necessary to study labour market institutions.
7.3. Labour market institutions
Differences in labour market adjustment are the result of the unique nature of national 
labour market regimes. Different labour market institutions are the bases for the uniqueness 
of labour market regimes which bring about the differences in labour market adjustments. 
This section aims to clarify the different characteristics of labour market institutions in three 
European countries by using the regulationists' approach introduced in Chapter 3.
I shall examine i) the mode of industrial relations and employment management, ii) 
the regulatory framework as a principal determinant of the adjustment mechanism and iii) the 
social security regime to take account of different welfare systems. These aspects comprise
the regulation concept of Rapport Salarial (wage / labour relations). This chapter aims to 
identify whether the domestic regimes of the three countries are geared towards labour 
market adjustment of an internal or external nature. For the former, one would expect the 
system of industrial relations to be relatively cooperative with employment security backed 
up by regulation. For the latter type of regime, industrial relations may be either 
confrontational or without much coordination, accompanied by very little regulation on 
employment security. In addition, it is useful to analyse social security regimes as they 
interact with labour market regimes. A low level of social protection brings about 
employment flexibility. Although it is contested to which degree the strictness of regulation 
determines the level of unemployment2, there is no debate that the level and extent of social 
benefits affect labour supply and mobility. For example, the higher participation of women 
in Nordic countries was achieved through a comprehensive development of state-supported 
collective services in education, health, and social welfare services such as child care. This is 
an example which suggests "the cross national differences in labour market behaviour to be 
attributable to the nature of welfare-state regimes." (Esping-Andersen, p. 144) Higher non 
wage labour costs would reduce labour mobility as they promote less hiring and firing and 
longer job tenures than otherwise. Generous unemployment benefits may reduce labour 
mobility as the unemployed can afford to stay unemployed. In addition, portability of 
pension schemes may facilitate higher labour mobility. Generally speaking, the countries 
with lower coverage of social security and lower taxation would make labour less expensive, 
thereby making labour markets more flexible externally. A country with higher social 
security coverage should be more internally oriented in its labour market adjustment, as it is 
less costly. In the following sections, I shall elaborate on these two different paths of 
internally- or externally-oriented labour market and social regimes by examining the 
industrial relations, regulations and social security regimes in detail.
2 For a recent survey of the argument, see Siebert (1997) , OECD (1993) ; 
notable academics arguing against the argument are Saint-Paul (1996) and 
Manning (1996), Nickell (1997).
7.3.1. Mode of industrial relations and employment management
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It is not the purpose here to explain in detail the trade union movements or employers’ 
organisations of a particular country. Rather, I shall examine the mode of interaction among 
government, employers and trade unions within the context of collective bargaining processes 
in France, Germany and Britain, in order to define different types of labour market regimes.
7.3.1.1. Trade union and employer representation
The unionisation and employer density rates presented in table 7.1 reflect the degree 
of their representation by their respective organisations.
Table 7.1. Union and Employer Representations in the Mid-1990s (in Percentages)
Union density (market sector) Employer density (market sector)
Germany 25 70 - 80
Britain 21 50-60
France 5 60-70
N.B.: Density stands for percentages of union members out of employed wage and salary earners for unions, and 
percentages of private sector firms registered for employers organisations for employers.
Source: Visser (1998)_________________________________________________________________________________
The membership of both trade unions and employers' organisations have declined 
over the last decades, thereby reducing the influence they used to have in the past. However, 
the effectiveness of their representation in collective bargaining processes differs 
considerably among the three countries.
Both trade union and employer representation is high in collective bargaining 
processes in Germany. Organisation is mainly sectoral. A sectoral trade union bargains with 
a sectoral employers' organisation on wages and working conditions. This representation by 
a single union rather than by multiple unions makes trade unions in Germany more influential
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than in other European countries, as will be explained later. The majority (81.1% of trade 
unions in 19903) of sectoral unions are affiliated to a predominant trade union confederation, 
and a majority of private sector firms are members of the confederation of employers' 
organisations.4 Neither the confederations of employers' organisations nor trade unions take 
part in collective bargaining but they do play an important and effective role by coordinating 
member policies.
In France and Britain, trade union and employer representation are not as well 
organised as in Germany. Trade unions in France are politically and religiously fragmented, 
with little coordination among them. Furthermore, there are several trade union 
confederations co-existing, organised along political, religious and professional lines.5 
French trade union federations are ideologically oriented with strong antagonisms and rivalry 
among themselves. There is no coordination whatsoever among them, and few, if any 
attempts are made to improve this situation.6 In contrast to their fragmented trade union 
counterparts, the confederation of employers' associations in France is much more united, and 
covers the majority of employers7. Despite the high rate of representation, it is fairly 
ineffective in coordinating members, as employers are deeply divided by personal conflicts 
and ideological factions.
As in Germany, Britain has a main trade union confederation8 which represents the 
majority of trade unions (89% in 19909), organised by sectors or professions. However, it is 
highly ineffective in coordinating members. As in the case of France, British trade unions are 
pluralistic and fragmented. Rather than politically or religiously, they are divided by craft
3 Source: Van Ruysseveldt, Huiskamp and van Hoof (1995), p. 45.
4 The former is Deutscher Gewerkshaftsbund (DGB) and the latter is 
Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Albeitgeberverbande (BDA) .
5 There are five major trade union confederations: the Confederation 
generale de travail (CGT), Confederation frangaise democratique de travail 
(CFDT), Force ouvriere (FO), Confederation frangaise des travailleurs 
chretiens (CFTC), and Confederation frangaise de 1 1encadrement 
Confederation generale des cadres (CFE-CGC).
6 This statement was confirmed by Jean-Pierre Yonnet, the European 
Representative of Force Ouvriere Post & Telecom Branch Union in a personal 
interview on 17 June 1997.
7 Counseil national du patronat frangais (CNPF).
8 Trade Union Congress (TUC).
9 Source: Van Ruysseveldt, Huiskamp and van Hoof (1995), p.45.
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and occupation and, to a lesser extent, by industrial affiliation. Such multi-unionism (the 
presence of more than one trade union at the bargaining table with an employer) makes trade 
unions in Britain and France ineffective in putting forward their demands, as they do not 
speak with one voice at the collective bargaining table. The ideological rift among trade 
unions diminishes union influence, as management can take advantage of infighting. One can 
probably say that employers' organisations in Britain have the lowest profile among most EU 
countries, since the members are, like trade unions, pluralistic and fragmented. There is only 
one main confederation of employers' association10, but it does not coordinate wage and 
employment policies among members, nor has it any mandate on collective bargaining. The 
organised representation by trade unions and employers' organisations is much more effective 
and constructive in Germany than in France or Britain.
7.3.1.2. The role of the State
The government in some countries is the third actor in industrial relations. The 
degree of state interference varies greatly in the three countries. In plain terms, one can say 
that government in Germany, through indirect intervention, plays a supporting role through 
consultation with its social partners. However, independence from state intervention 
(Tarifautonomie) is firmly established under the Basic Law in Germany (Article 9, section 3). 
The French government, on the other hand, plays a pro-active role by direct intervention. 
Scholars argue that the British government plays a passive role.11 However, the British 
government in the past played a decisive role in altering the overall environment of industrial 
relations. Unlike France and Germany, where the basic infrastructure of industrial relations is 
enshrined in the constitution, British industrial relations are not underpinned by any basic 
laws. The political system allows changes in any basic tenet of labour relations as long as 
laws are passed by the majority in parliament. In the 1980s, government interventions in
10 Confederation of British Industry (CBI).
11 For example, see van Waarden (1995), Van Ruyssefeldt and Visser eds. 
(1996), Schmid ed. (1994), Bamber and Lansbury eds. (1993), Streeck (1993).
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industrial relations increased both in France and Britain. However, the nature of 
interventions by the two governments is almost as different as chalk and cheese. During 
conservative governments Britain abolished a number of regulations stipulating trade union 
rights, and established the rules of the game for neo-liberal industrial relations: since 1979, it 
passed eight employment acts to progressively curtail trade union power and increase greater 
freedom for employers regarding employment regulations. The state played a vital role in 
creating a pertinent institutional structure for a pro-business environment regarding the 
conduct of the labour market and industrial relations. In the case of France, on the other 
hand, the socialist government introduced the Auroux reform in 1982, with the intention of 
strengthening trade union powers at the workplace level. It exercises a more traditional form 
of state intervention by dictating the terms of employment and working conditions, such as 
minimum wages, working hours, social security, workplace safety, etc.
In a nutshell, in France the law gives a mandate to the government to take an active 
role, in Germany the law regulates and conditions government intervention, and in Britain the 
government sets the law. This suggests that the state in Britain may hold potentially the 
strongest structural power in industrial relations.
7.3.1.3. Collective bargaining
7.3.1.3.1. Level and coverage of collective bargaining
Collective bargaining in Europe is in transition. In the past, the dominant level of 
collective bargaining in all three countries was the sectoral level. Collective agreements on 
wages and working conditions in France and Germany are legally binding, but not in Britain. 
In France, collective agreements are defined under the Labour Code as agreements relating to 
conditions of work and social codes between employers and trade unions. In Germany, there 
exists a thorough legal framework for the conduct of collective bargaining as well as the 
protection and enforcement provisions accompanying it. The right to bargain collectively and
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to resort to industrial action was stipulated in the Basic Law, the constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949. Collective agreements are not legally binding in Britain, 
unless explicitly stated otherwise. Such cases are extremely rare. This means that unlike in 
France or Germany, there is no systemic mechanism of administrative extension12 in Britain. 
In addition, there is no statutory form of employee representation, nor is there any obligation 
for employers to recognise trade unions or any other representatives for collective 
bargaining.13 There is a growing number of multinational corporations, such as Shell or ICI, 
which have de-recognised trade unions. According to Millward et al. (1992), 56% of 
manufacturing, and 64% of the service sector were not recognising trade unions in 1990. The 
figures are expected to have risen towards the end of the 1990s. Non-unionism means that 
there is no collective agreement in such establishments.
At the sectoral level, generally the largest union in the manufacturing sector sets the 
trend in collective bargaining. In Germany, IG Metall (metal sector) acts as a leading wage 
setter, and the result of their collective agreement serves as the benchmark for other 
agreements. As a representative of the export-oriented sector, IG Metall is highly aware of 
the need to maintain the external competitiveness of German industry, and acts as what has 
been described as "social Bundesbank". (European Commission/EDS p.37) That German 
trade unions are highly organised and aware of external competitiveness helped to restrain 
excessive wage increases in the past. This pragmatic approach of German trade unions 
differs greatly from ideologically-oriented union movements in France and Britain.
The importance of sectoral level collective bargaining has declined considerably in 
Britain, and to a lesser extent, in France. In France, a considerable number of employees in 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are believed to be not covered by collective
12 " Administrative extension" stands for the extension of the coverage of 
collective agreements to non-signatory parties.
13. In May 1998, in its White Paper, Fairness at Work, the government 
proposed that employers have to recognise trade unions if at least 40% of 
those eligible vote in support of recognition. Only then can unions apply 
to impose binding procedures for collective bargaining. Such high
percentages are believed to be unrealistic. Many British trade unions are 
keeping up the pressure for a change of the 40% threshold in recognition 
ballots.
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bargaining. According to the International Labour Office, the proportion of employees 
covered by collective agreements is 90% in 1995 in France, 90% in 1996 in Germany, and 
25.6% in 1994 in Britain.14 The figures reflect the fact that the dominant level of bargaining 
in Britain is at the company level. In Germany and France, sectoral level agreements provide 
the framework, but the lack of cohesion among trade union confederations in France makes it 
difficult for them to bargain effectively.
7.3.1.3.2. Decline in sectoral collective bargaining
Sectoral collective bargaining in Europe is on the defensive. Increasingly, there is a 
move away from centralised to decentralised, company level bargaining. In Germany, 
sectoral level bargaining is still by far the most important, but as in the other two countries, 
company-level bargaining has gained importance. Even in Germany company-level 
bargaining through works councils sometimes undermines collective agreements. In 
Germany issues settled by collective agreements can be legally regulated by works 
agreements at the company level only if the collective agreements explicitly allow for those 
supplementary agreements. The supplementary nature of bargaining through works councils 
does sometimes create tension between the two levels of bargaining. This is because 
supplementary wage increases at the company level are often achieved through concessions 
by works councils on working conditions or working hours, agreed by sectoral collective 
bargaining, which then are unacceptable to the trade unions. IG Metall (metal sector trade 
union) took IBM's works councils to court regarding an allegedly illegal agreement on 
Sunday work in 1989. In 1993, IBM introduced a new bargaining structure by withdrawing 
from the framework of sectoral collective bargaining except for its manufacturing division.
The decline in sectoral level bargaining has to do with structural changes in the world
economy, as well as institutional deadlock in trade union movements. The declining
importance of the manufacturing sector and the development of the service sector accelerated
14 Figures are taken from ILO World Labour Report 1997-98. p. 248. The 
figure for France is an estimate.
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the decline in union density. The decline in the density of employers' organisations is a 
contributory factor to the diminishing influence of sectoral collective bargaining.
7.3.1.3.3. Trend towards decentralisation
Is collective bargaining in three countries converging towards decentralisation? 
Though company-level bargaining is gaining importance in all three countries, they have 
maintained their own institutional uniqueness in collective bargaining. The British case is the 
most laissez-faire of the three. In the French case, though decentralisation has gained 
importance, sectoral collective bargaining has still been very much directed by the state. The 
German case is perhaps the most stable among the three, though there is an increasing 
number of companies boycotting sectoral collective agreements. This tendency is 
particularly serious in eastern Germany where two-thirds of employers are already outside the 
system of collective bargaining and negotiate wages only at the plant level. (Financial Times 
14/08/97) The collective bargaining system has recently come under increasing pressure as 
employers have demanded more flexibility in wages and working conditions if employment 
is to be guaranteed. Indeed, over the past few years, it has become increasingly common to 
include "opening clauses" in collective agreements, whereby plant level bargaining can 
negotiate variations from the sectoral norm to suit individual circumstances.15 A recent 
example is the Opel agreement signed by the Opel management and the company's group 
works council in January 1998. The deal includes the management guaranteeing job security 
in exchange for workers' acceptance of more flexible working-time arrangements and pay 
increases below the level of the sectoral collective bargaining agreement.
7.3.1.3.4. Industrial democracy
15. For detailed analyses, see EIRR 245, June 1994 and 2 95, August 1998.
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As decentralisation is setting the trend in collective bargaining of the three countries, 
it is important to compare the bargaining processes at the plant level. At the workplace level, 
works councils represent employees in both France and Germany, but not in Britain. This 
may, however, change with Britain implementing the directive on European works 
councils.16 Hege and Dufour (1995) compared the representation legitimacy at the workplace 
level in France and Germany by mainly comparing the functioning of works councils. 
Despite the institutional differences between the two countries in terms of organisational 
structure, strength of trade unions and ideology, they found in their samples that within 
establishments, the behaviour of works councils is surprisingly similar. In both countries 
they found close coordination between works councils and trade unions. Trade unions 
provide resources for training, and technical expertise to shop-floor representatives, which 
works councils are dependent on. Works councillors are also dependent on external union 
resources for information on broader wage and employment policy issues outside their 
companies, in order to prepare a strategy for negotiations. Trade unions, in turn, rely on 
works council cooperation to exert influence as well as to recruit new entrants from the shop 
floor level. Thus, there seems to be no major conflict in the role of trade unions and that of 
works councils in France and Germany.
However, there are major differences in the mandate and functioning of works 
councils between the two countries, which has to do with the degree of industrial democracy.
The works council (Betriebsrat) in Germany has historical roots way back to the time 
of the Weimar Republic. The legally binding establishment dates back to 1920. The current 
mandate of works councils is based on the Works Constitution Act of 1952. For firms of five 
or more permanent employees, works councils have to be established. The number of works
16. The European Works Councils (EWCs) Directive has now been formally 
extended to the UK by means of an extension directive, adopted in December 
1997. The provisions of the directive will come into force in the UK in 
December 1999. According to a survey by the University of Southampton in 
October/November 1997, however, there were 18 British firms which already 
had voluntarily established either an EWC or an information and 
consultation procedure.
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councillors elected by all employees is related to the size of the specific establishment. Work 
councillors meet the employer at least once a month.
The philosophy behind the introduction of works councils can be found in the concept 
of co-determination, the extension of democracy to the economic decision-making process 
at the work place. There are two institutional levels of workers' representation regarding co­
determination. One is workers' participation on the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat): works 
councils and unions nominate employee representatives to the supervisory board. The 
supervisory board selects the managing board, supervises executive management, audits 
annual financial accounts and annual reports, and supervises reports to the shareholders' 
annual meeting. The membership size differs depending on the size of the company. Under 
the Works Constitution Act of 1952, a third of the members must be elected by employees by 
secret and direct ballot. The Co-determination Act of 1976 stipulated that a half of members 
are to be elected by workers representatives but at least one of them must be from the group 
of white-collar employees. Members cannot be shareholders and members of the 
management board at the same time. The supervisory board convenes at least every six 
months.
The other institutional form of workers' representation is co-determination through 
works councils. The rights of works councils are stipulated as follows: first, co­
determination rights on social matters including working conditions, working hours, 
occupational training and remuneration. Second, co-determination rights on personal matters 
including recruitment, transfer and dismissal. Third, veto rights on individual staff 
movement, such as firing, transfer and dismissal. Fourth, information and consultation rights 
on personnel planning and changes in the working environment. Fifth, information rights on 
the financial affairs of the establishment. Sixth, information and consultation rights on the 
introduction of new technology and major operational changes in the company. (Muller- 
Jentsch p.59) The works councils are institutionally independent from unions and have their
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own constituency. However, in reality, most work counsellors are also union members.17 
Overall union representation in works councils in Germany was 69-76% in 1990.18
Irrespective of union presence, the law requires French companies to establish some 
form of committee for employee representation. In firms with more than 10 employees, 
personal delegates (delegues du personnel) have to be elected by all employees. Delegates 
are in charge of taking care of complaints by individual workers about wages and working 
conditions. They also monitor compliance with labour legislation and collective agreements. 
In companies or plants which employ 50 or more, the establishment of an enterprise 
committee (comite d'enterprise), the French version of works councils, is required. In 
addition, these companies also have to have a health and safety committee (comite d'hygiene, 
de securite et des conditions du travail).
The enterprise committee consists of one employer representative and elected 
employee representative. It manages funds provided by the firm for social activities for the 
employees and their families. It has the right to be informed and consulted about the general 
affairs of business and company policies. In particular, the personnel and employment 
policies of a company must be approved by the committee before decisions are made. It may 
also negotiate agreements on profit sharing. The committee must meet monthly. Though 
these committees were established in a 1945 Law, the 1982 Auroux law has enhanced their 
influence considerably, by giving them more power to promote workplace democracy, as 
well as by expanding the scope of consultation to cover technical and economic affairs. The 
objective of the law was to strengthen the position of union delegates with respect to 
company management and also with respect to central union officials. Delegates or 
representatives of such committees do not need to be trade union members, though the 
majority of them are. Nevertheless, works councils in France are very weak and the degree of 
co-determination is rather limited. Consequently, the enterprise committee acts primarily as 
an (obligatory) consultation forum. As the dispute about the Renault factory closure in
17. According to Huiskamp (1995) , this is particularly the case of the 
metal industry where the majority of works councillors are members of IG 
Metall.
18. Figures are quoted in table 3.2 of Muller-Jentsch, p. 57.
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Vilvoorde, Belgium19 demonstrated, the autocratic French style of management makes it 
especially difficult for employers to cooperate with employees. Furthermore, the fragmented 
French labour movement is not strong enough to exploit to their advantage the statutory 
opportunities offered to them.
The European Directive on works councils only seeks the establishment of works 
councils for consultation purposes. German-type co-determination is not included as a 
feature of European Works Councils. Thus, even if implemented in some companies in 
Britain, the degree of industrial democracy would be much lower than in Germany.
This suggests that both Germany and to a lesser degree, France tried to integrate 
labour into the economic management of firms. Successful integration of labour at the plant 
level enhances the cooperative nature of industrial relations in Germany, and creates an 
environment for internal rather than external forms of labour market adjustment. Except for a 
few firms, such a mechanism does not exist in Britain. This suggests that the British labour 
market regime is geared more towards external labour market adjustment.
In terms of the mode of industrial relations in general, the cooperative culture 
prominent in the German labour market regime promotes internal adjustment. In contrast to 
their French and British counterparts, the German trade unions are pragmatic with a strong 
awareness of economic competitiveness. Relative to France and Britain, employers in 
Germany have well-institutionalised channels of communication with employees, a situation 
which promotes negotiation and compromise. This implies that German industrial relations 
are most suited among the three for internal labour market adjustment. Though France has 
some institutions of dialogue, the lack of effective representation of both trade unions and 
employers hampers productive communication among them. Britain, however, does not have 
institutions to facilitate cooperation, nor effective and balanced representations of both labour 
and employers. Consequently, French and British industrial relations are more geared 
towards the external mode of adjustment.
19. In February 1997, the Renault management made the unilateral 
announcement in the Belgian Press that the company was to close down its 
Belgian plant at Vilvoorde in mid-summer and lay off nearly 3,000 workers 
in France.
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7.3.2. Regulatory framework
The legal framework is one of the distinctive national features which moulds different 
modes of industrial relations. There are fundamental legal differences between continental 
European countries with Roman-Germanic law, and Britain with the tradition of Common 
law. The legal framework in France is underpinned by Roman codified law. Roman law 
distinguishes sharply between public and private law, between state and society, giving 
priority to the former over the latter, (van Waarden p. 131) The Common law tradition in 
Britain draws a thin line between state and society, reflected by the old tradition of unwritten 
rules that gradually evolved into formal law. The focus of legal analysis in labour law is the 
relationship between the employer and each individual employee.20 Indeed, what is 
negotiated collectively in Britain is only enforceable as an individual contract - covered 
within the domain of civil laws. German labour law covers almost all aspects of industrial 
relations. The German legal tradition of detailed rules and regulations is reflected in current 
rule-based industrial relations.
The objective of this section is to determine the dominant level of regulation in the 
three countries, as well as to examine the different characteristics of regulation. There are 
three different levels of regulation for day-to-day issues of industrial relations: by law and 
regulation at the national level, by regulations agreed by collective bargaining at the sectoral 
level, and by those agreed upon at the company level. The purpose of comparing 
employment regulation is to examine the philosophical and ideological differences in labour 
market organisation and policies. Therefore, a detailed description of differences in 
regulations is avoided, unless they are essential for explaining some fundamental differences 
in the underlying ideology of labour market regimes.
20. It is interesting to note that up to 1939, legal studies were almost 
exclusively concerned with the common law of the master and servant 
relationship. (Hepple and Fredman p. 33)
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In France, the law (statutory legislation) sets a minimum standard which applies 
directly to some workers, but is further improved by collective agreements for others. In 
Germany, the law enshrines only minimum standards for working conditions. The standards 
agreed by collective agreements are usually higher and set de facto legal constraints. In 
Britain, there is virtually no regulation except in the area of safety at the workplace, with 
rules set at the company level, rather than at the national or sectoral level.
The main difference between the respective regulatory frameworks is that between the 
rule-based French and German system and the discretionary and voluntary British system. 
Accordingly, the former can be over-regulated, whereas the latter can be under-regulated. 
Barrel (1996) argues that the Common law system is better as far as adaptability or flexibility 
in labour markets is concerned, but his argument may be an over-simplification. Such 
"flexibility" could not address the poor employment performance in Britain during the 1970s. 
Streeck (1997) argues that such flexibility also contains negative connotations, as it creates 
discontinuity and confusion regarding fundamental rules of industrial relations. This is 
because, under the British political system, a simple majority in parliament can easily undo 
any law made by the administration's predecessors and create new ones, (p.334) Due to 
legislation and repeal by different governments, and the case law system, there are many 
overlapping, contradictory areas in the regulations in the area of industrial relations. (IDS 95, 
Watson Wyatt)
The German labour market is often regarded as one of the most over-regulated.
However, there is considerable "flexibility within regulation" in the German system of
industrial relations:21 there are two kinds of procedures establishing regulations: regulation
through law and regulation through negotiation with social partners. Under the latter,
through collective bargaining, updating of regulations is possible. As mentioned above, in
Germany the regulatory framework of working conditions is regulated by statutory
legislation. Yet collective bargaining is an important forum to 'sectoralise' the minimum
rules set by legislation. Furthermore, works councils can conclude agreements on issues not
21. Direct quote of Stefan Clauwaert, a researcher at the European Trade 
Union Institute, from personal interview on 16/6/97.
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covered by collective agreements. Since 1987 works councils have also been able to interpret 
and negotiate sectoral agreement on working hours. This suggests more flexibility at the 
plant level than the seemingly rigid legal framework indicates.22
The following paragraphs examine in more detail the regulations in the three 
countries. The two areas of labour regulations which present most starkly the contrast among 
the three countries - dismissals and right to strike or lockout - are discussed in detail.
7.3.2.1. Regulations on dismissal
A comparison of regulations on dismissal and industrial actions (section 7.3.2.2) is 
useful as it reveals a clear contrast in procedures and characteristics of different legal 
traditions.
In France and Germany, there are comprehensive regulations regarding dismissal. 
Since the law of 13 July 1973 (the Labour Code), the right of dismissal is granted to the 
employer in France. The legal procedure is as follows: an employer summons an employee 
whom he intends to dismiss to an interview prior to taking action, and the employee has the 
right to defence. Whether dismissals are due to economic or personal reasons, employers are 
by law obliged to provide real and well-founded reasons. (Labour Code LI22-14-2) 
Advanced notice is obligatory, with the period varying in accordance with seniority, and the 
length of employment. Works councils or personnel delegates have to be informed and 
consulted right after the preliminary interview with the employee concerned. Under the 
National Agreement of 1969, employee representatives must always be consulted about the 
planned dismissal of a manager. (Watson Wyatt) In the case of a redundancy for economic 
reasons, employers either have to offer a retraining contract at the primary interview, or they 
have to pay a penalty equivalent to the one-month salary of the employee. They are also 
obliged to inform the labour inspectorate at the Ministry of Labour of the redundancy.
22. The same point was made in Marsden (1995), who advocated the 
flexibility of seemingly regulated German labour markets relative to 
seemingly deregulated British labour markets.
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Regarding severance pay in France, anyone who worked continuously for 2 years or 
more for the same employer is entitled to minimum severance pay, except in the case of an 
instant dismissal due to a serious fault of the employee. The sum equals 20 hours of hourly 
pay for wage-eamers or 10% of monthly earnings for salaried employees. Indemnity 
increases with the number of years of continuous service. For example, someone who 
worked 20 years is entitled to the sum of 2.7 times his/her average monthly earnings. A 
dismissed employee who has worked for more than two years is entitled to take a claim of 
unfair dismissal to the labour tribunal if the reasons provided for the dismissal are 
unsatisfactory. The amount of compensation, should the reasons provided by the employer 
be found unfair, should not be lower than six months gross earnings.
In Germany, there are a number of procedures for employers to follow regarding 
dismissal of employees. There are detailed rules on consultation requirements, protective 
legislation and some other practical and legal requirements regarding notice periods. 
Employers are obliged to inform works councils in writing on planned dismissals of 
employees. The reasons for dismissal have to be stated and well-founded. Except in the case 
of immediate severance due to employee's fault, works councils have to approve the dismissal 
for it to take effect. The minimum notice period required varies depending on the years of 
service. By the law of 1993, the periods of notice for blue- and white- collar employees were 
equalised. There is no statutory law stipulating severance payment for fair dismissal. 
However, in the case of collective redundancies, a works council can negotiate with the 
employer on a social (compensation) plan (Sozialplan), which includes severance payments. 
Social plans in Germany are similar to their French equivalent in spirit but different in 
substance. As mentioned in Chapter 6, in France they provide mainly a contribution to the 
cost of retraining, whereas in Germany they provide aid for dismissed employees in a more 
encompassing manner. In addition to severance payments, these provisions include out­
placement, time off and fares for finding a new job and hardship funds. The level of 
payment varies depending on the region, sector and terms of individual contracts. A typical 
payment for a middle manager aged 40, working for the company for 20 years would be in
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the range of 12-18 months of his monthly earnings. (Watson Wyatt p. 144) In the case of 
unfair dismissal, the maximum sum payable in compensation is twelve months’ pay for 
employees younger than 50 years old with less than 15 years of service. The sum increases 
for older and longer-serving employees. In Germany, the criteria for unfair dismissal are 
broader than in France or Britain, where unfairness is constituted by discrimination by sex, 
religion, affiliation, race etc. Rather, it includes also dismissals in cases where the employee 
could be reemployed in another capacity after suitable rehabilitation or training, or under 
altered conditions with the employee's consent. Thus, it is not easy to dismiss employees in 
Germany especially if they have been continuously in service for a long time. Any employee 
who is 18 years or older working for a company for more than 6 months is entitled to 
protection by Labour courts against unfair dismissal.
In Britain, there is no obligation to put an employment contract in writing. The EU 
directive on proof of any employment relationship (EC91/533/EEC), which is implemented 
as the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act of 1993, however, stipulates that a 
written statement of the main terms of employment must be provided to each employee. This 
act only applies to employees who works at least 8 hours a week with a contract for the 
duration of more than one month.
Unlike in France and Germany, in Britain there has been an almost total lack of 
statutory regulation of employment conditions until recently. These were regulated by the 
individual contract of employment only, except for conditions which fell under the category 
of health and safety at work. Thus, there was no regulation on hours of work except for 
special cases such as minors or children. Likewise, there was no statutory regulation of levels 
of overtime, and of shift work. In addition, there is still no superstructure of binding 
collective agreements at industry level (administrative extension). This means almost all 
elements of pay and working conditions have been determined and enforced at company 
level, either by agreement or unilaterally from the management side.
The national working time legislation came into force in October 1998, as a result of 
the 1993 European Working Time Directive, which set maximum weekly working hours,
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paid holidays, and other minimum working conditions. The Directive was regarded as health 
and safety provision under the EU treaties and was therefore subject to regulation at EU level, 
including Britain. This required drastic changes in British labour market regulation. The 
British government, however, has ensured that its interpretation enables companies to 
exercise as much flexibility as possible. By allowing employers and employees to exercise 
opt-outs from the working hour limitations through an individual, a workforce or a collective 
agreement, Britain has so far managed to de facto mitigate the restrictive impact of the 
Directive.
According to Common Law, an employer is not required to give any reason for 
dismissal. The Employment Protection Act of 1978 modified this by stipulating that an 
employee who has been employed continuously for 6 months is entitled to a written statement 
by his/her employer, giving the reasons for dismissal, at least 14 days prior to dismissal. A 
termination of contract for health reasons constitutes unfair dismissal, whereas dismissal is 
possible in the case of employees' misconduct, and incompetence, given the proper 
procedures set by the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Services (ACAS)23 code of 
practice are followed.24 Employees who are continuously employed for a period of one year 
can bring a claim of unfair dismissal to an industrial tribunal25. The notice period varies 
depending on the length of service. In the case of gross misconduct on the part of an 
employee, an employer can dismiss him/her without notice. As for redundancy, there are 
consultation requirements with recognised trade unions both for individual or collective 
dismissals. This implies that for those employers who have not recognised or have 
derecognised trade unions, there is no need for any consultation with employees. However, 
the courts have advised employers to consult individual employees and have inferred this as a
23. The ACAS was established in 1974 under a Labour administration to 
resolve industrial disputes through arbitration. It consists of
representatives from trade unions, employers and government-appointed 
academics. The subsequent conservative administration limited the 
authority of ACAS to the arbitration of conflicts in the public sector 
only, in addition to its role of conducting inquiries.
24. The code of practice includes a warning in writing to the employee, 
giving him/her sufficient opportunity to improve before a dismissal to be 
enacted.
25 It was reduced from two years to one year in June 1999.
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contractual duty. Redundancy is taken as unfair on grounds of trade union affiliation or 
discrimination by sex, religion and race. Unlike other EU countries, British employers may 
use performance criteria, absenteeism, and health records as criteria when selecting for 
redundancy, and they have been widely used recently. (EDS 1995, p.423 - 424)
There is no statutory provision for severance compensation, apart from the 
redundancy payment. The amount of redundancy payment is based on age and the length of 
continuous services. Those aged between 41 and 64 are entitled to a sum of one and a half 
weeks' pay per year of service, up to a maximum of 20 years.
7.3.2.2. Regulations on the right of industrial action
Again, regulations on taking strike action are more comprehensive in France and 
Germany than in Britain. In France, the basic right to strike is guaranteed by the 
Constitution. Strikes unrelated to issues of collective bargaining, such as political strikes are 
illegal. Sympathy strikes, i.e., strikes in support of primary strikes, are legal if there is a clear 
link of interest with the primary strikers. There is no legal requirement to hold a ballot prior 
to a strike. However, public sector employees are obliged to announce a strike in advance. 
Under statute law, a strike is not a breach of contract. Since 1985, employees have had the 
right to be reinstated if they are unfairly dismissed on the ground of striking. Lockouts,26 
however, are generally considered by case law to be illegal in France.
The freedom to strike or lock out is guaranteed under the constitutional right of
freedom of association in Germany. Both strikes and lockouts should be exercised as
weapons of last resort - after other options of negotiation in collective bargaining have been
exhausted. Unlike in France, the right to lock out is equally recognised as a weapon in
industrial conflicts. The obligation to work and to pay wages is suspended during strike
action. A strike is a breach of contract for an employee only if he/she participates in an
illegal strike. In Germany these are strikes which are not directly related to collective
26. Whereas strikes are regarded as the ultimate bargaining tool by 
employees, lockouts are the ultimate measure by employers.
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bargaining, including political and sympathy strikes, though the latter can be legal in the case 
of direct relevance. Professional strikes are legal subject to secret ballot.
The right to strike is not recognised in the British legal framework. Consequently, 
striking is a breach of contract in Britain. This is in stark contrast to most EU countries 
where industrial action causes a suspension of contract. This implies that in Britain an 
employee can be fairly dismissed while he or she is participating in a strike or other industrial 
action. Since 1990, however, a distinction has been made between official and unofficial 
strikes. Since the 1992 Trade Union Act, strikes are approved as official only after the 
following complicated procedures have been followed: unions have to conduct a proper secret 
ballot by post, which should be held not more than four weeks before the strike action. The 
employer must be given at least seven days' notice of the ballot, together with details of those 
involved, and a sample copy of the ballot paper. Once the result is known, the employer must 
be a given the full details of the outcome and at least seven days' advanced notice of strike 
action, together with the details of those involved. (IDS 96a p.359) Only after these 
procedures have been properly taken, do strikers have immunity from prosecution. If a strike 
turns out to be unofficial, the employer can sue the trade unions (or the perpetrators) for civil 
damages through the courts. Even in the case of an official strike, employers may lawfully 
dismiss strikers for breach of contract if the dismissal is summary, including all the strikers. 
Political and sympathy strikes are illegal, and employees do not have any right to claim unfair 
dismissal in such a case.
On the other hand, there is no legal restriction on lockouts. Rather than lockouts, 
employers commonly resort to the tactic of the suspension of employees.
Therefore, regarding the regulation of industrial conflicts, the French law favours 
employees over employers, the British does the opposite, and German law tries to take a more 
balanced stance.
Stringent regulations on strikes like those in Britain do not necessarily prevent 
industrial conflicts taking place.
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Table 7.2. Industrial conflict: the volume of working days lost per 1,000 employees in employment
1991-92 1993 1994 1995 1996
Germany 9 18 7 8 3
Britain 49 30 13 19 58
France 27 49 40 138 59
N.B. The first column is the annual average of two years.
Source: Visser(1998)_____________________________________________________________________________
Despite its relatively tolerant regulation, the number of industrial conflicts is much 
lower in Germany than in Britain. This reflects the cooperative nature of industrial relations 
in Germany. Confirming the confrontational nature of their industrial relations surveyed in 
section 7.3.1, France in particular, and Britain show high rates of disruption by industrial 
conflicts. This suggests that though norms are important, the reality of how regulations affect 
industrial relations is very much a result of the specific power relations among the actors in 
industrial relations - employers, employees and the state in a given society.
7.3.2.3. The level of regulation and the extent of employment protection
In France, industrial conflict and legal intervention by the state rather than collective 
bargaining have been the dominant mechanism of rule making in industrial relations. In this 
sense, the dominant level of regulation is the law rather than collective bargaining. In 
Germany, labour laws set minimum conditions only. Many areas of practice in industrial 
relations are regulated by law. However, the law merely sets out a framework for collective 
bargaining: social partners have some flexibility in interpreting the law according to their 
needs. This tendency became even more pronounced recently with the increasing use of 
"opening clauses" in sectoral collective agreements, as mentioned in 7.3.1.3.3. Thus, it could 
be argued that the dominant level is a combination of both law and collective bargaining. 
The law merely sets out a framework, and collective bargaining defines more suitable 
regulations for the negotiating parties. Britain, with its tradition of common law, does not
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share the same legal tradition with France and Germany. Thus, British labour laws can be 
easily abolished or introduced as the government changes. For instance, all provisions 
regarding compulsory arbitration in the case of unions seeking recognition from employers, 
introduced under the 1975 Employment Protection Act, were removed by the 1980 
Employment Act. Therefore, company level bargaining and rules are the dominant level of 
regulation in Britain.
The different legal tradition of common law implies that, unlike in the Roman- 
Germanic legal framework, in Britain there are no collective rights for workers, guaranteed 
by the highest level of law, the constitution. As the legislation enacted since 1979 curbed 
trade union power, British workers are considerably worse off legally in terms of strikes and 
dismissals than their continental counterparts. Among the three countries, French workers 
enjoy the most favourable legal framework in respect to industrial action, whereas German 
workers seem to have the most protective legal framework for regulations regarding 
dismissal.
These factors imply that the British regulatory framework is most suited for external 
adjustment of the labour market. On the other hand, the French and German legal structures 
and regulations contain many costly procedures for employers to follow if they want to 
dismiss employees, thereby facilitating internal rather than external adjustment.
7.3.4. Social security regimes
This brief section deals with a comparison of social security regimes regimes related 
to labour markets in three countries. Social security issues are at the same time separated 
from and overlapping with labour market issues. As explained in section 7.3, the social 
security regime is strongly interrelated to the working of the labour market regime. Taken 
together, one can explore the social characteristics of labour market regimes much more 
comprehensively. Here I shall only examine the social security regime insofar as it is directly 
related to the labour market. Rather than going into the details of social protection schemes, I
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will characterise the differences only at the macro-institutional level. Following Boyer 
(1988) and Ferrera (1996), I compare extent (eligibility), level of benefits, financing and 
organisational arrangements of social security regimes.
There are four types of institutional frameworks underpinning welfare regimes in 
Europe.27 The first is the Scandinavian model, where eligibility is fully universal, with high 
levels of benefits. General taxation plays a predominant role in financing. Central and local 
authorities are responsible for service provision. The only exception is unemployment 
insurance which is voluntary, managed by the trade unions with a heavy subsidy by the state. 
The second is the liberal model where full universality exists only in the health area. Other 
benefits related to social assistance are means-tested, and amounts are small. The system of 
financing is mixed: health is financed by tax but cash benefits are financed by social security 
contributions. Public administration takes charge of providing services. The social partners 
do not have any significant role in managing social security provision. The third is the 
Bismarckian model where the coverage is conditional on employment or family status. The 
principle of insurance underlies the level and structure of benefits, which are mostly eamings- 
related, and the method of financing. Different regulations apply to different occupational 
groups. The coverage is very extensive, but additionally there are social assistance benefits 
to fill remaining gaps. Generally, the benefits are more generous than in the liberal model. 
Financing is mostly through professional funds, i.e., through social security contributions by 
employers and employees. The social partners participate actively in governing the insurance 
schemes: Though marginal, they have some autonomy from public authorities, especially in 
the area of health insurance. The fourth is the Latin model where the institutional 
arrangements for social protection follow a mixed pattern. Latin countries have highly 
fragmented and somehow unbalanced systems of welfare : with a Bismarckian income 
maintenance system, very generous pension schemes, but no national minimum income, 
which implies a severe gap in coverage. Taxation pays for health care, and the rest is
27. Esping-Andersen (1990) has classified three rather than four welfare 
regimes, but he did not examine the countries belonging to the 
Mediterranean model.
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financed by social security contributions. The social partners play a role in benefits related to 
income maintenance, but states increasingly control the health sector. (Ferrera p.4-6)
In accordance with the above classification, Britain belongs to the liberal model, 
whereas both France and Germany fit into the Bismarckian model. The generous benefits in 
France and Germany are maintained by large amounts of social security contributions, which 
accounts for the considerable gap or wedge between labour costs and take-home pay, i.e., the 
tax wedge. Both France and Germany exhibit high average and marginal tax wedges28. For 
example in 1993, for a single person earning the average gross wage of a male manual worker 
in industry, non-wage costs accounted for nearly 50% of total labour cost (gross wage) in 
France and Germany, in contrast to only about 30% in Britain.29 Employers' social security 
contributions in France were almost 27% of their gross wage whereas they were 17% in 
Germany and 10% in Britain. In Britain, employers pay no contribution for employees on 
very low wages, i.e., below around 20% of average earnings. In Britain, however, many 
employers contribute to private pension schemes on behalf of their employees, which pushes 
up the de facto (inclusive of non-statutory contributions) rate of social contributions.
Social security contributions are merely a component of indirect labour costs, though 
by far the biggest one. Other components include contributions to vocational training and to 
private insurance schemes.30 Results from a Labour Cost Survey in 1992 indicate that among 
the three countries France has by far the highest indirect labour costs, which accounted for 
31.4% of total labour costs in 1992. Britain had the lowest with around 15.4%, and Germany 
was in the middle with 22.9%.31
28. The average tax wedge stands for the sum of employees' and employers' 
social security contributions and personal income tax as a percentage of 
gross labour cost, i.e., gross wages plus employers' social security 
contributions. The marginal tax wedge is defined as percentages of any 
marginal increase in gross labour costs as a result of an increase in 
employees' and employers' social security contributions and personal income 
tax. (OECD 1997)
29. One should note, however, that the disposable income of employees with 
families increases drastically with tax incentives and family/child 
allowances in all European countries. This is particularly the case in 
France.
30. Bonuses and holiday pay are accounted for as direct costs.
31. All figures in this section are from Eurostat (1997a) .
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The duration of unemployment benefits is indefinite in all three countries.32 
However, there are significant differences in the conditionality and the level of benefits. Here 
again, there is a dichotomy between the continental countries and Britain. In all three 
countries, one has to work a certain amount of time before qualifying for unemployment 
benefits. The qualifying condition for maximum duration of benefits in France is 5 years of 
employment, and in Germany, 3 years. In Britain, however, it is not the duration of work but 
a certain level of insurance contribution which is needed to qualify for insurance benefits. 
Only about 11 weeks of work at the 1988 earnings of an average production worker were 
needed to qualify in 1989.33 Such drastic differences in eligibility are reflected by the amount 
granted in unemployment benefits. In 1993, the initial replacement rate, i.e. the disposable 
income receivable in benefits and assistance when unemployed in relation to that when in 
work, for a 35 year-old single person who was on average earnings when in work with a ten- 
year employment record was 80% in France, 61% in Germany and 41% in Britain. After 2 
years of unemployment, the replacement rate was still over 70% of disposable income in 
France, 57% in Germany, and 41% in Britain.34 Unlike in France and Germany, 
unemployment benefits are calculated as a flat rate rather than a proportion of previous 
earnings in Britain. This method of calculation is rooted in the philosophy underlying the 
British labour market/welfare regime: in contrast to the continent, in Britain, benefits are 
fixed to meet the basic needs of the individual or of families rather than to replace previous 
earnings. The French and German social security regimes - including unemployment benefits 
- are occupationally oriented, whereas that of British is universally oriented.
The organisational management of unemployment benefits also exhibits differences 
between France, Britain and Germany. In France and Germany, benefits are financed through 
contributions by employers and employees. In France, an autonomous bipartite body 
(comprised of employers and trade unions) administers unemployment benefits. In Germany,
32. In Britain, however, the maximum benefit duration for unemployment 
insurance is 52 weeks. Afterwards, it switches to a guaranteed minimum 
income scheme, depending on the level of household income of the 
unemployed.
33. Data are taken from OECD (1991), p.201
34 All figures are from European Commission. (1995).
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reflecting the federal structure, they are managed at the state (Land) and local offices of the 
Federal Employment Institute, an independent public agency. In Britain, in contrast to its 
continental counterparts, unemployment benefits are financed not through a separate 
unemployment insurance contribution, but through a general social security contribution by 
employers and employees, the National Insurance Fund. The Department of Health and 
Social Security is responsible for administering unemployment benefits within the social 
security system.
The social security regimes briefly presented in this section show clear differences 
between France, Germany and Britain. France and Germany share a similar macro- 
institutional framework for their welfare systems, a similar level and a similar institutional 
arrangement of unemployment benefits. Britain, on the other hand, has a different kind of 
welfare regime and consequently, the level and system of unemployment benefits differs 
considerably from the two Bismarckian countries.
7.4 Labour market regime differences and their implications
The differences between the labour market regimes of the three countries investigated 
are all encompassing - from the institutional framework to collective bargaining, from the 
regulatory framework to social security regimes: in all these areas, the three countries 
maintain distinct institutional differences. Multi-unionism, ineffectiveness of social partners 
to manage industrial relations and the strong state's presence - whether in day-to-day matters 
or in decision-making on the overall climate of industrial relations - are common features to 
both France and Britain. Through the Auroux law, the French government has tried to 
impose a structure of industrial relations similar to Germany through industrial democracy. 
As Lane (1989) puts it, the statutory framework does not always coincide with the industrial 
relations in practice (p.209), as it has to interact with the underlying institutional framework. 
Consequently, despite the drastic differences in the legal framework between Britain and 
France, the abilities of social partners to manage industrial relations in both countries are
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equally poor. In terms of the system of collective bargaining, there is a growing tendency 
towards decentralisation, though the background against which decentralisation takes place is 
different in the three countries. In France, it was to promote trade union power at the plant 
level: in Germany, it was to increase industrial democracy; but in Britain it was to diminish 
trade union power. Regarding the regulatory structure, one can again see a clear contrast 
between the continental economies which have rigid structures to ensure employees' rights 
enshrined in the constitution and Britain where there is no universal over-arching legal 
structure. This contrast is again reflected by the clear differences between the social regimes 
of France, Germany, and Britain. In both regulatory and social security regimes, France and 
Germany share a similar ideology and institutional framework. As a consequence, the rules 
and conditions - regulations on dismissal and rights to strike in the regulatory regime, the 
level of non-wage costs and unemployment benefits in the social security regime - are 
comparable in the two countries. Britain, on the other hand, has a distinctively different 
regime in both areas. Consequently, its rules and conditions are very different from its 
continental counterparts.
All three countries' distinct national institutional, legal and social characteristics are 
reflected in their respective labour market regimes, with the British institutional, legal and 
social regime fundamentally different from both the French and the German regimes. The 
diversity of European labour markets is greater than what could be expected from the 
differences in the structure of production, and it reflects the importance of socio-cultural and 
institutional differences.
Table 7.3 below summarises the labour market characteristics of the three countries.
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Table 7.3. Labour Market Regime Characteristics
Germany Britain France
Organised interests 
unions and employers
of Highly organised, disciplined 
and stable
Fragmented and volatile Rivalry among members and 
volatile
Relations between unions 
and employers
Balanced Unstable / employer-led weakness on both sides / 
larger role for state
Collective bargaining
Dominant level Sector but flexibility at the 
workplace level
Company Sector but increasingly 
decentralised
Coverage Medium to high low Medium to high
Style Integrative Adversarial Confrontational
Pattern Stable Unstable Unstable
Coordination Considerable Absent Ineffective
Conflict low but highly organised Medium to high and dispersed High and spasmodic
Role of the state facilitating abstaining in day-to-day affairs 
but able to shape structure of 
industrial relations
interventionist
Regulation High employment protection Low employment protection High employment protection
Collective civil rights 
workers
of guaranteed by law Not guaranteed Guaranteed by law
Social security coverage High Low High
Welfare state State is compensator of first 
resort
State encourages market- 
oriented workfare.
State is compensator of first 
resort
Regarding differences in the mode of industrial relations and collective bargaining 
among the three countries, German-style industrial relations should promote internal rather 
than external forms of adjustment, as social partners have more integrative and stable 
relations. In both Britain and France, industrial relations regimes tend to promote external 
forms of adjustment, since social partners do not have an effective institutionalised forum for 
cooperation. Coordination is either absent or ineffective due to the lack of institutions in 
Britain and the lack of cohesive representation among social partners in France. As for the 
regulatory framework and social policies, there is more similarity between France and 
Germany than with Britain. They both protect individual and collective labour rights. In
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Britain, an universal legal framework does not exist regarding these matters, and industrial 
relations are regulated in the spirit of voluntarism. The degree of employment protection is 
high in the former two countries and low in Britain. Social security coverage in the three 
countries shows the same characteristics. These factors suggest that French and German 
regulatory and social regimes promote an internal mode of labour market adjustment, 
whereas the British regimes lend themselves to external adjustment. In sum, the dominant 
mode of labour market adjustment judged from the respective labour market institutions is as 
follows: Germany is internally-oriented, Britain is externally-oriented, and France seems to 
be both externally and internally-oriented.
7.5. Diverse character of labour market institutions and its implication for monetary union
The institutional differences of labour markets in the three countries have not yet been 
reduced by the pressure for globalisation. Rather, globalisation and the process of European 
integration in the 1990s seem to have reinforced the dichotomy between continental 
European countries and Britain. This is contrary to the expectation that the pressure on 
labour costs from globalisation would produce convergence. This external pressure has 
certainly facilitated the trend towards labour market flexibility. At the same time, however, it 
has reinforced the existing pattern of two distinctively different paths of labour market 
adjustments - one predominantly characterised by internally- and the other characterised 
predominantly by externally-oriented labour market flexibility. This distinguishes labour 
markets from other product markets: the labour market is a social institution, and thus its 
reaction to external pressure differs from one society to another. In practice, the differences 
are partly induced by the British reluctance to harmonise labour market practices within the 
EU. However, it is mostly due to the differences in historical traditions and social 
preferences, as mentioned above. Since all these countries are core EU countries with similar 
income levels, these differences signify compelling evidence for different national social 
preferences in the efficiency versus redistribution trade-off. (Bean et al. 1998) They solidify
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different preferences and behaviour regarding labour market adjustment. Monetary union 
requires more intensive and broader economic policy coordination among member states. 
However, it looks difficult for countries with such fundamental differences in economic and 
social organisation to agree on economic policies which would not contradict each other and 
which would bring about the system-wide cohesion of Europe as an economic unit. The next 
chapter deals in more detail with labour market behaviour in the three countries by examining 
LMF in detail.
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Chapter 8
Labour Market Regimes in Europe 3: Operationalising the criteria of labour market
flexibility
Having studied the concepts of the LMF and labour market institutions, this chapter 
presents an empirical comparison of labour market regimes in France, Germany and Britain. 
I shall mostly use data from the European Commission and the OECD, as their data 
classifications are internationally compatible.1
The objective of this chapter is two-fold: first, it is an attempt to show objectively 
how and in which areas French, German and British labour markets are flexible. Second, by 
doing so, one can classify labour market regimes as either externally or internally oriented. 
Following Jenkinson and Beckerman (1986), I define flexibility as how far and how fast 
wages, numerical and functional factors adjust to aid in equilibrating the labour market. 
(p.25) One has to distinguish the concept of flexibility from variability. Flexibility means 
more than the variability. Flexibility focuses on the degree of response to a given change, 
such as changes in output, or unemployment rates. I shall use regression analyses to examine 
the degree of flexibility in labour cost and numerical flexibility. Given the nature of 
functional flexibility, it is difficult to quantify. Therefore, it will be analysed with more 
qualitative means.
8.1. Labour cost flexibility
This is the only area of LMF, for which quantitative indicators can be used without 
reservation. Since I will focus on the flexibility of wages, I shall not use conventional wage 
equations, as some economists do.2 Instead, I shall examine the simple relationship between 
output and real and nominal wages. Following the standard approach taken by Nickell 
(1979), Golden (1990), and Hashimoto and Raisian (1992), I shall use regression analysis to
1. For detailed sources of data, see appendix.
2. For example, Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988), Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1995).
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estimate the responsiveness of real and nominal wages to the changing level of output, to 
show how elastic wages are relative to output changes. The regressions take the following 
simple form:
In Zjt = c + a  T + 3 In Yjt + ejt (i)
where In Z is the logarithm of a variable chosen, such as real and nominal wages, c is 
constant, T is the time trend, In Y is the logarithm of real GDP. a  and 3 denote the 
regression coefficients, and e is an error term. The subscripts j and t denote, respectively, the 
country and year of the observations. Following the time serious technique, the first 
difference of the variables are taken as follows, and the estimations are made using the 
ordinary least square:
Ain Zjt = c + a  T + 3 Ain Yjt + e[t (2)
where A denotes the first-difference operator. The coefficient 3 shows the percentage 
change in the chosen variable as GDP changes 1 %. The bigger the absolute numbers of 
coefficients, the larger the impact of changes in output on the chosen variable. This means 
labour market performance is more responsive to changes in output and is thus more flexible. 
The sign of the coefficient is also very important: by estimating the coefficients, one can also 
study if output and the chosen variables relate procyclically or counter-cyclically. If the 
coefficients show positive values, the variables relate to output procyclically. If they are 
negative, they do so countercyclically.
In addition, aggregate real labour costs defined in section 8.1.1. are also estimated 
here with the following regression.
Ain Wjt = c + c|) Ain IIjt + ejt
Ain Wjt = c + r  Ain nit+ W Ain Yjt + ejt
(3)
(4)
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where W stands for nominal or real wages and n is an index of productivity. r and 
W are coefficients, indicating the responsiveness of real wages to productivity and output 
respectively.
Table 8.1 and 8.2 show the result of the regression using equations (2) - (4). The 
definition and sources of the data used, as well as a simple statistical interpretation are 
compiled in the appendix at the end of this chapter.
Table 8.1. Responsiveness of Nominal Wages: 1962-96
France Germany Britain
Estimated Coefficients
GDP t -1.631
(-3.14)
GDPm  0.436 0.651
(1.06) (1.84)
Productivity t -1.791
(-2.92)
Productivity t. j 0.593 1.186
(1.12) (2.71)
Constant 0.063 0.061 0.054 0.067 0.106 0.107
(4.13) (3.59) (3.99) (5.22) (6.84) (6.46)
Number of observations 34 34 33 33 35 35
R-squared 0.034 0.038 0.192 0.098 0.231 0.205
Standard error of regression 0.046 0.046 0.042 0.045 0.609 0.062
N.B. T ratios are in parentheses. 
For data, see appendix.
The results in table 8.1 indicate that changes in German nominal wages are more 
responsive to changes in GDP and productivity than for the French equivalent. The British 
results are contrary to expectation, since both coefficients show negative signs. When GDP 
and productivity go up, wages should go up as well. Thus, the coefficients of both GDP and 
productivity should have positive signs, as the French and German cases exhibit. The French 
results, however, may be ruled out as insignificant, as their t ratios are too small.
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Table 8.2. Responsiveness of real wages: 1962-96
France Germany Britain
Estimated
Coefficients
GDP t 0.567 0.556 0.223
(4.21) (4.89) (1.57)
GDP t-i 0.427 0.411 0.189
(3.12) (5.27) (1.30)
Productivity t 0.809 0.430 0.791 0.751 0.295 0.339
(4.92) (2.26) (5.69) (7.26) (1.81) (1.97)
Productivity t.j
Constant 0.008 0.003 -0.001 0.008 0.003 -0.007 0.014 0.013 0.009
(1.55) (0.55) (-0.18) (2.07) (0.81) (-1.99) (3.52) (3.08) (1.39)
Number of 35 35 34 34 34 33 35 35 34
observation
R-squared 0.351 0.424 0.509 0.427 0.503 0.735 0.069 0.09 0.127
Standard error of 0.015 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.013 0.009 0.166 0.016 0.016
regression
F-statistic 16.044 41.543 2.25
N.B. T ratios are in parentheses.
The results shown in table 8.2 indicate that the responsiveness of real wages to 
changes in GDP is about the same in France and Germany, whereas it is much lower in 
Britain. The same argument applies for the responsiveness of real wages to productivity 
changes. If GDP and productivity are estimated together, however, the results for the two 
countries diverge. Whereas the responsiveness to GDP changes stays about the same in 
Germany and France, that to change in productivity differs: German responsiveness is much 
higher than its French equivalent. The British result, again, shows low sensitivity to both 
changes in GDP and productivity when they are regressed together. However the weaker t- 
ratios of British results suggest that these figures should be interpreted with caution, as they 
are not statistically significant enough. The F statistic in the British case indicates that the 
changes in GDP and productivity are not jointly significant.
The estimation result for aggregate wage flexibility in tables 8.1 and 8.2 show that 
German real and nominal wages are both very sensitive to changes in productivity. This 
result reflects that in Germany's institutional wage bargaining system, trade unions 
negotiating wage rises in line with productivity rises.3 As far as real wage flexibility is 
concerned, the degree of flexibility in France and Germany is more or less the same for 
responsiveness to output changes. The British results are statistically significant for nominal
3. For example, see Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) (1996) .
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wages, but contrary to expectations. Those for real wages are not statistically significant, 
thus no decisive argument can be made. If one allows a certain level of statistical leeway, 
however, the regression analyses on aggregate wage flexibility indicate a higher aggregate 
real wage flexibility in Germany and France than in Britain.4
Chart 8.1: Social Security Contributions (as Percentages of GDP at Market
Prices)
25 T
20
West Germany
Germany
France
UK- o -
co CDCO
Source: Eurostat
Chart 8.1 shows that the proxy of non-wage labour costs, social security 
contributions, are much higher in France and Germany than in Britain.5 One can observe a 
convergence between France and Germany in the 1990s. The low level of social security 
contribution implies that Britain is much more flexible than in Germany or in France in terms 
of non-wage costs.
In Germany, workers with lower incomes, i.e., with regular weekly working hours of 
less than 15 hours and earnings of no more than DM 590 for the old Lander of DM 500 for 
the new Lander are exempted from social security contributions. The government is aiming 
to reduce social security contributions paid equally by employee and employer, and to reduce
4 These results are supported by Coe (1985), though he uses wage equations 
in his estimation.
5 Social security contributions represent around 90% of non-wage labour 
costs in France and Germany and around 80% in Britain in 1992. The 
statistics are taken from Eurostat (1997a).
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taxes to enhance the competitiveness of the German economy. Labour cost reduction is one 
of the key economic and employment policies in France. However, it has so far only 
implemented a reduction in sickness insurance contributions for low-wage employees, 
payable by employers. In addition, the law of December 1993 introduced a progressive 
reduction until 1998 in the family allowance contributions payable by employers for wages 
between 1 and 1.6 times the SMIC (French national minimum wage). The law of June 1996 
stipulates that state aid is given in the form of an exemption from social security 
contributions to companies which reduce their employees' working hours by at least 10% in 
exchange for an increase in employment by an equivalent proportion. In Britain, there have 
also been reductions in national insurance contributions for low earners. Thus, the gap 
between Britain and continental economies seems to persist.
As for relative labour cost flexibility, there are no internationally comparable data for 
the spectrum of productivity in industrial subsectors or regions. The OECD industrial 
structure statistics provides comparable statistics for an industrial breakdown of production, 
employment and wages and salaries. However, these statistics are only available from 1983 
onwards, i.e., there are not enough observations for time series regressions. In addition, for 
Germany and Britain, the statistics for the service sector - the biggest contributor regarding 
production and employment - are missing for the whole period. Therefore, instead of a 
regression analysis, trends in earning dispersion are used to analyse relative wage flexibility. 
Relative labour cost flexibility regarding the skill level cannot be directly observed. Thus, as 
proxies, I shall examine occupational and educational wage differentials. Table 8.3. show the 
trends in earning dispersion since the 1980s. D1 and D9 refer to the upper earning limit of, 
respectively, the first and the ninth deciles of employees ranked in order of their earnings 
from lowest to highest. In other words, 10% of employees earn less than the D1 earning 
threshold and 90% earn less than the D9 earning threshold. Thus, D9/D1 can be used as an 
indicator for the dispersion of earnings.
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Table 8.3.: Trends in earnings dispersion 1983-1995 
Total, D9/D1
France Germany Britain
1983 3.14 2.69 2.96
1986 3.17 2.59 3.09
1989 3.28 2.46 3.27
1992 3.26 2.44 3.31
1993 3.26 2.31 3.32
1994 3.28 3.31
1995 3.38
Source: Author's calculation from OECD Employment outlook (1996) pp. 61-62.
Table 8.3. indicates that the earnings dispersion has been growing in both France and 
Britain, but diminishing in Germany. The Germans also have the lowest absolute level of 
dispersion among the three countries. This suggests that Germany is the least flexible among 
the three in terms of relative wage flexibility. The absolute level of dispersion between 
France and Britain has been similar. However, whereas the growth rate of dispersion for 
France was only about 4.5% in a decade, it was about 14% for Britain. In other words, since 
the 1980s, Britain has increasingly become flexible regarding relative wage flexibility, and in 
the 1990s, it has superseded France and become the most flexible country among the three.
Table 8.4. : Relative earnings of persons 25 to 64 years of age with income from employment by level of educational attainment and 
gender in 1994
Upper secondary education =100
Men Women
Lower Upper Non- university- Lower Upper Non­ University-
secondary secondary university level secondary secondary university level
education education tertiary education education education tertiary education
education education
France 85 100 134 187 75 100 131 165
Germany 97 100 116 167 81 100 111 162
Britain 79 100 119 164 66 100 150 204
Source: OECD Education at a Glance (1996), p.242
Table 8.4.1.: Earnings dispersion by skill levels
University-level education / lower secondary education in
1994
Men Women
France 2.20 2.20
Germany 1.72 2.00
Britain 2.08 3.09
Source: Calculated from table 8.4.
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Tables 8.4 and 8.4.1 present earning differences by level of education, a proxy of skill 
levels. Again, Germany shows the lowest degree of dispersion among the three. For male 
relative wage flexibility, France is most flexible, whereas for female relative wage flexibility, 
Britain is by far the most flexible in 1994. Except for France, there is a wider dispersion for 
women than for men. This is probably because unskilled women earn much lower wages 
than unskilled men. Tables 8.3 to 8.4.1 consistently indicate that Germany is the least 
flexible country regarding relative wage flexibility, whereas Britain is the most flexible.
Finally, there are two labour market institutions to be taken into account - wage 
indexation6 and minimum wage legislation. The former is no longer practised in the 
countries I study here. The latter exists legally in France and at a sectoral level in Germany, 
and will be re-introduced in the UK. The institutional setting of minimum wages varies: in 
France, a statutory minimum wage (SMIC) is set by the government. It is reviewed at least 
annually by the government in order to ensure an annual increase in purchasing power 
equivalent to at least half of the increase in hourly wage rates. In Germany, there is no 
statutory minimum wage. However, minimum standards are established by collective 
agreements which can be made binding through extension. Minimum wages vary by age and 
qualifications in both countries. Furthermore, in Germany, there are some differences across 
regions and industries. In Britain, the level of a statutory national minimum wage is under 
discussion by the government's Low Pay Commission: it is composed of representatives from 
employer bodies (particularly in industrial sectors where low pay is a problem), trade unions 
and independent bodies. The government will make the final decision on what the minimum 
wage will be. This institutional arrangement may resemble more the French than the German 
system, with national minima varying according to age and training. As for the level of 
minimum wages, a statutory minima in France was 50% of average earnings in 1993, an 
average minimum wage in Germany was 55% of average earnings in 1991. In Britain,
6. Wage indexation is a mechanism for periodic adjustments in the nominal 
value of wage contracts in line with movements in a specified price index. 
It is believed to have fuelled wage inflation in the 1970s.
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minimum wages used to be set by Wages councils by industry before 19937: they were 40% 
of average wages in 1993.8 As mentioned in section 7.1.1, there is no conclusive evidence of 
the adverse effect of minimum wages on employment. Nevertheless, the low level of 
minimum wages relative to average earnings in Britain is another indicator that Britain is the 
most flexible country in terms of relative wage flexibility.
8.2 Numerical flexibility
Unlike labour cost flexibility, numerical flexibility cannot be analysed by statistical 
analysis alone. Therefore, I shall introduce a number of statistical indicators, which reveal 
some of the picture. In addition, institutional factors introduced in chapter 7 have to be taken 
into account to complement the statistical analysis.
A general indicator of internal numerical flexibility is to measure how working hours
responded to changes in output. As in the previous section, I examine the degree of
responsiveness by estimating the equation (2). Larger positive coefficients indicate higher
pro-cyclical sensitivity of working hours to economic growth or decline, i.e., flexibility. A
coefficient not significantly greater than zero indicates that changes in working hours are not
sensitive to changes in output, implying the existence of rigidity in the response of working
hours to output._______________________________________
Table 8.5. Responsiveness of working hours: 1962-95
France Germany Britain
Estimated coefficients 
GDP t 0.24 0.43 0.266
(2.78) (4.91) (2.84)
Time trend 0.001 0.001 0.001
(2.68) (1.97) -2.24
Constant -0.022 -0.024 -0.014
(-3.79) (-4.45) (-2.85)
Number of observation 33 34 33
R-squared 0.225 0.439 0.275
Standard Error of Regression 0.007 0.011 0.011
N.B. T ratios are in parentheses.
7. The 1993 Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act abolished all 
wages councils except in agriculture.
0. Figures are from EIRR 266, p. 16.
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The results in table 8.5 show all coefficients are positive to a different degree. 
Germany has the highest flexibility of working hours in response to changes in output among 
the three, and France and Britain have about the same degree of flexibility, both significantly 
lower than in Germany.
The flexibility of working hours is conditioned by some legal and contractual 
limitations to working time. Table 8.6 summarises the different regulatory arrangement in 
the three countries.
Table 8.6.: Regulations on working time
France Germany Britain
Statutory limit Reduced to 39 to 35 hours 
normal working per week, 
sectoral variations exists. 
Absolute maximum of 48 
hours per week. Statutory 
daily maximum are 10 hours.
48 hours per week, sectoral 
variations exists. Statutory 
daily maximum of 8 hours.
No general legislation.
Overtime 9 hours per week or 130 hours 
per year, or more if included in 
a collective agreement.
2 hours per day over a period 
of 6 months or 24 weeks, 
provided that the average 
working day does not exceed 8 
hours.
By agreement between 
employers and employees and 
their representatives.
Annual paid Leave 5 weeks. 24 days in all Bundesl&nder, 5 
- 6 weeks under collective 
agreements.
No legislation. Nearly 40% of 
full-time employees receive 
20-25 days of annual leave.
Flexibility options The 1993 five-year 
employment law encouraged 
annualised hours arrangement. 
By means of sectoral, 
company or enterprise-level 
collective agreement, 
employers may vary average 
daily and weekly working time 
over a specified reference 
period, around an agreed 
average, as long as statutory 
maxima are observed.
Greater flexibility in collective 
agreements, by averaging out 
over a longer period or on 
annual basis. For example, the 
35 working hour metal sector 
agreement in 1995 included a 
flexibility clause allowing 
employees to work up to a 
maximum of 38.8 hours a 
week, and overtime payments 
for hours worked over and 
above 38.8 hours.
Many companies have 
introduced annual hour 
schemes.
Source: European Commission (19971 Employment Observatory: tableau de bord 1996,. EIRR 278.280.281 C19971.
The reduction of working time is encouraged in France and Germany in the spirit of 
work-sharing. In France, the Jospin government proposed that a statutory limit of 35 hours 
per week should be phased in by 2000 for private sector companies employing more than 20 
people. fFinancial Times 11/12/97) It was passed as the Loi Aubry in June 1998. Many
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companies in France reduced working hours and employed extra staff instead, taking 
advantage of financial incentives given by the government. In Germany the reduction of 
working time in order to expand employment is the main bargaining issue at sectoral as well 
as plant-level collective bargaining. In the West German metal industry, a 35-hour working 
week has been introduced since October 1995, and IG Metall is aiming for a further reduction 
of the working week (possibly towards 30 hours) in order to safeguard more jobs. 
Volkswagen and Bayer, for example, struck working time reduction agreements to save jobs 
in summer 1997. In both countries, early retirement is also promoted as a measure to reduce 
the working hours of older workers and to recruit young unemployed persons or trainees in 
their place. Britain alone has been refusing to approve the EU level Working Time Directive 
of November 1993 (Council Dir 93/104/EC), and challenged its legal basis. However, the 
European Court of Justice dismissed the British application in November 1996. 
Consequently, Britain must, like other EU members, act to comply with the directive and 
incorporate its provisions into national law. The directive sets out a maximum weekly 
working time of 48 hours including overtime, a minimum leave period of four weeks per year 
and other conditions for minimum rests and night shifts. Although the Directive only 
required cosmetic changes in France and Germany, it requires Britain to introduce a 
completely new statutory framework.
Table 8.7.1. Flexible working by country
France Germany Britain
% allowing flexible working 46 83 44
of which % using:
Job sharing 23 7 17
Flexitime 59 89 47
Short-term contract working 59 50 46
Part-time working 46 59 85
Seasonal working 41 14 37
Working from home 9 13 24
Source: 3i European Enterprise Centre (1997)
Corresponding to the legal provision in table 8.6, the average hours actually worked 
are the longest in Britain. It is estimated that 16% of the total workforce worked more than
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48 hours a week, the maximum working week stipulated by the EU Working Time Directive. 
According to the enterprise survey results by 3i European Enterprise centre (1997), 47% of 
the British workforce work over 40 hours a week, whereas the corresponding figures are 10% 
in France and 14% in Germany. 44%, 83% and 68% of the workforce worked between 36 to 
40 hours per week in Britain, France and Germany respectively.9 German workers work the 
shortest hours per week among the three. On the other hand, table 8.7.1 reveals that Germany 
has the highest overall percentage of establishments practising flexible working. Tables 8.5 
to 8.7 also indicate that despite the fact that the German workforce works fewer hours, it is 
the most responsive to changing levels of output. These findings imply that first, there are 
factors other than regulation, such as a lower level of wages10 and a higher consumer debt 
ratio, which are the driving force behind the British workforce's longer hours working: 
second, it is difficult to rank internal numerical flexibility, as there are a number of different 
and conflicting indicators. One can probably argue as follows: as far as relative (de facto) 
adaptability is concerned, Germany is internally most flexible, but as far as absolute 
(potential) flexibility is concerned, Britain would score a higher ranking. Despite Germany's 
legal restriction, the results of table 8.5 indicate that Germany is the most internally 
numerically flexible country.
Data on atypical working included in table 8.7.2 - part-time, fixed-term and temporary 
contracts - are normally regarded as a benchmark for external numerical flexibility. Except 
for part-time permanent employees, whose rights of non-discrimination were agreed upon by 
the European-level agreement on part-time work in June 1997, atypical workers are 
considered as peripheral staff.
9. Figures are from EIRR 281 (1997) and 3i European Enterprise Centre 
(1997) . The result of the latter is based on a survey taken in November and 
December 1996.
10. The same argument was made by European Industrial Relations 
Observatory. 1. 1997, p.8.
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Table 8.7.2. Atypical working (% total employed) in 1995
France Germany Britain
Part-time employment 15.6 16.3 24.1
fixed-term employment 12.3 10.4 7.0
Source: Eurostatfl996') Labour Force Survev 1995
Tables 8.7.1 and 8.7.2 both show that Britain has the highest proportion of part-time 
employees, and France has the highest proportion of fixed-term employees. In both France 
and Germany, part-time employment is increasingly a means to reduce unemployment 
through work-sharing. The use of fixed-term employment in France and Germany is an 
important means to create a more flexible workforce. In France, fixed-term employment is 
particularly high partly because of the high proportion of seasonal workers in the agricultural 
sector. According to the survey by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions (1994), the main reasons for the use of fixed-term employment are 
1) tasks only last for a fixed period, 2) fixed-term employees replace temporarily absent staff. 
By law, most employment rights of fixed-term employees are the same as that of permanent 
staff in France and Germany. There is no statutory right to equal rights with permanent staff 
in Britain, but employment protection laws even for full time employees are less strict than in 
France and Germany. Therefore, the use of fixed-term employees has more to do with the 
flexible handling of the workload than with the high labour costs. For employers, 
furthermore, it is a convenient way to control the (numerical) volume of the labour input, as 
in times of economic downturn, the contracts of fixed-term employees would simply not be 
renewed.
For more direct indicators of external numerical mobility, the regression result for the 
responsiveness of employment to changes in output can be used, from the regression analysis 
presented in equation (2). Again, a positive coefficient suggests that changes in the level of 
employment procyclically relate to changes in output: when output grows, employment 
grows, and vice versa. Larger coefficients means that employment changes are more 
sensitive to output fluctuation.
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Table 8.8. Responsiveness of employment: 1962-96
France Germany Britain
Estimated coefficients
GDPt 0.379 0.471 0.44
(6.87) (6.29) (3.86)
Time trend 0.001 0.001
(2.89) (3.30)
Constant -0.015 -0.022 -0.008
(-3.97) (-4.64) (-2.54)
Number of observation 35 34 35
R squared 0.638 0.57 0.311
Standard Error of Regression 0.004 0.009 0.013
N.B. T ratios are in parentheses.
Table 8.8 indicates that changes in the number of people employed in Germany are 
the most sensitive to changes in output. Thus, according to this result, Germany is the most 
externally numerically flexible country, followed by Britain and then France. This result is 
somehow unexpected, as the German labour market is believed to be one of the most rigid. 
However, this result confirms the findings of Hashimoto and Raisian (1992), who 
investigated the period between 1950-83.
In addition, statistics related to labour (occupational) mobility, such as job and labour 
turnover, and enterprise tenure indicate the degree of external numerical flexibility. Job 
turnover measures job flows by adding gross job gains and gross job losses. Labour turnover 
measures the flow of workers in and out of jobs (hires and separations - quits or layoffs). 
Enterprise tenure measures the length of service of employees. Yet, as Schettkat (1996) put 
it, the concepts and definitions of what is called labour market flow analysis are not yet 
standardised. Labour and job turnover are measured between two points of time. There is no 
consensus on how long the interval should be. This is a peculiar problem for flow analysis, 
as quarterly and annual data can present very different pictures.11 This is because with a 
shorter period of interval, temporary arrangements are also counted. For this reason many 
experts prefer the measurement to be on an annual basis. There are no internationally 
standardised data: national data on job and labour turnover in various countries are not
11Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) found that the job turnover rate in the US 
manufacturing industries during 1979 and 1983 ranged from 13% to 20% per 
year if measured on an annual basis. Based on quarterly data, on the other 
hand, results showed annual job turnover rates of between 31% and 57%.
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uniform and differ in terms of coverage, sources and reference periods. Though the OECD 
(1994,96a) attempted comparative studies, "accurate cross-country comparisons are hindered 
by often major differences in the type of data available." (OECD 1994, p. 127) Thus, rather 
than using these controversial set of data, I shall use more straight-forward and less 
statistically biased data on enterprise tenure.
Table 8.9. Distribution of employment by enterprise tenure, 1995
Current tenure (%)
France Germany Britain
Under 6 months 10.1 7.9 10.5
6 months and under 1 year 4.9 8.2 9.1
1 and under 2 years 8.0 9.4 10.7
2 and under 5 years 17.7 22.0 19.5
under 5 years 40.6 47.5 49.8
5 and under 10 years 17.4 17.2 23.5
10 and under 20 years 23.3 18.4 17.3
20 years and over 18.7 17.0 9.4
Average tenure (years)
Total 10.5 9.7 7.8
Men 11.0 10.6 8.9
Women 10.3 8.5 6.7
Median tenure (years)
Total 7.7 10.7 5.0
Average tenure by selected industries (years)
Manufacturing 12.1 10.8 9.0
Wholesale and retail trade 8.0 8.0 5.9
Hotels and restaurants 5.1 4.8 4.1
Transport, storage and 
communication
13.1 12.1 9.2
Financial intermediation 14.2 11.1 8.7
Real estate, renting and business 7.9 7.1 5.7
activities
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1997. p. 138-40.
Table 8.9 shows that Britain has the largest proportion of employees working short-tenure 
among the three countries. Germany shows the smallest proportion in this regard. The 
average tenure is longest in France and shortest in Britain. The median tenure in Germany is 
longer than in France, probably because many young people in France have shorter tenures. 
In 1995, the average tenure of the workforce aged between 15-24 years was 1.6 years, while 
it was 2.4 years and 2.2 years in France, Germany and Britain, respectively.12 Again, Britain
12. Figures are from OECD Employment Outlook. 1997, p.139.
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shows the shortest median tenure. In a selected industrial breakdown, France has the longest 
tenure in manufacturing and private service sectors, with Britain exhibiting the shortest 
tenure in all sectors, with Germany in the middle of the two extremes. The results indicate 
that France and Germany have lower short-term turnover (indicated by the proportion of 
workers with tenures less than one year) and higher long-term stability (indicated by average 
or median tenures), whereas Britain has higher short-term turnover and lower long-term 
stability in employment.
There are some institutional factors which pose constraints on labour mobility. They 
include the structure of the housing market, mutual recognition of professional qualifications, 
the non-portability of private pensions, and employment protection regulations (EPLs). In 
this thesis, I shall concentrate on EPLs as a primary factor to influence labour mobility. 
Albeit important, the housing market, recognition of qualifications, and pension portability 
are secondary factors affecting labour mobility. Therefore, I shall only briefly sketch the 
debate here. For Britain, research has shown that individuals who live in privately-rented 
housing tend to be more mobile geographically than owner-occupiers or those living in 
publicly-rented housing.13
Table 8.10 Breakdown of housing by tenure (%)
in 1980s
France West Germany Britain
Owner-occupied 51 37 67
Privately-rented 23 45 7
Municipal )18 )18 23
Social ) ) 3
N.B.: "Municipal" refers to local government and state-owned housing.
"Social" refers to housing association, co-operative and equivalent
semi-public housing.
Source: Drake (1991)
As table 8.10 shows, the higher house ownership ratio and municipal housing 
(publicly-rented accommodation) in Britain relative to continental economies suggests that 
the potential barrier to mobility in Britain may be higher than on the continent. Professional
13 For details, see Hughes and McCormick (1987).
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qualifications are still a reflection of the idiosyncratic regimes of national educational and 
vocational training, and are not mutually recognised. This is a problem particularly for a 
skilled workforce and hampers their mobility outside the country where they acquired their 
qualifications. EU citizens are legally free to work anywhere within the EU, but the lack of 
mutual recognition of professional skill is, along with the language barrier, a predominant 
reason for the lack of intra-EU labour mobility.14 Unlike public pension schemes, private 
pension schemes are generally not portable once employees are disassociated from the 
company - the pension fund provider. The level of retirement benefits is a function of years 
of service and average earnings. This may create a disincentive for changing the employer, 
particularly for older workers. Higher reliance on private pensions in Britain may also create 
a potential barrier to labour mobility. Unlike the traditional 'defined benefit scheme', the 
portability problem does not arise with 'defined contribution funds'. The main difference 
between defined benefit and defined contribution schemes is the distribution of risk between 
the member and the sponsor: in the former system, members trade wages for pensions at the 
long-term average rate of return in the capital market, while employers bear the investment 
risk, topping up benefits if the fund proves inadequate. In the latter system, all the risk of 
returns caused by the capital market fluctuation is bome by employees. In Britain, for 
example, those retired in 1974 often had pensions less than half of the value of those retiring 
in 1973, due to the bad performance of capital markets. (Davis p. 17) In Britain, the defined 
contribution system was only used by 14% of occupational pension funds members in 1991. 
Increasingly, however, many firms are switching or applying the defined contribution system 
to new employees. In Continental Europe, the pension fund investments are still in their 
infancy. The majority of private pension funds consist of defined benefit schemes, where 
portability is a problem. This is one reason why the Trade Union Congress is pushing the 
issue of portability of pensions at both domestic and European level.15
14 For a discussion of the reasons for low labour mobility in the EU, see 
European Economy (1995), table 29.
15 Based on the interview with Dave Feickert, European Officer, at TUC 
office in Brussels on 19/06/97.
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Employment protection laws (EPLs) directly influence firing and hiring behaviour of 
firms, by setting rules governing unfair dismissal, layoffs, severance payments, minimum 
notice periods, administrative authorisation for dismissals and prior discussion with labour 
representatives. The previous chapter explained regulatory arrangements related to 
dismissals. This section interprets the strictness of employment protection by ordinal scaling. 
Each indicator in each country is to be ranked in a scale from 0 to 3, where higher score 
(ranking) indicates stricter EPLs. Ordinary scaling gives numbers according to the order or 
preferences of a set of objectives, but not at regular intervals. Number 3 is higher in ranking 
than number 2 or 1. However, these numbers can indicate ranking only, and cannot tell how 
much or to what degree number 3 is stricter than lower numbers. For those indicators where 
rankings are already available from existing studies, a re-adjustment of scaling has been 
undertaken where necessary. The simple sum of the ranking numbers would show the 
relative degree of protection among the three - the larger the sum, the stricter the EPLs.
Table 8.11 introduces the ranking of EPLs from different sources. The ranking of the 
OECD (1994) comes from the evaluation of inconveniences in the administrative procedure 
for individual dismissal, notice periods, severance pay, and the degree of difficulty in 
dismissal concerning the definition of unfair dismissal, trial period, compensation and 
reinstatement. The International Organisation of Employers (IOE) classified regulatory 
constraints as insignificant (score 0), minor (for termination of regular contracts), 
insignificant or minor (for fixed-term contracts) (both score 1), serious (score 2) or 
fundamental (score 3). A ranking by Bertola (1990) is based upon his reading of various 
evidence provided by Emerson (1988), based on an EC Ad Hoc Survey undertaken in 1985. 
The update of this survey, the EC Ad Hoc Survey (1995), is based on questionnaires sent to 
employers regarding the obstacles to employing more people, (table 5, p.78). Taking the EU 
country which has the highest percentage of employers complaining about insufficient 
flexibility in hiring and shedding staff as score 3, the percentage results of replies of the 
employers in three countries are adjusted to the scaling below.
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Table 8.11. Ranking of the strictness of EPLs
Source OECD (1994) IOE (1985) Bertola EC Ad Hoc Total
(1990) survey (1995)
France 2 2.5 2.4 2.4 9.3
Germany 2.3 2.5 1.8 2.3 8.9
Britain 0.3 0.5 1.2 1.5 3.5
The total index of strictness of EPLs is highest in France, followed by the slightly 
lower score for Germany, and then the much lower score for Britain. The ranking between 
France and Germany is very close by any scaling. OECD (1994) ranked German EPLs 
stricter than France's, because Germany scored much higher in difficulty of dismissal than 
France, by having a wider definition of unfair dismissal (as mentioned in Chapter 7), longer 
trial periods, higher levels of compensation, and the obligation of reinstatement. Bertola 
(1990), on the other hand, considers France to be stricter than Germany, because he takes 
account of enterprise tenures and the annual average of new recruits and separations. Job 
turnover in 1982 shown in Emerson (1988) indicates much lower turnover in France than in 
Germany. The very low ranking of the British EPLs corresponds to the institutional analysis 
in chapter 7.
Tables 8.9 and 8.11 both point to a shorter enterprise tenure and lax EPLs in Britain. 
They also show longer tenure and stricter EPLs in France and Germany. Therefore, these 
data indicate higher external numerical flexibility in Britain relative to France and Germany. 
Overall, tables 8.5 and 8.8 suggest significant adjustment of numerical labour input in 
Germany: it is most internally and externally numerically flexible regarding responsiveness 
of working hours and employment changes to output. However, by taking account of the 
results from tables 8.9 and 8.11, Germany looks, along with France, externally numerically 
inflexible. These results also indicate that Britain tends to belong to the opposite camp - 
externally very flexible, but internally not too flexible in practice. The data on France show 
that it is not internally flexible, but externally not flexible either, especially judged by the 
degrees of responsiveness to output and strictness of EPLs.
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8.3. Functional flexibility
As Beatson (1995) put it, the operational definitions of functional flexibility are more 
difficult than the understanding of the concept itself. Basically one needs a database which 
covers a large number of firms' internal job classifications and the contents of employees' 
actual workload. One visible and conventional indicator for functional flexibility is the 
degree of job demarcations set in union legislation. Using this indicator, the French and in 
particular the British workforce are much less functionally flexible than German workers. 
(OECD 1986, Lorenz 1992). However, this is an area increasingly covered by work councils, 
through which plant-specific working conditions are decided. This means that it is almost 
impossible to give an objective yet clear picture of functional flexibility.
The other problem is the lack of international comparison. The OECD, however, is 
the leading research institute in this area. One of its studies (1989) finds that in France and 
Britain, people interviewed identify flexibility as "fixed-term contracts", "the ability to lay off 
workers" or "flexible working hours", while in Germany their concern for flexibility was 
more to do with multi-skills, qualifications and especially training. In other words, the 
French and the British identify flexibility with its external aspect, whereas the Germans 
identify it with its internal aspect. A less descriptive and more objective way is to give a 
snap-shot picture of the degree of functional flexibility through large scale interviews in all 
plants. Such a study would be extremely costly and time-consuming. Yet, even with such 
interviews, it is difficult to compare the status quo of functional flexibility in different 
countries analytically. For, it is difficult to distinguish between implicit and explicit forms of 
functional flexibility. In other words, countries with a tradition of rigid job demarcation 
register slight changes in job specification as flexibility, whereas those with traditionally 
higher functional flexibility may include a variety of functions in a single job specification. 
As long as there is no international standardisation of job functions and specifications, an 
international comparison cannot be done objectively. These complications explain the fact
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that there is no published comprehensive empirical study on the international comparison of 
functional flexibility.16 For this reason, the existing analytical works comparing LMF among 
(mostly) OECD countries only deal with labour cost and numerical flexibility.17
It is mainly the sociological approach in the discipline of industrial relations, 
describing the different cultures and traditions of management-workforce relations, which 
touches the issue of functional flexibility.18 This particular flexibility is deeply rooted in the 
historical, cultural and social traditions of industrial relations. Thus, as mentioned, unlike 
labour cost or numerical flexibility, it cannot be objectively compared in quantitative terms. 
Lane (1995, p.202) among others19 argues that functional flexibility is affected by the system 
of vocational education and training. This is because training and development of the 
workforce for persistent restructuring and improvement of the workplace are important 
preconditions for functional flexibility.
Functional flexibility demands an environment with a higher share of skilled relative 
to unskilled workers. Thus, the examination of the skill-level of the workforce is one of the 
indicators for functional flexibility. I take educational attainment and training as the 
benchmark for skill level, for education and training help to increase the skill and 
qualifications of workers, which makes them more able to accomplish required tasks and to 
adapt to new job requirements.
16. There are national surveys, such as the Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey (WIRS) in Britain, the INSEE survey in France, and the IAB 
establishment panel in Germany, which deal with the issue at least partly. 
However, their survey formats are not compatible to conduct rigorous 
international comparison.
17For example, see a number of publications by the OECD, Klau and
Mittelstadt (1986), Koshiro ed.(1992), Buechtemann ed. (1993) Blank ed.
(1994), and Beatson (1995) .
18 In particular, see Maurice et. al. eds. (1986), Boyer ed. (1988), Lane 
(1989, 1995), Lorenz (1992), Streeck (1992), Bamber and Lansbury eds.
(1993), Schmid ed. (1994), and Van Ruysseveldt, Huiskamp. et. al. eds.
(1995).
19.For example, see Marsden (1986), Maurice et al. (1986), OECD (1989, 
1990), Eyraud et al. (1990), Lorenz (1992), Kuhl et al. (1996).
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Chart 8 .2 .:  Educational attainm ent of employed aged 25 to  59  in 19 95
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Table 8.12.1: Employment status by skill level o f persons aged 25 to 59
In percentages, in 1995
Germany France Britain
Total
Skilled employed 83.9 67.5 58.5
Unskilled unemployed 23.1 46.6 55.6
Males
Skilled employed 86.2 68.7 62.9
Unskilled unemployed 22.9 47.0 54.3
Females
Skilled employed 80.6 65.9 53.1
Unskilled unemployed 23.2 46.4 58.0
Source: calculated from Eurostat Labour Force Survey 1995 (table A l in
appendix)
Germany France Britain
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Table 8.12.2.: Occupational qualification and nature of job in 1994 (%)
Germany France Britain
Occupational qualification
yes 89 75 53
no 10 24 43
no reply 0 1 4
Types of training
in-house 46 32 23
external 43 43 33
Nature of present job
skilled 75 77 57
unskilled 17 19 36
no reply 7 4 7
Source: European Economy (1995)
Chart 8.2 clearly presents Germany as having the highest proportion of employees 
with higher level of education, i.e., upper secondary and third level (education following after 
a complete course of secondary level education, i.e., tertiary education - colleges and 
universities), whereas the British workforce is the least educated with the French being in the 
middle. Table 8.12.1 interprets workers above the level of educational attainment of upper 
secondary level as skilled, and those who did not continue to or finish upper secondary level 
as unskilled. Germany has for both sexes the highest proportion of skilled employed and the 
lowest proportion of unskilled unemployed. Britain shows the opposite picture by having the 
lowest proportion of skilled employed and the highest proportion of unskilled unemployed. 
Table 8.12.2 is based on the results of an ad hoc labour market survey in 1994.20 According 
to table 8.12.1, the German workforce is the most occupationally qualified and skilled, with 
the British workforce the least on both counts, and the French, again, in the middle of the 
two. However, more than their German equivalent, the French workforce perceives itself as 
skilled. This may be because the French job classification system is less standardised than 
the German or British systems.21 As for the provider of training, it is predominantly in-house
20 Data must, however, be interpreted with caution as they rely in part on 
self-evaluation. This is inevitable as the concept of vocational training 
differs from one country to another.
21 Marsden (1990) argued that the French system has institutional support 
for internal labour markets, as opposed to occupational labour markets. In 
the former labour market, horizontal mobility is difficult, because skills 
are not properly standardised as in the latter labour market. However,
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training in Germany, while external providers prevail in France and Britain. These results, 
evident from both tables, suggest that the German workforce are the most suited and the 
British the least suited to functional flexibility.
Besides education and in-house training, skill-levels can also be enhanced by 
publicly-organised training schemes in the form of active labour market policies (ALMPs). 
Although the effectiveness of large-scale public training programmes is widely contested22, 
they are increasingly promoted in continental Europe as a means of coping with high and 
persistent unemployment. In contrast to passive labour market policy which merely provides 
social benefits, ALMPs directly provide measures aimed at reducing unemployment. Among 
measures such as youth employment programmes, direct job creation, and subsidised 
employment, labour market training is the prime programme with the largest proportion of 
ALMPs expenditure.
Table 8.13: Public expenditures on labour market programmes as a percent of GDP
1985 1995
Germany France Britain Germany France Britain
Public employment services and 0.21 0.13 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.20
administration
Labour market training 0.20 0.25 0.09 0.38 0.38 0.10
Youth measures 0.05 0.17 0.25 0.06 0.25 0.12
Subsidised employment 0.17 0.06 0.22 0.41 0.42 0.02
Measures for disabled 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.26 0.09 0.03
Unemployment compensation 1.41 1.20 2.01 2.08 1.43 1.33
Early retirement for labour 0.01 1.21 0.05 0.06 0.36 —
market reasons
Total 2.23 3.07 2.79 3.48 3.09 1.79
Active measures 0.81 0.67 0.72 1.34 1.30 0.46
Passive measures 1.41 2.41 2.06 2.15 1.79 1.33
Source: OECD Employment Outlook 1991,1997.
Table 8.13 shows that Germany and France have a much higher proportion of 
spending on labour market programmes. In addition to the level of spending, there are a 
number of stark contrasts between the continental economies and Britain. First, whereas the
vertical mobility (e.g. moving from a semi-skilled to skilled worker) in 
the former labour market is easier than the latter.
22 For example, see Schmid, G., B. Reissert, and G. Bruche (1992), Auer
(1994), Field, Halligan and Owen (1994), and European Commission (1996a).
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former share an increasing trend in the proportion of active relative to passive measures, the 
latter shows a decreasing trend in ALMPs. Passive measures include unemployment 
compensation and early retirement for labour market reasons, with the rest - public 
employment services and administration, labour market training, youth measures, subsidised 
employment and measures for the disabled being active measures. The low spending in 
Britain on ALMP may change in 1998-99 with the introduction of the welfare-to-work labour 
market programme by the New Labour government. However, given the programme is 
financed by one-off windfall taxes, it is yet to be seen whether such an increase will last or 
not. Second, the proportion of participants in subsidised employment, subsidies to employers 
who hire the long-term unemployed and those from other special groups, was higher in 
France and Germany, than in Britain in 1995. Third, no significant amount of spending for 
early retirement policies was recorded in Britain in 1995. It was still a minor component of 
ALMPs in 1985, but steadily declined towards the end of the 1980s and ceased to be recorded 
by 1990.
Table 8.14.: Participant inflows in ALMPs in 1995 as a percent of the labour force
Germany France Britain
Public employment services and 
administration
- - --
Labour market training 2.0 3.5 1.0
Youth measures 0.7 2.8 1.0
Subsidised employment 1.4 4.4 0.1
Measures for disabled 0.3 0.4 0.2
Total 4.4 11.1 2.3
Source: OECD Emolovment Outlook 1997
Table 8.14 shows a high proportion of participants in labour market training 
compared to other measures of ALMPs for all three countries. France shows by far the 
highest inflows of participants in ALMPs. This result corresponds to the higher proportion of 
ALMPs in France relative to Germany (not to mention Britain), recorded in table 8.13.
The size of and expenditure on ALMPs differs, depending on historical and 
institutional factors. The systems of training are also diverse, reflecting long-standing
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traditions of idiosyncratic industrial relations. Lynch (1994) classified the respective training 
regimes as follows: Germany's system is based on apprenticeship training, France's on 
employer training taxes, and Britain's on government-led or school-based training schemes. 
Germany and France share the characteristic that their training systems are both work-place 
based, financed by social partners; in Britain, in turn, they are very much government-led 
programmes financed by tax payers. In Germany, the national strategy of training is designed 
by the tripartite co-determination among employers, unions and government. The actual 
training is largely run by companies. Local chambers of commerce (employers 
organisations) use moral persuasion to prevent excessive poaching of trainees. The local 
governments are responsible for vocational schools which closely cooperate with employers 
and unions. They also coordinate curricula among vocational schools, since trainees receive 
nationally recognised certificates of skills upon completion of training. Germany has a 
highly structured initial training system through apprenticeship, but further training of 
employees is company-based and less structured than this initial training system. In France, a 
company with more than 10 employees has been obliged to pay employer's training tax since 
1971. If a firm cannot document training expenses above a certain threshold, (greater than 
1.5% of its gross payroll in 1996) it must pay the difference in the form of the tax.23 In 
France, social partners control the funds financed by taxes. The funds set up under the terms 
of collective agreements are jointly organised except for the metal, chemical and banking 
sectors, and reflect the government's overall employment policies. By submitting their on- 
the-job training plan, firms can apply for funds. Unlike Germany, France has a less 
developed structure of initial training, but the French state has developed a supporting 
structure for further training. Since the 1980s, the British government has replaced the 
declining apprenticeship-based initial training system with a government-led youth training 
scheme. It uses training as part of employment policies, by targetting special groups of 
people such as the young, long-term unemployed, or single parents. Unlike in Germany and
23 Figures are based on Heidemann (1996).
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France, training programmes are organised and financed by the state. The responsibility of 
training lies with the employer-led Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) in England and 
Wales and Local Enterprise Companies (LECs) in Scotland. They are independent but 
accountable to the government. The funding for training is now based on the success rate of 
their trainees in achieving National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) awards. As tables 8.12.1 
and 8.12.2 highlight, the general skill level of the British workforce is behind their 
Continental equivalent. The institutional framework of training in Britain needs to be over­
hauled if it is to be effective.
With the above classification of the LMF, macroeconomic indicators were used to 
study the degree of flexibility. They cannot, however, capture the flexibility at enterprise 
level. This is a serious flaw for assessing functional flexibility in particular, and the reliance 
on indirect data is only the second best solution. Building up a comparable cross-country 
microeconomic database is the urgent task of international organisations such as the OECD, 
EU and ILO.24
8.4. Evaluation
This section sums up what has already been examined in this chapter, in order to 
come to a conclusion on the implication these findings have for the problematique of regime 
compatibility. The tables 8.15.1 and 8.15.2 below summarise the ranking of different LMFs.
24 The OECD has an ongoing project on "Technological and Organisational 
Changes and Labour Demand, Flexible Enterprise: Human Resource 
Implications." which is expected to be the first contribution of the large- 
scale comparative cross-country analysis of LMF using direct data from 
enterprise surveys.
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Table 8.15.1.: Ranking of LMFs: breakdown
Type of flexibility Tables/Charts France Germany Britain
Wage/Cost Aggregate flexibility Table 8.1. 2 1 3
(external) Table 8.2. 1 2 3
Chart 8.1. 3 2 1
Relative flexibility Table 8.3. 2 3 1
(external) Table 8.4. 2 3 1
Total 10 11 9
Numerical Internal flexibility Table 8.5. 3 1 2
Table 8.6. — — -
Table 8.7.1. 2 1 3
Total 5 2 5
External flexibility Table 8.7.2. 3 2 1
Table 8.8. 3 1 2
Table 8.9 2 3 1
Table 8.10. — — —
Table 8.11 3 2 1
Total 11 8 5
Functional Internal flexibility Chart 8.2. _ _ _ —
Table 8.12.1. 2 1 3
Table 8.12.2. 2 1 3
Table 8.13. 2 1 3
Table 8.14. 1 2 3
Total 7 5 12
N.B.: — means either irrelevant or redundant.
Table 8.15.2.: Ranking of LMFs: aggregation
Type of flexibility France Germany Britain
External flexibility wage/cost 10 11 9
external numerical 11 8 5
Total 21 19 14
Internal flexibility internal numerical 5 2 5
functional 7 5 12
Total 12 7 17
Source: Table 8.15.1.
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Table 8.15.2 is the simple sum of the rankings of the degree of LMFs in different 
kinds of flexibilities, shown in table 8.15.1. Table 8.15.1 is ordinal scaling, which has ranked 
flexibility of the three countries as the 1st, 2nd and 3rd in each table studied. The larger the 
number is, the more rigid is its labour market regarding a particular flexibility indicated. Due 
to the number of variables concerned, the largest total score for external flexibility is 27 and 
the smallest is 9. The largest total score for internal flexibility is 18 and the smallest is 6. 
Figure 8.1 graphically presented the degree of flexibility according to table 8.15.2. The 
numbers in table 8.15.2 were adjusted to percentages on a scale between the largest and 
smallest scores possible. For example, in case of external flexibility, number 27, the largest 
score possible was taken as 100% and number 9, the lowest score possible was taken as 0%. 
In case of internal flexibility, the number 18 is 100% and the number 6 is 0%. In figure 8.1. 
both horizontal lines present the degree of flexibility between 33% (21s zero point) and 100%. 
For external flexibility, scores are 78%, 70% and 52% for France, Germany and Britain, 
respectively. Regarding internal flexibility, they are 66%, 39%, 94% in France, Germany and
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Britain respectively. The dotted vertical line shows the half point which marks the dividing 
line between flexibility and rigidity. France is least flexible regarding external flexibility, 
and Britain is the most flexible country. The German high score is similar to that of France, 
which indicates the presence of external rigidity. Germany is, on the other hand, most 
flexible concerning internal flexibility, with Britain being the least flexible country. The 
breakdown in table 8.15.1 indicates that the degree of internal LMFs in France is neither 
flexible or rigid, being at the half point. However, being both externally inflexible, the 
French performance is closer to the German result rather than the British. Therefore, figure 
8.1. exhibits that German and French labour market regimes are inclined to be externally 
inflexible. Taking into account the institutional efforts for internal adjustments in France, 
examined in Chapter 7, one can interpret the French labour markets as being similar to the 
German rather than the British regarding internal flexibility. The British labour market, on 
the other hand, tends to be externally flexible and internally inflexible. This confirms the 
results of the investigation of labour market institutions in Chapter 7. Therefore, Britain and 
its biggest Continental counterparts - France and Germany - may have fundamentally 
different labour market regimes with possibly contradictory strategies of labour market 
flexibility.
8.5. Implication for EMU
What are the implications of the findings in this chapter for monetary union? It is 
worthwhile to recall here Boyer's argument, introduced in Chapter 7, that different labour 
market regimes, one distinguished by external LMF and the other by internal LMF, would 
not co-exist well. According to this hypothesis, close economic coordination among the three 
countries would be difficult, as they have fundamentally different labour market regimes and 
social preferences.
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EMU, under the Maastricht framework, imposes a single interest rate for all EMU 
member states. Regarding economic adjustment, it leaves room for manoeuvre for national 
fiscal and economic policies. However, as the case study of American monetary union 
showed, a single currency was difficult to manage with inconsistent economic management 
and ideologies. Though it may not require a "European economic government"25, it would de 
facto require dense economic coordination among member states, if it to be run smoothly. 
Consequently, the hypothesised monetary union among France, Germany and Britain would 
have a difficult future. Persistent disagreements on economic policies and management could 
be expected given that they have incompatible labour market regimes. It is, indeed, in the 
labour market where most economic adjustments have to be taken under monetary union. 
Therefore, a certain degree of compatibility of labour market regimes would be crucial for the 
success and sustainability of monetary union. However, in case of monetary union among 
the three countries studied, this condition has yet to be fulfilled.
This and previous chapters have demonstrated the structural differences of the labour 
market regimes among the three countries. The objective was to show the presence of 
structural incompatibility of the labour market regimes which may hamper the long-term 
sustainability of EMU. However, this is not to argue that hypothesised monetary union 
among the three is bound to fail. With the presence of strong political commitment and 
leadership, it is possible to initiate changes in structure, as the EMS experience reviewed in 
chapter 1 illustrated. However, it is not the task of this thesis to examine this. Rather, the 
purpose of this chapter is to clearly point out where the problem lies in the management of
25. Oskar Lafontaine, the Finance Minister of Germany from September 1998 
and March 1999, argues for the formation of a European economic government 
for a greater degree of cooperation on taxes and spending. He also urges 
drawing the employers and the trade unions into the process of macro- 
economic policy coordination. For details, see Financial Times 26/10/98,
p. 22.
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such a monetary union: the problem is rooted in the regime differences and incompatibility of 
labour markets, which is considerable in the case of the three countries examined. The 
chapter was aimed at showing how big the structural problems that policy makers have to 
face in management of post-EMU are and to point out the huge task ahead for European 
policy makers.
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Appendix
Sources of Data
Annual data of France, Germany and the UK:
N.B.: Due to data consistency over the time series since 1961, Germany covers West 
Germany only, even after the unification of Germany in October, 1990.
Employment: Occupied population: total economy in 1000, 1961-1996 from Eurostat. (Taken 
from European Commission Data base)
Output: Gross Domestic Product at 1990 market prices in billions of ECU, 1961-1996 from 
Eurostat. (Taken from European Commission Data base)
Productivity: Gross Domestic Product at 1990 market prices per person employed in 1000 
ECU, 1961-1996 from Eurostat. (Taken from European Commission Data base)
Wages: Nominal Compensation per employee: total economy in 1000 ECU, 1961-1996 from 
Eurostat (Taken from European Commission Data base); Real Compensation per employee, 
deflator GDP: total economy (1991=100), 1961-1996 from Eurostat. (Taken from European 
Commission Data base)
N.B.: Compensation is a concept of wages defined as cost to the employer. In a breakdown, 
it includes earning (basic wages for normal time worked, premiums, bonuses, allowances, 
remuneration for time not worked, bonuses and gratuities, housing and rent allowances), plus 
severance and termination pay and employers’ contribution to social security, pensions and 
related schemes. (Rassou 1994)
Non-wage cost: Social security contributions in billions of ECU, 1961-1996 from Eurostat. 
(Taken from European Commission Data base)
Working hours: ILO Yearbook of Labour Statistics. Table 4.A. Hour of work by economic 
activity per week by wage earner (manual or production workers), all sectors excluding 
major division 1 of the International Standard Industrial Classification (i.e. agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing), 1961-1995.
N.B.: Statistics for Germany and the UK since 1986 cover hours paid for, whereas those for 
France and the UK during 1961-1985 cover hours actually worked, including overtime, but 
excluding hours paid for but not worked, such as paid annual leave, paid public holidays, paid 
sick leave.
The interpretation of statistical results:
2 76
The purpose of this section is to explain the practical interpretation of the statistical results. 
Consequently, any formula or mathematical calculation of a particular statistic is omitted, and 
only the essentials needed to interpret the statistical result are pointed out.
1. T ratio: the t value is used for determining whether a particular variable considered is 
statistically significant. The reference values for t statistics are available in a T-table, and a t 
value depends on the number of observations. For example, in case of 30 observations, the 
following critical t values correspond to certain statistical significance:
|t| > 1.697 = significant at the 10 per cent level.
|t| > 2.045 = significant at the 5 per cent level.
|t| > 2.457 = significant at the 1 per cent level.
The larger a t value is, the more statistically sound the coefficient of a particular estimation. 
(N.B.: The 1% level significance is superior to 5 or 10 % level significance, as a 1 % level 
significance is equivalent to a 99% probability of the statistics being sound, whereas 5% and 
10% correspond to a 95% and 90% probability, respectively.)
2. F test: When we are dealing with the significance of a number of independent variables as 
a set, we use the F value instead of the t value in order to test the joint significance. If the F 
value exceeds a chosen critical value, the independent variables as a set can be interpreted to 
influence the dependent variable. The critical F value varies depending on the number of 
independent variables and observations, and can be found in an F-table. For example, a 
critical value of F-statistic, (2,31) F is:
F > 3.44 = significant at the 25 per cent level.
F > 9.46 = significant at the 10 per cent level.
F > 19.5 = significant at the 5 per cent level.
F > 99.5 = significant at the 1 per cent level.
3. R squared and standard error of regression: both indicate the statistical soundness of the 
regression. The R squared shows to what degree the move of independent variables explain 
the move of the dependent variable, i.e., the proportion of the variation in the dependent 
variables explained by variation in the independent variables. The standard error of 
regression indicates the degree of statistical soundness of the regressions as a whole. The 
closer R squared is to 1, and the smaller the standard error, the better the statistical results. In 
a time series analysis with a small number of independent variables, however, the low value 
of R squared is not an obstacle to interpreting the statistical result as sound.
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Table A1 . Employment status by educational attainment level of persons aged 25 to 59 years (in percentages)
Male and Female 
Germany France Britain 
1993 1995 1993 1995 1993 1995
Employed Third level education 23.9 25.8 19.1 22.1 24.1 25.7
Upper Secondary level 54.9 58.1 44.5 45.4 30.5 32.8
<upper secondary 13.3 12.5 36.3 32.6 43.2 41.3
No answer 7.9 3.7 0 0 2.2 0.2
Unemployed Third level education 13.5 14.9 11.2 13.5 11.3 12.7
Upper Secondary level 55.6 56.8 38.1 39.9 29.5 31.5
<upper secondary 22.9 23.1 50.6 46.6 56.5 55.6
No answer 8 5.2 NA NA 2.7 0.3
Inactive Third level education 9 9.9 8.1 10.6 9.8 10.6
Upper Secondary level 53.1 55.5 30 31.8 21.2 23.6
<upper secondary 29.5 28.8 61.9 57.5 67.4 65.7
No answer 8.3 5.8 0 0.1 1.6 0.1
Total Third level education 20.2 21.8 16.5 19.3 20.6 22.1
Upper Secondary level 54.5 57.5 41.4 42.5 28.7 31
<upper secondary 17.3 16.5 42.1 38.1 48.6 46.7
No answer 8 4.2 0
Males
0 2.1 0.2
Employed Third level education 27.4 29.4 17.8 20.3 25 26.5
Upper Secondary level 54.2 56.8 47 48.4 35 36.4
<upper secondary 10.6 10.2 35.1 31.4 37.9 36.9
No answer 7.8 3.6 NA NA 2 0.2
Unemployed Third level education 15.4 17.6 11.9 14.1 10.9 12.3
Upper Secondary level 51.3 53.7 37.9 39 31.7 33.1
<upper secondary 23.1 22.9 50.1 47 55 54.3
No answer 10.2 5.8 NA NA 2.4 0.4
Inactive Third level education 13.7 14 8.1 10 11.7 11.8
Upper Secondary level 60.2 62.2 32.2 34.2 27.1 29.3
<upper secondary 17.6 17.7 59.5 55.6 59.4 58.8
No answer 8.6 6.1 NA NA 1.9 NA
Total Third level education 25.4 27.1 16.5 18.9 22.5 24
Upper Secondary level 54.6 57.1 45.1 46.4 34 35.5
<upper secondary 12 11.7 38.3 34.7 41.4 40.3
No answer 8 4 0
Females
0 2.1 0.2
Employed Third level education 18.9 20.7 20.9 24.3 23 24.7
Upper Secondary level 55.8 59.9 41.3 41.6 25.1 28.4
<upper secondary 17.2 15.7 37.8 34.1 49.6 46.8
No answer 8.1 3.7 NA NA 2.3 0.1
Unemployed Third level education 11.8 12.5 10.6 12.9 12.2 13.4
Upper Secondary 59.4 59.6 38.3 40.7 25 28.4
level
cupper secondary 22.8 23.2 51.1 46.4 59.4 58
No answer 5.9 4.7 NA NA 3.4 NA
Inactive Third level education 7.6 8.5 8.1 10.8 9.2 10.2
Upper Secondary 50.9 53.3 29.3 31 19.4 21.7
level
cupper secondary 33.2 32.5 62.5 58.1 69.9 68
No answer 8.3 5.7 NA NA 1.5 0.1
Total Third level education 14.8 16.4 16.5 19.7 18.6 20.2
Upper Secondary 54.5 57.9 37.7 38.7 23.5 26.5
level
cupper secondary 22.7 21.3 45.8 41.5 55.8 53.2
No answer 8 
Source: Eurostat Labour Force Survev 1993.1995
4.4 0 0 2.1 0.1
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Conclusion
The purpose of this thesis has been to criticise the current Maastricht framework for EMU 
and provide an alternative framework with a structural perspective. Namely, the Maastricht 
convergence criteria have been criticised for focussing too narrowly on some demand side 
variables, and for ignoring real and structural factors which will be crucial for the regime shift 
and the new regime building necessary under monetary union. My contribution here has been 
to provide a broader structural framework, the French regulation theory, in order to assess the 
sustainability of EMU. I focussed on labour market regimes, as they are pivotal for the proper 
functioning and socio-economic sustainability of EMU. Labour market regimes are crucial, since 
labour markets are bound to become the dominant adjustment mechanism in the Euro zone. In 
addition, as the EMS experience has suggested, idiosyncratic labour market structures, unlike 
monetary structures, can work as a real constraint on the policy makers’ intentions to the 
undertake domestic structural reforms required by international monetary cooperation.
Conventional wisdom often argues that Britain is not an ideal country to join EMU since 
its business cycle is different. Arguing from a structural point of view, I conclude that in the 
presence of structural incompatibility in labour markets, EMU membership could pose problems 
for Britain in the long run: its social preferences and modes of labour market adjustment are not 
compatible with the core continental economies. This is not to say that EMU, if it comprised all 
three countries investigated here would be destined to fail. Rather, one purpose of my thesis is 
to provide policy makers with concrete information about the task lying ahead of them. In this 
respect my thesis points out that labour market structures matter as an area policy makers have 
to concern themselves with, given the risk that current labour market incompatibilities pose for 
the long-run sustainability of EMU.
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By questioning the current quantifiable Maastricht targets, this thesis has sought to map 
out a more comprehensive way to prepare the ground for a viable monetary union. Some may 
criticise my thesis as too speculative, because EMU is in its nascence and it is therefore too early 
for a critique focussing on the long-term sustainability of this specific project. Aside from a 
critique of the Maastricht criteria, however, this thesis presents an alternative framework to 
assess the viability of monetary union in general, which has enduring relevance as a scholarly 
contribution to the problematique of monetary union.
A theory developed by international political economy, the theory of hegemonic stability 
(HST) argues that for an economic system to work smoothly, there has to be a leader and a clear 
hierarchy in power distribution among the participants. As there is no clear single leadership 
pushing for the EMU project, and the distribution of power among the three biggest member 
states of the EU is oligopolistic, the HST situation does not hold for the case of EMU. Despite 
the relative preponderance of the German economy, Germany is not in a position to force other 
member states into structural adjustment towards the German model.
Searching for an alternative framework, the obvious candidate was the theory of OCA. 
The theory of OCA surveyed in Chapter 2 suggests that monetary union composed of a relatively 
homogenous group of member states is ideal. In order to complement and expand the insights 
provided by this economic theory with a political economic perspective, the broader concept of 
regime compatibility was introduced, using the French regulationists’ approach. The term 
‘regime’ in the regulationists’ connotation refers to the mode of socio-economic interaction 
between capital and labour. By examining the differences in ‘mode of regulation’, i.e. the way 
in which markets, institutions and social actors interact, it was possible to contrast the structural 
differences among regimes. It was argued that regimes which are built upon fundamentally 
different social preferences are not structurally compatible. Monetary union comprising
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different regimes lacks coherence and therefore might be difficult to sustain.
With this hypothesis in mind, Chapters 4 and 5 have examined historical cases of 
monetary unions, with the conclusion that heterogeneity contributed to the collapse of historical 
monetary unions. In addition to the institutional problem of bimetallism and the lack of control 
over money supply, the LMU was less sustainable than the SMU due to the heterogeneity of its 
membership. As soon as France lost its hegemonic influence, the diversity of economic 
structures translated into the irresponsible management of money, conflicts over policies, and 
the eventual breakdown of the LMU.
In addition to the differences in political economic orientation and economic structure, 
there was a stark difference in economic, and in particular, labour systems between the North and 
the South of the United States before the Civil War. Despite the fact that there was already a 
political union in America, the frontier of the nation was persistently changing. Furthermore, 
‘nationalism* as a centripetal force to keep the nation together was underdeveloped. Hence the 
intensification of sectional conflicts and differing needs for financial arrangements, rooted in 
economic structural differences, contributed to the repeated breakdown of the federal system of 
banking and led ultimately to the conflict of the Civil War. These historical experiences have 
shown us that monetary unions consisting of members with divergent social and economic 
interests and structures did not last, and hence were not viable.
As the American case has demonstrated, differences in labour market regimes are the key 
to understanding the structural differences in the current EMU project. The labour market will 
be the very area where conflict is most likely to arise, as it will have to bear the major adjustment 
burden after the loss of the exchange rate instrument. Chapters 6 and 7 showed that France, 
Germany and Britain have very different labour market conditions, policies and institutions. If 
countries with different wage formation characteristics have to face common demand or supply
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shocks, they will show differing wage and price developments. Monetary union, however, 
requires convergence of prices and allows only one interest rate for the heterogeneous Euro 
zone. As a consequence of heterogenous structures, divergence in unemployment levels will 
be unavoidable, which may be exacerbated by the relative immobility of labour in Europe. 
(Heylen, Van Poeck and Van Gompel P. 98) In this sense, the other side of the coin of the 
nominal convergence achieved by the Maastricht criteria may well be real divergence. With the 
restrictions imposed by the stability pact, and without effective federal fiscal transfers, such real 
divergences could persist and become politically unsustainable. The single currency may 
become a symbol of economic destitution for countries in economic difficulties. Discontent in 
some countries may force them to secede from EMU, as the South did from the Union in the 
American case1. On the other hand, should the European Central Bank decide to bail out these 
countries, the moral hazard problem would arise. In either case, the future management of 
monetary union, consisting of member states with divergent socio-economic interests, faces 
difficulties that might lead to the breakdown of EMU, even with a strong commitment by policy 
makers to the project.
A successful monetary union, therefore requires a certain degree of agreement on real / 
structural factors.2 However, as Freeman (1988) put it, there is no guarantee that labour market 
institutions that are successful in one country can be transferred to another and operate there to 
produce the same outcome. Rather, taking the regulationist approach, such a transfer of one 
institutional setting developed in one society to another almost always brings about totally
^■Feldstein (1997) also drew this parallel.
2 Although I raise the general point of the importance of studying 
structural aspects, this thesis has focussed solely on labour market regime 
compatibility. Given the central role of national labour markets for
adjustment in a monetary union, structural differences in labour market 
regimes may be the cause for severe friction among the EMU participants. 
However, a similar study regarding the financial and credit market regime or 
industrial organisations may also provide some interesting implications for 
EMU.
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different outcomes and often ends in miserable failure. Therefore, rather than structural 
convergence, I have examined structural compatibility by studying the nature of labour market 
flexibility in France, Germany and Britain in Chapter 8.
Neo-liberal practitioners have propagated labour market flexibility as the panacea for 
almost all economic problems that industrialised countries currently face - from economic 
stagnation and high unemployment to EMU. However, the concept of labour market flexibility 
is too easily used by politicians, without any clear indication of the kind of flexibility to be 
pursued. An examination of different kinds of flexibility has led to the conclusion that, generally 
speaking, the German labour market behaves flexibly internally, with the British being externally 
flexible, and the French being externally inflexible and internally neither flexible nor inflexible. 
Taking account of the institutional factors investigated in Chapter 7, France has been 
nevertheless classified as being in the same camp as Germany, i.e., the internal flexibility camp. 
Following Robert Boyer's argument, I have argued that there is a fundamental incompatibility 
in national ideologies, concepts and practices in labour market policies in Europe: the concept 
and practice of internal labour market flexibility are hard to reconcile with those of external 
labour market flexibility. In other words, the British and continental labour market regimes are 
not structurally compatible. Without substantial progress towards a common labour market 
regime for Europe, such differences in labour market policies could lead to fundamental conflict 
between the dominant externally flexible Anglo-Saxon model and the dominant internally 
flexible continental model. Such a conflict would, no doubt, arise over the management of Euro- 
wide economic policies, which may disrupt the successful management of the Euro.
This, of course, is contingent on political developments themselves. If the European 
leaders are very strongly committed to the further development of European integration, the 
structural differences may be diminished, and the relevant conditions for sustainable monetary
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union would eventually be achieved. Yet, in the same way as structural compatibility alone does 
not necessarily lead to monetary union, commitments by policy makers alone cannot guarantee 
its success. The objective of this thesis, therefore, is to articulate the structural constraints which 
political agents face in the challenge to create a sustainable EMU.
The effective centralisation of money only came about in America after the ultimate 
confrontation of two different economic systems - emerging capitalism in the North and 
defensive proto-capitalism in the South. Only after the establishment of a decisive hegemony 
by the former regime, could America achieve social and economic cohesion as a nation and a 
relatively stable and long-lasting monetary union that established the dollar as a full national 
currency.
European Monetary Union will create a single currency with countries of diverse labour 
market regimes. The conflict in Europe may be characterised as a contest of two different types 
of capitalism - i.e., Anglo-Saxon free market vs. continental compromise capitalism. As in the 
case of America, it may be difficult to create a viable monetary union without having socio­
economic cohesion and a common orientation of economic and social policy. In the case of 
Europe, the need to achieve structural compatibility could be even more acute as the EU attempts 
monetary union without fully-fledged political union. Indeed, EMU may in future be regarded 
as a catalyst for a regime shift: EMU may either open up Pandora’s box, or promote structural 
compatibility or convergence of socio-economic regimes and even a full political union in the 
future - but these prospects are for future scholars to explore.
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